Narrative:

Shortly after calling, 'landing gear down, landing check,' it was apparent that the nose gear was still up (red light and nlg pin fully retracted). While captain fixated on condition, I suggested recycling the gear. He did, with same results. Since we were past the FAF fix by now, the captain told the tower we would do a fly-by for visual verification. Fly-by confirmed what we already knew. Missed approach was flown and radar vectors were provided to allow us to focus on problem. I called for the missed approach/go around short segment checklist, but all the captain could do is fixate on the problem. After the 3RD call for the checklist, I performed it myself. All the while I was flying the airplane and talking to ATC. As I was now ready to call for the abnormal, the captain realized he had failed to turn the engine driven hydraulic pumps from low to high and had also failed to turn on either auxiliary or transfer pumps. Further looking revealed we had failed to do the entire in-range checklist. After all this he still did not execute the in-range checklist. Also, I called for the approach list, which he did not do. I performed, or rather insured that all items for both checklist were completed. He did perform the landing checklist when called for and a normal landing was made. Problem started when in-range checklist was called for but not done. Captain was possibly distraction or very lax on checklist usage. I failed to monitor captain adequately, due to crossing altitude restrs of STAR (focusing on flying the airplane). New to aircraft I also did not know that high pressure was necessary to get this nose gear down. Although the captain commented that he had made this mistake before, he didn't realize the problem this time until after going around. Lesson learned: accept nothing less than full compliance with sops and checklist usage. Also, maintain full situational awareness and monitor other crew member's actions.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLC OF AN MLG COULD NOT EXTEND THE NOSE LNDG UNTIL THEY PLACED THE HYD PUMP ON HIGH AS CALLED FOR ON THE CHKLIST.

Narrative: SHORTLY AFTER CALLING, 'LNDG GEAR DOWN, LNDG CHK,' IT WAS APPARENT THAT THE NOSE GEAR WAS STILL UP (RED LIGHT AND NLG PIN FULLY RETRACTED). WHILE CAPT FIXATED ON CONDITION, I SUGGESTED RECYCLING THE GEAR. HE DID, WITH SAME RESULTS. SINCE WE WERE PAST THE FAF FIX BY NOW, THE CAPT TOLD THE TWR WE WOULD DO A FLY-BY FOR VISUAL VERIFICATION. FLY-BY CONFIRMED WHAT WE ALREADY KNEW. MISSED APCH WAS FLOWN AND RADAR VECTORS WERE PROVIDED TO ALLOW US TO FOCUS ON PROB. I CALLED FOR THE MISSED APCH/GAR SHORT SEGMENT CHKLIST, BUT ALL THE CAPT COULD DO IS FIXATE ON THE PROB. AFTER THE 3RD CALL FOR THE CHKLIST, I PERFORMED IT MYSELF. ALL THE WHILE I WAS FLYING THE AIRPLANE AND TALKING TO ATC. AS I WAS NOW READY TO CALL FOR THE ABNORMAL, THE CAPT REALIZED HE HAD FAILED TO TURN THE ENG DRIVEN HYD PUMPS FROM LOW TO HIGH AND HAD ALSO FAILED TO TURN ON EITHER AUX OR TRANSFER PUMPS. FURTHER LOOKING REVEALED WE HAD FAILED TO DO THE ENTIRE IN-RANGE CHKLIST. AFTER ALL THIS HE STILL DID NOT EXECUTE THE IN-RANGE CHKLIST. ALSO, I CALLED FOR THE APCH LIST, WHICH HE DID NOT DO. I PERFORMED, OR RATHER INSURED THAT ALL ITEMS FOR BOTH CHKLIST WERE COMPLETED. HE DID PERFORM THE LNDG CHKLIST WHEN CALLED FOR AND A NORMAL LNDG WAS MADE. PROB STARTED WHEN IN-RANGE CHKLIST WAS CALLED FOR BUT NOT DONE. CAPT WAS POSSIBLY DISTR OR VERY LAX ON CHKLIST USAGE. I FAILED TO MONITOR CAPT ADEQUATELY, DUE TO XING ALT RESTRS OF STAR (FOCUSING ON FLYING THE AIRPLANE). NEW TO ACFT I ALSO DID NOT KNOW THAT HIGH PRESSURE WAS NECESSARY TO GET THIS NOSE GEAR DOWN. ALTHOUGH THE CAPT COMMENTED THAT HE HAD MADE THIS MISTAKE BEFORE, HE DIDN'T REALIZE THE PROB THIS TIME UNTIL AFTER GOING AROUND. LESSON LEARNED: ACCEPT NOTHING LESS THAN FULL COMPLIANCE WITH SOPS AND CHKLIST USAGE. ALSO, MAINTAIN FULL SITUATIONAL AWARENESS AND MONITOR OTHER CREW MEMBER'S ACTIONS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.