Narrative:

I was working the local control #2 position this morning during the inbound push. Mem was in a north confign; landing runways 36L; 36R; and 27; departing runways 36C; and 27. Ground control #2 was taxiing a C550 from FBO to runway 36C for departure '...via taxiway a; hold short of taxiway south.' this restr is to protect the path of any aircraft departing runway 36C; as taxiway a crosses the departure end of runway 36C. Local procedures mandate that no vehicles or aircraft be allowed on taxiway a between txwys south and C when aircraft are departing runway 36C. I cleared the CRJ2 for takeoff from runway 36C. As the CRJ2 was rotating; I noticed the C550 was crossing taxiway south and penetrating the protected area of taxiway a; crossing just under the CRJ2. Ground control #2 noticed this at the same instant; but it was too late to stop the C550; and the CRJ2 was airborne. The C550 said that he had been instructed to hold short of taxiway C. This happens very often at mem; and could prove fatal if the wrong aircraft were ever involved. For instance: heavy jets often require runway 36C for departure due to weight and operational characteristics. These heavy jets will often utilize nearly every inch of the runway for their departure roll. If an aircraft were to taxi through this protected area via taxiway a; it is quite possible that the runway 36C departing traffic would impact the taxiing traffic on taxiway a. This would be even more critical if the taxiway a traffic were any aircraft that had a tall tail. In the future; I will include taxiway a as part of my departure scan before clearing any aircraft for takeoff from runway 36C. If I observe any traffic on taxiway a; I will confirm with ground control #1 that the traffic is holding for my departure traffic. If a heavy is involved; or if the taxiway a traffic is an aircraft that has a tall tail; then I will wait until I observe the traffic come to a complete stop. Additionally; better coordination or confirmation might be helpful from ground control #1 to ensure that traffic does not penetrate this safety area.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MEM LCL CTLR ISSUES A TKOF CLRNC WITH ANOTHER ACFT IN EXCLUSION AREA.

Narrative: I WAS WORKING THE LCL CTL #2 POS THIS MORNING DURING THE INBOUND PUSH. MEM WAS IN A N CONFIGN; LNDG RWYS 36L; 36R; AND 27; DEPARTING RWYS 36C; AND 27. GND CTL #2 WAS TAXIING A C550 FROM FBO TO RWY 36C FOR DEP '...VIA TXWY A; HOLD SHORT OF TXWY S.' THIS RESTR IS TO PROTECT THE PATH OF ANY ACFT DEPARTING RWY 36C; AS TXWY A CROSSES THE DEP END OF RWY 36C. LCL PROCS MANDATE THAT NO VEHICLES OR ACFT BE ALLOWED ON TXWY A BTWN TXWYS S AND C WHEN ACFT ARE DEPARTING RWY 36C. I CLRED THE CRJ2 FOR TKOF FROM RWY 36C. AS THE CRJ2 WAS ROTATING; I NOTICED THE C550 WAS XING TXWY S AND PENETRATING THE PROTECTED AREA OF TXWY A; XING JUST UNDER THE CRJ2. GND CTL #2 NOTICED THIS AT THE SAME INSTANT; BUT IT WAS TOO LATE TO STOP THE C550; AND THE CRJ2 WAS AIRBORNE. THE C550 SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO HOLD SHORT OF TXWY C. THIS HAPPENS VERY OFTEN AT MEM; AND COULD PROVE FATAL IF THE WRONG ACFT WERE EVER INVOLVED. FOR INSTANCE: HVY JETS OFTEN REQUIRE RWY 36C FOR DEP DUE TO WT AND OPERATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS. THESE HVY JETS WILL OFTEN UTILIZE NEARLY EVERY INCH OF THE RWY FOR THEIR DEP ROLL. IF AN ACFT WERE TO TAXI THROUGH THIS PROTECTED AREA VIA TXWY A; IT IS QUITE POSSIBLE THAT THE RWY 36C DEPARTING TFC WOULD IMPACT THE TAXIING TFC ON TXWY A. THIS WOULD BE EVEN MORE CRITICAL IF THE TXWY A TFC WERE ANY ACFT THAT HAD A TALL TAIL. IN THE FUTURE; I WILL INCLUDE TXWY A AS PART OF MY DEP SCAN BEFORE CLRING ANY ACFT FOR TKOF FROM RWY 36C. IF I OBSERVE ANY TFC ON TXWY A; I WILL CONFIRM WITH GND CTL #1 THAT THE TFC IS HOLDING FOR MY DEP TFC. IF A HVY IS INVOLVED; OR IF THE TXWY A TFC IS AN ACFT THAT HAS A TALL TAIL; THEN I WILL WAIT UNTIL I OBSERVE THE TFC COME TO A COMPLETE STOP. ADDITIONALLY; BETTER COORD OR CONFIRMATION MIGHT BE HELPFUL FROM GND CTL #1 TO ENSURE THAT TFC DOES NOT PENETRATE THIS SAFETY AREA.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.