Narrative:

I contacted clearance delivery prior to pushback to ask which runway we should expect for takeoff. They said runway 1R from intersection B. I looked at the takeoff performance data; and this was not listed as one of the 5 runway choices. I called operations and asked for data for that intersection to be sent on our final weight and balance. We were cleared to taxi to runway 1R at intersection B; via taxiway G; taxiway west; and taxiway D. We got very busy and I inadvertently taxied past taxiway B and just past the hold line; but not onto runway 25R. Ground control told us to hold our position; and after a min; instructed us to cross runway 25R; and expect full length of runway 1R for takeoff. Las tower asked us to call them after landing to discuss this further. A chain of non-normal events contributed to this near runway incursion. Our APU was inoperative; and we had told las operations this upon taxi-in on our prior flight. They did not pass this along to ramp personnel; so the start cart was not ready at departure time. After several problems with the start cart; we finally pushed back; late. 10 mins after pushback; we still had not received our final weight and balance. This necessitated another call to operations during taxi. They said that the ramp personnel had not entered the cargo weights; and to standby. We finally got the final weight and balance through ACARS while taxiing south on taxiway D; near the intersection of taxiway B. The first officer quickly entered the data. Trying to do the flight control checks; check and verify the data; and perform the taxi checklist while approaching this intersection greatly added to our task saturation and loss of taxi awareness. We are taught over and over to not be 'heads down' during critical phrases of taxiing. We just got too busy; and a bit frustrated; and lost situational awareness while taxiing to a runway intersection neither of us had ever seen used before. A large contributor to this distraction; although not an excuse; was all of the problems getting proper takeoff data. Operations needs to have the proper expected runway data entered into the system or communicated to dispatch; so we get a usable takeoff performance. Operations also needs to ensure cargo data is entered in a timely manner; not 15 mins after cargo loading is completed.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN AIR CARRIER OPERATIONS STAFF WAS LATE SUPPLYING TAKEOFF PERFORMANCE DATA TO AN A320 CREW. AS THE HURRIED CREW COMPLETED A CHECKLIST AND ENTERED THE DATA; THEY INCURRED A RUNWAY.

Narrative: I CONTACTED CLRNC DELIVERY PRIOR TO PUSHBACK TO ASK WHICH RWY WE SHOULD EXPECT FOR TKOF. THEY SAID RWY 1R FROM INTXN B. I LOOKED AT THE TKOF PERFORMANCE DATA; AND THIS WAS NOT LISTED AS ONE OF THE 5 RWY CHOICES. I CALLED OPS AND ASKED FOR DATA FOR THAT INTXN TO BE SENT ON OUR FINAL WT AND BAL. WE WERE CLRED TO TAXI TO RWY 1R AT INTXN B; VIA TXWY G; TXWY W; AND TXWY D. WE GOT VERY BUSY AND I INADVERTENTLY TAXIED PAST TXWY B AND JUST PAST THE HOLD LINE; BUT NOT ONTO RWY 25R. GND CTL TOLD US TO HOLD OUR POS; AND AFTER A MIN; INSTRUCTED US TO CROSS RWY 25R; AND EXPECT FULL LENGTH OF RWY 1R FOR TKOF. LAS TWR ASKED US TO CALL THEM AFTER LNDG TO DISCUSS THIS FURTHER. A CHAIN OF NON-NORMAL EVENTS CONTRIBUTED TO THIS NEAR RWY INCURSION. OUR APU WAS INOP; AND WE HAD TOLD LAS OPS THIS UPON TAXI-IN ON OUR PRIOR FLT. THEY DID NOT PASS THIS ALONG TO RAMP PERSONNEL; SO THE START CART WAS NOT READY AT DEP TIME. AFTER SEVERAL PROBS WITH THE START CART; WE FINALLY PUSHED BACK; LATE. 10 MINS AFTER PUSHBACK; WE STILL HAD NOT RECEIVED OUR FINAL WT AND BAL. THIS NECESSITATED ANOTHER CALL TO OPS DURING TAXI. THEY SAID THAT THE RAMP PERSONNEL HAD NOT ENTERED THE CARGO WTS; AND TO STANDBY. WE FINALLY GOT THE FINAL WT AND BAL THROUGH ACARS WHILE TAXIING S ON TXWY D; NEAR THE INTXN OF TXWY B. THE FO QUICKLY ENTERED THE DATA. TRYING TO DO THE FLT CTL CHKS; CHK AND VERIFY THE DATA; AND PERFORM THE TAXI CHKLIST WHILE APCHING THIS INTXN GREATLY ADDED TO OUR TASK SATURATION AND LOSS OF TAXI AWARENESS. WE ARE TAUGHT OVER AND OVER TO NOT BE 'HEADS DOWN' DURING CRITICAL PHRASES OF TAXIING. WE JUST GOT TOO BUSY; AND A BIT FRUSTRATED; AND LOST SITUATIONAL AWARENESS WHILE TAXIING TO A RWY INTXN NEITHER OF US HAD EVER SEEN USED BEFORE. A LARGE CONTRIBUTOR TO THIS DISTR; ALTHOUGH NOT AN EXCUSE; WAS ALL OF THE PROBS GETTING PROPER TKOF DATA. OPS NEEDS TO HAVE THE PROPER EXPECTED RWY DATA ENTERED INTO THE SYSTEM OR COMMUNICATED TO DISPATCH; SO WE GET A USABLE TKOF PERFORMANCE. OPS ALSO NEEDS TO ENSURE CARGO DATA IS ENTERED IN A TIMELY MANNER; NOT 15 MINS AFTER CARGO LOADING IS COMPLETED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.