Narrative:

Copilot flying, kind of a 'nervous nellie', also low time in seat. Climbing out of new york going to dca. Level at 16000, controller cleared us direct to sbj. We did not turn, continued on present heading which was about 20 degrees off of direct sbj. I was not aware we had been cleared direct sbj as I was doing my normal 'above 10000' duties such as passenger PA's and calling in times to company. Controller asked were we going to sbj? Copilot mouthed expletive and turned to sbj. Captain said we were now going direct. Controller said ok, now climb to FL180 and 'there is VFR traffic at 17500 at 10 O'clock converging. We said ok, looking, and started our climb. TCASII started saying 'traffic, traffic'. We saw target on TCASII, painting 17500 at our 10:30-11 O'clock. TCASII then went to resolution mode, commanding descend, descend and showing a required 2000 FPM descent. Captain took over, pushed nose over and we descended to 16000 ft. Never visually saw traffic but at one point the screen showed we were at equal altitudes at about 1 mi separation. TCASII then showed clear of conflict. We advised controller what we had done and resumed climb to 18000. So how did it happen and why? Copilot missed the turn, and captain did not monitor what copilot was doing. Copilot kind of nervous type and low time, trying to be perfect, and his nervousness compounded by the fairly autocratic captain. Captain had been 'instructing' him somewhat, which I think he resented. Not too good level of communication between seats. My role is to monitor what the pilots are doing, also. It's very common at this time of the flight, however, (just above 10000 ft on the climb out), for me to be 'head down' and not monitoring ATC, as I do my other duties. I did not know we had been cleared direct as I had been off the radio when that clearance was given. I try hard to stay in the loop but at certain times it is not possible. This was one of those times, and it resulted in a midair. Supplemental information from acn 262277: I don't know whether the navigation error contributed directly to this near miss, however I believe it is very probable that it did. The failure to set the proper frequency to the solberg VOR emphasizes the need to me to be ever vigilant about xchking. More so in the high density traffic areas like new york, and also where maneuvering abd altitude clrncs occur rapidly. I am doubtful about the fact that VFR traffic should have been permissible in the flight conditions existing at that time and place.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: POTENTIAL CONFLICT WITH XING CLBING TFC.

Narrative: COPLT FLYING, KIND OF A 'NERVOUS NELLIE', ALSO LOW TIME IN SEAT. CLBING OUT OF NEW YORK GOING TO DCA. LEVEL AT 16000, CTLR CLRED US DIRECT TO SBJ. WE DID NOT TURN, CONTINUED ON PRESENT HDG WHICH WAS ABOUT 20 DEGS OFF OF DIRECT SBJ. I WAS NOT AWARE WE HAD BEEN CLRED DIRECT SBJ AS I WAS DOING MY NORMAL 'ABOVE 10000' DUTIES SUCH AS PAX PA'S AND CALLING IN TIMES TO COMPANY. CTLR ASKED WERE WE GOING TO SBJ? COPLT MOUTHED EXPLETIVE AND TURNED TO SBJ. CAPT SAID WE WERE NOW GOING DIRECT. CTLR SAID OK, NOW CLB TO FL180 AND 'THERE IS VFR TFC AT 17500 AT 10 O'CLOCK CONVERGING. WE SAID OK, LOOKING, AND STARTED OUR CLB. TCASII STARTED SAYING 'TFC, TFC'. WE SAW TARGET ON TCASII, PAINTING 17500 AT OUR 10:30-11 O'CLOCK. TCASII THEN WENT TO RESOLUTION MODE, COMMANDING DSND, DSND AND SHOWING A REQUIRED 2000 FPM DSCNT. CAPT TOOK OVER, PUSHED NOSE OVER AND WE DSNDED TO 16000 FT. NEVER VISUALLY SAW TFC BUT AT ONE POINT THE SCREEN SHOWED WE WERE AT EQUAL ALTS AT ABOUT 1 MI SEPARATION. TCASII THEN SHOWED CLR OF CONFLICT. WE ADVISED CTLR WHAT WE HAD DONE AND RESUMED CLB TO 18000. SO HOW DID IT HAPPEN AND WHY? COPLT MISSED THE TURN, AND CAPT DID NOT MONITOR WHAT COPLT WAS DOING. COPLT KIND OF NERVOUS TYPE AND LOW TIME, TRYING TO BE PERFECT, AND HIS NERVOUSNESS COMPOUNDED BY THE FAIRLY AUTOCRATIC CAPT. CAPT HAD BEEN 'INSTRUCTING' HIM SOMEWHAT, WHICH I THINK HE RESENTED. NOT TOO GOOD LEVEL OF COM BTWN SEATS. MY ROLE IS TO MONITOR WHAT THE PLTS ARE DOING, ALSO. IT'S VERY COMMON AT THIS TIME OF THE FLT, HOWEVER, (JUST ABOVE 10000 FT ON THE CLBOUT), FOR ME TO BE 'HEAD DOWN' AND NOT MONITORING ATC, AS I DO MY OTHER DUTIES. I DID NOT KNOW WE HAD BEEN CLRED DIRECT AS I HAD BEEN OFF THE RADIO WHEN THAT CLRNC WAS GIVEN. I TRY HARD TO STAY IN THE LOOP BUT AT CERTAIN TIMES IT IS NOT POSSIBLE. THIS WAS ONE OF THOSE TIMES, AND IT RESULTED IN A MIDAIR. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 262277: I DON'T KNOW WHETHER THE NAV ERROR CONTRIBUTED DIRECTLY TO THIS NEAR MISS, HOWEVER I BELIEVE IT IS VERY PROBABLE THAT IT DID. THE FAILURE TO SET THE PROPER FREQ TO THE SOLBERG VOR EMPHASIZES THE NEED TO ME TO BE EVER VIGILANT ABOUT XCHKING. MORE SO IN THE HIGH DENSITY TFC AREAS LIKE NEW YORK, AND ALSO WHERE MANEUVERING ABD ALT CLRNCS OCCUR RAPIDLY. I AM DOUBTFUL ABOUT THE FACT THAT VFR TFC SHOULD HAVE BEEN PERMISSIBLE IN THE FLT CONDITIONS EXISTING AT THAT TIME AND PLACE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.