Narrative:

Outbnd at 7000' on the smo 068 degree right the captain advised ATC that the airport was in sight and the approach controller cleared us for the stadium visual approach to runway 24R. West of the coliseum we were asked to start a base turn if feasible. Approach told us we were #1 for the runway. We were then handed off to the local controller. When the captain checked in, the controller did not respond, and when prompted a second time he replied in a very fast and almost unclear voice. After some discussion between myself and the captain about what was said the tower controller told us to square our base to final for 3 departures. The controller did not wait for a response or acknowledgement from us, and then gave us a reduction in airspeed to 180 KTS, at which time the captain advised the crew that an aircraft was on final for runway 25. After looking to the right and facing into the sun the first officer advised that he had lost sight of the north complex, and the captain instructed him to start his turn to final. He had the hollywood park in sight. At this time the controller issued a traffic advisory to us when air carrier Y was in our 7 O'clock position. As a result of the confusion and the poor visibility due to the sunset the extended centerline of runway 24R was exceeded to the south. I feel the contributing factor to the incident was a breakdown in communication between the approach controller who advised us we were #1 and turned us on an early base for the runway and the local controller who immediately told us to square our turn and slow the aircraft. This resulted in a little confusion in the cockpit with configuring the aircraft for the approach. Had the approach controller not amended the clearance. The local controller in my judgement would have had enough time for the 3 departures he wanted off the runway. Also a factor was the time of day and the fact the visibility was greatly reduced and restr as the aircraft was turned wbound on final. The fact that the first officer was unfamiliar with the approach was also a factor.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: LESS THAN STANDARD SEPARATION AND CLOSE PROX BETWEEN 2 ACR ON VISUAL APCHS. ACR X OVERSHOT FINAL FOR PARALLEL RWY. PLT DEVIATION.

Narrative: OUTBND AT 7000' ON THE SMO 068 DEG R THE CAPT ADVISED ATC THAT THE ARPT WAS IN SIGHT AND THE APCH CTLR CLRED US FOR THE STADIUM VISUAL APCH TO RWY 24R. W OF THE COLISEUM WE WERE ASKED TO START A BASE TURN IF FEASIBLE. APCH TOLD US WE WERE #1 FOR THE RWY. WE WERE THEN HANDED OFF TO THE LCL CTLR. WHEN THE CAPT CHKED IN, THE CTLR DID NOT RESPOND, AND WHEN PROMPTED A SECOND TIME HE REPLIED IN A VERY FAST AND ALMOST UNCLEAR VOICE. AFTER SOME DISCUSSION BTWN MYSELF AND THE CAPT ABOUT WHAT WAS SAID THE TWR CTLR TOLD US TO SQUARE OUR BASE TO FINAL FOR 3 DEPS. THE CTLR DID NOT WAIT FOR A RESPONSE OR ACKNOWLEDGEMENT FROM US, AND THEN GAVE US A REDUCTION IN AIRSPD TO 180 KTS, AT WHICH TIME THE CAPT ADVISED THE CREW THAT AN ACFT WAS ON FINAL FOR RWY 25. AFTER LOOKING TO THE RIGHT AND FACING INTO THE SUN THE F/O ADVISED THAT HE HAD LOST SIGHT OF THE N COMPLEX, AND THE CAPT INSTRUCTED HIM TO START HIS TURN TO FINAL. HE HAD THE HOLLYWOOD PARK IN SIGHT. AT THIS TIME THE CTLR ISSUED A TFC ADVISORY TO US WHEN ACR Y WAS IN OUR 7 O'CLOCK POS. AS A RESULT OF THE CONFUSION AND THE POOR VIS DUE TO THE SUNSET THE EXTENDED CENTERLINE OF RWY 24R WAS EXCEEDED TO THE S. I FEEL THE CONTRIBUTING FACTOR TO THE INCIDENT WAS A BREAKDOWN IN COM BTWN THE APCH CTLR WHO ADVISED US WE WERE #1 AND TURNED US ON AN EARLY BASE FOR THE RWY AND THE LCL CTLR WHO IMMEDIATELY TOLD US TO SQUARE OUR TURN AND SLOW THE ACFT. THIS RESULTED IN A LITTLE CONFUSION IN THE COCKPIT WITH CONFIGURING THE ACFT FOR THE APCH. HAD THE APCH CTLR NOT AMENDED THE CLRNC. THE LCL CTLR IN MY JUDGEMENT WOULD HAVE HAD ENOUGH TIME FOR THE 3 DEPS HE WANTED OFF THE RWY. ALSO A FACTOR WAS THE TIME OF DAY AND THE FACT THE VIS WAS GREATLY REDUCED AND RESTR AS THE ACFT WAS TURNED WBOUND ON FINAL. THE FACT THAT THE F/O WAS UNFAMILIAR WITH THE APCH WAS ALSO A FACTOR.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.