Narrative:

After leaving the gate for takeoff, ground notified us of a delay and gave a wheels-up time 15 mins later. The first officer decided to use this time to send a discrepancy message to our maintenance control center via ACARS. I hadn't noticed since I was considering whether to shut an engine down or not, hoping for a 5 min early clearance. We did get an early takeoff clearance and while performing my pre-takeoff check, noticed an ACARS response from maintenance control. My next thought was to check the MEL, but the throttles were up by then and we were crossing the hold line. There was, also, some pressure to expedite since landing traffic was 3 mi out. I had considered stopping, but was beyond the hold line. Also, canceling clearance and pulling off at next intersection, but landing traffic was closing. So, we took off, without consulting the MEL. Once airborne, we did check, and the MEL required dispatcher's approval. It was too late. I spoke with first officer about crew coordination and telling the captain about any problems that he or the flight attendants find, no matter how seemingly small. We, also, discussed dispatch definitions for MEL purposes. He learned something that day.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A BREAKDOWN IN CREW COORD RESULTS IN A DEP OF AN ACR WITHOUT THE REQUIRED DISPATCHER APPROVAL OF AN MEL ITEM.

Narrative: AFTER LEAVING THE GATE FOR TKOF, GND NOTIFIED US OF A DELAY AND GAVE A WHEELS-UP TIME 15 MINS LATER. THE FO DECIDED TO USE THIS TIME TO SEND A DISCREPANCY MESSAGE TO OUR MAINT CTL CTR VIA ACARS. I HADN'T NOTICED SINCE I WAS CONSIDERING WHETHER TO SHUT AN ENG DOWN OR NOT, HOPING FOR A 5 MIN EARLY CLRNC. WE DID GET AN EARLY TKOF CLRNC AND WHILE PERFORMING MY PRE-TKOF CHK, NOTICED AN ACARS RESPONSE FROM MAINT CTL. MY NEXT THOUGHT WAS TO CHK THE MEL, BUT THE THROTTLES WERE UP BY THEN AND WE WERE XING THE HOLD LINE. THERE WAS, ALSO, SOME PRESSURE TO EXPEDITE SINCE LNDG TFC WAS 3 MI OUT. I HAD CONSIDERED STOPPING, BUT WAS BEYOND THE HOLD LINE. ALSO, CANCELING CLRNC AND PULLING OFF AT NEXT INTXN, BUT LNDG TFC WAS CLOSING. SO, WE TOOK OFF, WITHOUT CONSULTING THE MEL. ONCE AIRBORNE, WE DID CHK, AND THE MEL REQUIRED DISPATCHER'S APPROVAL. IT WAS TOO LATE. I SPOKE WITH FO ABOUT CREW COORD AND TELLING THE CAPT ABOUT ANY PROBS THAT HE OR THE FLT ATTENDANTS FIND, NO MATTER HOW SEEMINGLY SMALL. WE, ALSO, DISCUSSED DISPATCH DEFINITIONS FOR MEL PURPOSES. HE LEARNED SOMETHING THAT DAY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.