Narrative:

At bwi airport given taxi instructions (pushed back from the gate) to runway 28 'via papa; bravo; cross runway 22'. As I looked up from starting the second engine the captain had already turned onto runway 22 and was taxing to runway 28 via charlie. I asked the captain where he was going and he then completed his left turn and proceeded north east on runway 4/22. The captain then turned right onto bravo and picked up the rest of the taxi instructions. In my departure brief; (I was the pilot flying) I asked the captain if I could start both engines prior to taxiing first flight of the day; heavy for an airbus; and the busy nature of bwi in the morning). The captain stated 'as soon as I start to move forward you can start the second engine'. During the push I started #1 engine and tactfully asked 'just start one'? The captain again stated 'wait until I start moving'. After we were released from guidance; the captain directed me to call for taxi. We received our taxi clearance and began to move. I then began to start the number 2 engine. The company has pushed the single engine issue to the point where captains are not exercising good judgment when and where not to employ single engine operations. As a retired air force fighter pilot I am not going to say that I can't do something/anything. If the captain wants me to start the second engine and not assist during the taxi (during the start) then that's what I'll do. Bottom line we taxied a plane full of people down a runway without clearance. When I noticed it there was nothing I could do about it. I am not confident the captain would have listened anyway. I strongly recommend more guidance be given to captains about the common sense issues associated with these unsafe single engine practices. I have to work too hard with too many captains which could be mitigated if company procedures were more smartly implemented.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A320 First Officer reports his Captain not taxiing via the cleared route while the First Officer is starting the second engine. Runway 4/22 was used as a taxiway instead of crossing it as cleared.

Narrative: At BWI airport given taxi instructions (pushed back from the gate) to Runway 28 'VIA PAPA; BRAVO; CROSS RUNWAY 22'. As I looked up from starting the second engine the Captain had already turned onto Runway 22 and was taxing to Runway 28 via Charlie. I asked the Captain where he was going and he then completed his left turn and proceeded north east on Runway 4/22. The Captain then turned right onto Bravo and picked up the rest of the taxi instructions. In my departure brief; (I was the pilot flying) I asked the Captain if I could start both engines prior to taxiing first flight of the day; heavy for an Airbus; and the busy nature of BWI in the morning). The Captain stated 'as soon as I start to move forward you can start the second engine'. During the push I started #1 engine and tactfully asked 'just start one'? The Captain again stated 'wait until I start moving'. After we were released from guidance; the Captain directed me to call for taxi. We received our taxi clearance and began to move. I then began to start the number 2 engine. The Company has pushed the single engine issue to the point where Captains are not exercising good judgment when and where not to employ single engine operations. As a retired Air Force Fighter Pilot I am not going to say that I can't do something/anything. If the Captain wants me to start the second engine and not assist during the taxi (during the start) then that's what I'll do. Bottom line we taxied a plane full of people down a runway without clearance. When I noticed it there was nothing I could do about it. I am not confident the Captain would have listened anyway. I strongly recommend more guidance be given to Captains about the COMMON SENSE issues associated with these unsafe single engine practices. I have to work too hard with too many Captains which could be mitigated if Company procedures were more smartly implemented.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.