|37000 Feet||Browse and search NASA's
Aviation Safety Reporting System
|Local Time Of Day||0601 To 1200|
|Locale Reference||airport : msp|
|Altitude||agl bound lower : 0|
agl bound upper : 0
|Operator||common carrier : air carrier|
|Make Model Name||Large Transport, Low Wing, 3 Turbojet Eng|
|Flight Phase||ground : preflight|
|Affiliation||company : air carrier|
|Function||flight crew : first officer|
|Qualification||pilot : cfi|
pilot : atp
|Experience||flight time last 90 days : 210|
flight time total : 7000
flight time type : 3000
|Affiliation||company : air carrier|
|Function||flight crew : captain|
oversight : pic
|Qualification||pilot : atp|
|Anomaly||non adherence : far|
other anomaly other
|Independent Detector||other flight crewa|
|Resolutory Action||none taken : detected after the fact|
|Primary Problem||Flight Crew Human Performance|
|Air Traffic Incident||Pilot Deviation|
Flight from msp to ord landing in dtw the flight engineer determined that the aircraft operating manuals were not on the aircraft and that we had better notify maintenance control to get a set on prior to next departure. In retrospect the plane had just come out of the maintenance hangar and had numerous items missing from the cockpit. What amazed me was that the flight engineer did not catch the manuals missing in his preflight (he's required to check them) and more importantly he did not check the weight for takeoff as being ok for the runway we were taking off from (he says that 'we were so light it wouldn't have made a difference.'). If he had tried to check our takeoff weight as ok prior to takeoff we would have found out that the manuals were not on the aircraft and taxied back in to get them. I see the primary problem here as non adherence to the checklist and not paying lip service to the preflight check or especially the before takeoff check that checks runway weights. I guess as a crew member I put trust in the others on my crew to do their job as I do. That trust was broken in this instance, but there was a good lesson learned by our flight engineer and all of us, and I doubt if that will happen again. Needless to say, it would have been nice if maintenance had put the manuals back on the plane, but ultimately the responsibility was with us to check.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: ACR LGT OPERATED WITHOUT FEDERAL AVIATION REG REQUIRED ACFT OPERATIONS MANUALS ONBOARD.
Narrative: FLT FROM MSP TO ORD LNDG IN DTW THE FE DETERMINED THAT THE ACFT OPERATING MANUALS WERE NOT ON THE ACFT AND THAT WE HAD BETTER NOTIFY MAINT CTL TO GET A SET ON PRIOR TO NEXT DEP. IN RETROSPECT THE PLANE HAD JUST COME OUT OF THE MAINT HANGAR AND HAD NUMEROUS ITEMS MISSING FROM THE COCKPIT. WHAT AMAZED ME WAS THAT THE FE DID NOT CATCH THE MANUALS MISSING IN HIS PREFLT (HE'S REQUIRED TO CHK THEM) AND MORE IMPORTANTLY HE DID NOT CHK THE WT FOR TKOF AS BEING OK FOR THE RWY WE WERE TAKING OFF FROM (HE SAYS THAT 'WE WERE SO LIGHT IT WOULDN'T HAVE MADE A DIFFERENCE.'). IF HE HAD TRIED TO CHK OUR TKOF WT AS OK PRIOR TO TKOF WE WOULD HAVE FOUND OUT THAT THE MANUALS WERE NOT ON THE ACFT AND TAXIED BACK IN TO GET THEM. I SEE THE PRIMARY PROB HERE AS NON ADHERENCE TO THE CHKLIST AND NOT PAYING LIP SVC TO THE PREFLT CHK OR ESPECIALLY THE BEFORE TKOF CHK THAT CHKS RWY WTS. I GUESS AS A CREW MEMBER I PUT TRUST IN THE OTHERS ON MY CREW TO DO THEIR JOB AS I DO. THAT TRUST WAS BROKEN IN THIS INSTANCE, BUT THERE WAS A GOOD LESSON LEARNED BY OUR FE AND ALL OF US, AND I DOUBT IF THAT WILL HAPPEN AGAIN. NEEDLESS TO SAY, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN NICE IF MAINT HAD PUT THE MANUALS BACK ON THE PLANE, BUT ULTIMATELY THE RESPONSIBILITY WAS WITH US TO CHK.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.