Narrative:

I was assigned the final position at approach control. I received the proper briefing; especially concerning the thunderstorms in the area and traffic situation. After a couple of minutes; I advised the operational supervisor that 'right downwind traffic' was no longer working. The weather was impacting my base requiring me to turn onto the final inside the FAF. A few minutes later the supervisor interrupted me to inquire what vectors an aircraft was on; I turned to him and answered his questions and then turned back to the scope and my traffic. A few minutes later the supervisor instructed me to break an aircraft off the final. There was 3.3 miles separation with a 10 knot overtake; the first aircraft on a two mile final and the aircraft on a 5 mile final. I instructed the aircraft to cancel approach clearance; but with other traffic on a right downwind; I was unable to turn him/her off the final until he/she was level at 3000' (1000 feet above the downwind traffic). Another aircraft was 5 southwest of ZZZ1 right on the edge of severe weather and I turned him base and to expect a turn to final right at the marker. I turned the aircraft downwind and vectored another company coming in from the northwest more southwesterly to build a hole for the first aircraft that previously was broke out. Supervisor then interrupted me again inquiring what I was doing. I had to explain my plan to build a hole to put the previous aircraft in. At this time I told the supervisor he was distracting me and my operation; if he was going to continue interrupting my operation he would need to get another controller; another distraction to my operation. The supervisor again interrupted me asking what I was doing about an overtake; I was required again to turn my back on the operation to answer the supervisor and inform him I had already given breakout instructions to aircraft X. I asked the supervisor if he was monitoring my frequencies; he replied 'no'. I told him I was still getting traffic on the right downwind with no-where to put them and he was causing a distraction to the operation. Shortly thereafter I was told I had had an operational error. The supervisor stood behind me watching the operation; interrupting me 3-4 times; but never offered assistance. Just prior to losing separation; traffic management unit put a hold on all other ZZZ1 arrivals. About 15 minutes late in my professional opinion. The left downwind at ZZZ1 was already shut down; the right downwind had weather west of a point parallel to the FAF; and the final was becoming impacted from the IAF down to the FAF.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Approach controller described loss of separation event; claiming supervisor caused distraction was the primary factor in the operational error.

Narrative: I was assigned the Final Position at Approach Control. I received the proper briefing; especially concerning the thunderstorms in the area and traffic situation. After a couple of minutes; I advised the operational supervisor that 'Right Downwind Traffic' was no longer working. The weather was impacting my base requiring me to turn onto the final inside the FAF. A few minutes later the supervisor interrupted me to inquire what vectors an aircraft was on; I turned to him and answered his questions and then turned back to the scope and my traffic. A few minutes later the supervisor instructed me to break an aircraft off the final. There was 3.3 miles separation with a 10 knot overtake; the first aircraft on a two mile final and the aircraft on a 5 mile final. I instructed the aircraft to cancel approach clearance; but with other traffic on a right downwind; I was unable to turn him/her off the final until he/she was level at 3000' (1000 feet above the downwind traffic). Another aircraft was 5 southwest of ZZZ1 right on the edge of severe weather and I turned him base and to expect a turn to final right at the marker. I turned the aircraft downwind and vectored another company coming in from the northwest more southwesterly to build a hole for the first aircraft that previously was broke out. Supervisor then interrupted me again inquiring what I was doing. I had to explain my plan to build a hole to put the previous aircraft in. At this time I told the supervisor he was distracting me and my operation; if he was going to continue interrupting my operation he would need to get another controller; another distraction to my operation. The supervisor again interrupted me asking what I was doing about an overtake; I was required again to turn my back on the operation to answer the supervisor and inform him I had already given breakout instructions to Aircraft X. I asked the supervisor if he was monitoring my frequencies; he replied 'No'. I told him I was still getting traffic on the right downwind with no-where to put them and he was causing a distraction to the operation. Shortly thereafter I was told I had had an operational error. The supervisor stood behind me watching the operation; interrupting me 3-4 times; but never offered assistance. Just prior to losing separation; Traffic Management Unit put a hold on all other ZZZ1 arrivals. About 15 minutes late in my professional opinion. The left downwind at ZZZ1 was already shut down; the right downwind had weather west of a point parallel to the FAF; and the final was becoming impacted from the IAF down to the FAF.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.