Narrative:

We were cleared to taxi into position and hold runway 22L at mdw. As we taxied onto the runway, the mdw tower controller urgently cleared us for immediate takeoff, turn to a heading, traffic on final runway 22L. Air carrier requires all mdw departures to make a modified static takeoff. I had to make a split second decision to either taxi off the runway or make the modified static takeoff. I chose to do the static takeoff. I xferred aircraft control to the first officer because it was his leg. After releasing brakes and on the takeoff roll, the tower controller said we were taking 'entirely too much time on the runway' and directed the approaching aircraft to go around. The first officer continued the takeoff normally. After getting the gear up, both the first officer and I were trying to recall the heading instructions while I was trying to get a picture of where the go around aircraft was to ensure we avoided him. Meanwhile, I was attempting to request our heading from the controller, but the frequency was congested due to the controller and go around pilot coordinating instructions. By this time, the first officer had made a shallow left turn to approximately 205 degrees. At about 1700 ft MSL, the controller said that this was the 'second time a company aircraft had done this today,' turn right heading 110 degrees. I don't know if this was the second time a company aircraft didn't make an immediate takeoff or the second time company aircraft didn't turn to the departure heading immediately after takeoff. In any case, our turn to 110 degrees was made well within 4 NM of mdw as the procedure dictates. We flew as directed, leveling off at 3000 ft as cleared. The rest of the departure was uneventful. Comments: the mdw procedure is non standard to start with. Getting a clearance for an immediate takeoff, given a 250 degree heading change, trying to avoid the go around aircraft and being unable to question the controller -- all of which was unexpected -- contributed to this event. Further, does mdw know company aircraft must do a modified static takeoff delaying us somewhat on the runway? Supplemental information from acn 597307: it has always been our company policy to bring aircraft to complete stop and run engine up to certain EPR prior to releasing brakes and this should have been anticipated which would not have caused the go around. There was confusion on our behalf as to exactly what the heading was after takeoff. We did not anticipate an immediate takeoff when cleared onto runway 22L to hold and when we were told to take off due to traffic, it caused unexpected hurrying in the cockpit and we should have had the climb out instructions understood by both crew members.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DC9-30 CREW WITH TKOF CLRNC, AND ANOTHER ACR ACFT ON FINAL APCH. TWR CTLR GAVE ACFT ON FINAL A GAR. THE CTLR DID NOT ACCOUNT THE COMPANY REQUIREMENT TO ACCOMPLISH A STATIC TKOF.

Narrative: WE WERE CLRED TO TAXI INTO POS AND HOLD RWY 22L AT MDW. AS WE TAXIED ONTO THE RWY, THE MDW TWR CTLR URGENTLY CLRED US FOR IMMEDIATE TKOF, TURN TO A HEADING, TFC ON FINAL RWY 22L. ACR REQUIRES ALL MDW DEPS TO MAKE A MODIFIED STATIC TKOF. I HAD TO MAKE A SPLIT SECOND DECISION TO EITHER TAXI OFF THE RWY OR MAKE THE MODIFIED STATIC TKOF. I CHOSE TO DO THE STATIC TKOF. I XFERRED ACFT CTL TO THE FO BECAUSE IT WAS HIS LEG. AFTER RELEASING BRAKES AND ON THE TKOF ROLL, THE TWR CTLR SAID WE WERE TAKING 'ENTIRELY TOO MUCH TIME ON THE RWY' AND DIRECTED THE APCHING ACFT TO GO AROUND. THE FO CONTINUED THE TKOF NORMALLY. AFTER GETTING THE GEAR UP, BOTH THE FO AND I WERE TRYING TO RECALL THE HEADING INSTRUCTIONS WHILE I WAS TRYING TO GET A PICTURE OF WHERE THE GAR ACFT WAS TO ENSURE WE AVOIDED HIM. MEANWHILE, I WAS ATTEMPTING TO REQUEST OUR HEADING FROM THE CTLR, BUT THE FREQ WAS CONGESTED DUE TO THE CTLR AND GAR PLT COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS. BY THIS TIME, THE FO HAD MADE A SHALLOW L TURN TO APPROX 205 DEGS. AT ABOUT 1700 FT MSL, THE CTLR SAID THAT THIS WAS THE 'SECOND TIME A COMPANY ACFT HAD DONE THIS TODAY,' TURN R HEADING 110 DEGS. I DON'T KNOW IF THIS WAS THE SECOND TIME A COMPANY ACFT DIDN'T MAKE AN IMMEDIATE TKOF OR THE SECOND TIME COMPANY ACFT DIDN'T TURN TO THE DEP HEADING IMMEDIATELY AFTER TKOF. IN ANY CASE, OUR TURN TO 110 DEGS WAS MADE WELL WITHIN 4 NM OF MDW AS THE PROC DICTATES. WE FLEW AS DIRECTED, LEVELING OFF AT 3000 FT AS CLRED. THE REST OF THE DEP WAS UNEVENTFUL. COMMENTS: THE MDW PROC IS NON STANDARD TO START WITH. GETTING A CLRNC FOR AN IMMEDIATE TKOF, GIVEN A 250 DEG HDG CHANGE, TRYING TO AVOID THE GAR ACFT AND BEING UNABLE TO QUESTION THE CTLR -- ALL OF WHICH WAS UNEXPECTED -- CONTRIBUTED TO THIS EVENT. FURTHER, DOES MDW KNOW COMPANY ACFT MUST DO A MODIFIED STATIC TKOF DELAYING US SOMEWHAT ON THE RWY? SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 597307: IT HAS ALWAYS BEEN OUR COMPANY POLICY TO BRING ACFT TO COMPLETE STOP AND RUN ENG UP TO CERTAIN EPR PRIOR TO RELEASING BRAKES AND THIS SHOULD HAVE BEEN ANTICIPATED WHICH WOULD NOT HAVE CAUSED THE GAR. THERE WAS CONFUSION ON OUR BEHALF AS TO EXACTLY WHAT THE HEADING WAS AFTER TKOF. WE DID NOT ANTICIPATE AN IMMEDIATE TKOF WHEN CLRED ONTO RWY 22L TO HOLD AND WHEN WE WERE TOLD TO TAKE OFF DUE TO TFC, IT CAUSED UNEXPECTED HURRYING IN THE COCKPIT AND WE SHOULD HAVE HAD THE CLBOUT INSTRUCTIONS UNDERSTOOD BY BOTH CREW MEMBERS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.