Narrative:

The situation was a procedure used at washington ARTCC that allowed dual departure routes to the south of raleigh, nc, the second of which came in close proximity to a military operating area (echo MOA). After several weeks of using this procedure, it was discovered that the radial was not flight checked and the procedure was discontinued. A flight check revealed that the rdu 150-180 degree radials were not usable. Regardless of whether the radials flight check, this procedure presents problems that are not being given realistic consideration. Technically, the route provides all the required separation needed in a radar environment, but it doesn't take into account the following: occasional loss of targets as aircraft fly over a radar site; communications: washington center is not in communication with military aircraft in the echo MOA. Initially, washington center is not in communications with raleigh departure, either. Sometimes the departures are out of ten, twelve or fourteen thousand feet before the center is talking to them. On occasion raleigh approach forgets to switch an aircraft and the controller must call approach control. The point to be made is that maintaining separation of aircraft, and insuring that either aircraft are not deviating from their assigned route, is difficult when the controller is not in communication with the aircraft involved. Military aircraft have been known to spillout of the echo MOA. While not all instances are documented, recent recordation of spillout shows fgt's spilling out by as much as 3000' vertically and 10 miles laterally aircraft also spill-in to the echo MOA due to such factors as weather, pilot error, etc. As a method of alleviating the aforementioned concerns, the controllers of the F area (washington center) recommend not using dual departure routes concurrently with the echo MOA. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter revealed that procedure has been discontinued and will not even be considered again until dec 1988. NAVAID did not flight check as usable on the radials that the procedure was based on and NAVAID modification must take place before the dual departure routes can be tried again. It was suggested that prior to re-implementation. The reporter should suggest a change in the echo MOA atacc letter of agreement to milfac/users that all aircraft in the MOA be in radio/radar contact with milfac and they guarantee the aircraft will not spill out of MOA. This change would place responsibility on user rather than FAA controller if fgt spill out. The spoke/hub operation at this airport has increased traffic volume greatly in this area and ARTCC controllers need all the assistance they can get to prevent potential conflicts with military aircraft in the MOA.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DEP ROUTE ESTABLISHED ON RADIAL OF NAVAID THAT HAD NOT BEEN FLT CHECKED. VERY CLOSE PROX TO MOA AND SHELF IN MOA TO BE RELEASED WITH NO ASSURANCE THAT FGTS WILL REMAIN WITHIN COFINES OF MOA.

Narrative: THE SITUATION WAS A PROCEDURE USED AT WASHINGTON ARTCC THAT ALLOWED DUAL DEP ROUTES TO THE SOUTH OF RALEIGH, NC, THE SECOND OF WHICH CAME IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO A MIL OPERATING AREA (ECHO MOA). AFTER SEVERAL WEEKS OF USING THIS PROCEDURE, IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE RADIAL WAS NOT FLT CHECKED AND THE PROCEDURE WAS DISCONTINUED. A FLT CHECK REVEALED THAT THE RDU 150-180 DEG RADIALS WERE NOT USABLE. REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THE RADIALS FLT CHECK, THIS PROCEDURE PRESENTS PROBLEMS THAT ARE NOT BEING GIVEN REALISTIC CONSIDERATION. TECHNICALLY, THE ROUTE PROVIDES ALL THE REQUIRED SEPARATION NEEDED IN A RADAR ENVIRONMENT, BUT IT DOESN'T TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE FOLLOWING: OCCASIONAL LOSS OF TARGETS AS ACFT FLY OVER A RADAR SITE; COMMUNICATIONS: WASHINGTON CENTER IS NOT IN COMMUNICATION WITH MIL ACFT IN THE ECHO MOA. INITIALLY, WASHINGTON CENTER IS NOT IN COMMUNICATIONS WITH RALEIGH DEP, EITHER. SOMETIMES THE DEPS ARE OUT OF TEN, TWELVE OR FOURTEEN THOUSAND FEET BEFORE THE CENTER IS TALKING TO THEM. ON OCCASION RALEIGH APCH FORGETS TO SWITCH AN ACFT AND THE CTLR MUST CALL APCH CTL. THE POINT TO BE MADE IS THAT MAINTAINING SEPARATION OF ACFT, AND INSURING THAT EITHER ACFT ARE NOT DEVIATING FROM THEIR ASSIGNED ROUTE, IS DIFFICULT WHEN THE CTLR IS NOT IN COMMUNICATION WITH THE ACFT INVOLVED. MIL ACFT HAVE BEEN KNOWN TO SPILLOUT OF THE ECHO MOA. WHILE NOT ALL INSTANCES ARE DOCUMENTED, RECENT RECORDATION OF SPILLOUT SHOWS FGT'S SPILLING OUT BY AS MUCH AS 3000' VERTICALLY AND 10 MILES LATERALLY ACFT ALSO SPILL-IN TO THE ECHO MOA DUE TO SUCH FACTORS AS WEATHER, PLT ERROR, ETC. AS A METHOD OF ALLEVIATING THE AFOREMENTIONED CONCERNS, THE CTLRS OF THE F AREA (WASHINGTON CENTER) RECOMMEND NOT USING DUAL DEP ROUTES CONCURRENTLY WITH THE ECHO MOA. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH REPORTER REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION: REPORTER REVEALED THAT PROC HAS BEEN DISCONTINUED AND WILL NOT EVEN BE CONSIDERED AGAIN UNTIL DEC 1988. NAVAID DID NOT FLT CHECK AS USABLE ON THE RADIALS THAT THE PROC WAS BASED ON AND NAVAID MODIFICATION MUST TAKE PLACE BEFORE THE DUAL DEP ROUTES CAN BE TRIED AGAIN. IT WAS SUGGESTED THAT PRIOR TO RE-IMPLEMENTATION. THE RPTR SHOULD SUGGEST A CHANGE IN THE ECHO MOA ATACC LETTER OF AGREEMENT TO MILFAC/USERS THAT ALL ACFT IN THE MOA BE IN RADIO/RADAR CONTACT WITH MILFAC AND THEY GUARANTEE THE ACFT WILL NOT SPILL OUT OF MOA. THIS CHANGE WOULD PLACE RESPONSIBILITY ON USER RATHER THAN FAA CTLR IF FGT SPILL OUT. THE SPOKE/HUB OPERATION AT THIS ARPT HAS INCREASED TFC VOLUME GREATLY IN THIS AREA AND ARTCC CTLRS NEED ALL THE ASSISTANCE THEY CAN GET TO PREVENT POTENTIAL CONFLICTS WITH MIL ACFT IN THE MOA.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.