Narrative:

During the landing rollout runway 34R at sea-tac airport the tower advised that there was an aircraft 1 mi on final behind us for the same runway and to expedite the turnoff at 'north' taxiway and contact ground turning the corner. This was the first indication that there was an aircraft so close behind for my runway. We were also informed of the md-11 taxiing north on the 'B' taxiway (south of 'north') would be holding short. As we left the runway at 'north,' it was apparent that the md-11 did not hold short. Tower/ground subsequently advised that they would be taxiing to the r-hand side.now at 90 degrees to the runway, it was apparent that the md-11 was not holding short as initially expected nor sufficiently to the right side of the taxi/ramp area. I stopped the aircraft and directed the first officer to inform the tower that we are unable to clear. (As I could now view the approaching aircraft on final). This call went out over ground control rather than tower, not realizing that the first officer had already switched. It became apparent that aircraft Y arriving should go around and I subsequently directed the first officer to tell the tower to have Y go around. The first officer indicated the arriving Y was in the landing transition. At this time I attempted to move the aircraft ahead as much as space would permit as the md-11 passed exit. In the end of it, the arriving aircraft touched down and completed the landing. A good portion of our aircraft was still over the hold short line. Problems: Y did not properly space itself when informed that his aircraft was 40 KTS faster.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACFT Y LANDED ON OCCUPIED RWY, HAD LTSS FROM ACR X. PLTDEV. SYS ERROR.

Narrative: DURING THE LNDG ROLLOUT RWY 34R AT SEA-TAC ARPT THE TWR ADVISED THAT THERE WAS AN ACFT 1 MI ON FINAL BEHIND US FOR THE SAME RWY AND TO EXPEDITE THE TURNOFF AT 'N' TXWY AND CONTACT GND TURNING THE CORNER. THIS WAS THE FIRST INDICATION THAT THERE WAS AN ACFT SO CLOSE BEHIND FOR MY RWY. WE WERE ALSO INFORMED OF THE MD-11 TAXIING N ON THE 'B' TXWY (S OF 'N') WOULD BE HOLDING SHORT. AS WE LEFT THE RWY AT 'N,' IT WAS APPARENT THAT THE MD-11 DID NOT HOLD SHORT. TWR/GND SUBSEQUENTLY ADVISED THAT THEY WOULD BE TAXIING TO THE R-HAND SIDE.NOW AT 90 DEGS TO THE RWY, IT WAS APPARENT THAT THE MD-11 WAS NOT HOLDING SHORT AS INITIALLY EXPECTED NOR SUFFICIENTLY TO THE R SIDE OF THE TAXI/RAMP AREA. I STOPPED THE ACFT AND DIRECTED THE FO TO INFORM THE TWR THAT WE ARE UNABLE TO CLR. (AS I COULD NOW VIEW THE APCHING ACFT ON FINAL). THIS CALL WENT OUT OVER GND CTL RATHER THAN TWR, NOT REALIZING THAT THE FO HAD ALREADY SWITCHED. IT BECAME APPARENT THAT ACFT Y ARRIVING SHOULD GAR AND I SUBSEQUENTLY DIRECTED THE FO TO TELL THE TWR TO HAVE Y GAR. THE FO INDICATED THE ARRIVING Y WAS IN THE LNDG TRANSITION. AT THIS TIME I ATTEMPTED TO MOVE THE ACFT AHEAD AS MUCH AS SPACE WOULD PERMIT AS THE MD-11 PASSED EXIT. IN THE END OF IT, THE ARRIVING ACFT TOUCHED DOWN AND COMPLETED THE LNDG. A GOOD PORTION OF OUR ACFT WAS STILL OVER THE HOLD SHORT LINE. PROBS: Y DID NOT PROPERLY SPACE ITSELF WHEN INFORMED THAT HIS ACFT WAS 40 KTS FASTER.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.