Narrative:

The altitude deviation occurred during the departure from teb while on the teb 5 departure procedure. During the climb out; the procedure calls for a leveloff at 1500 ft then a turn to 280 degree heading and upon reaching 4.5 DME a climb to 2000 ft. The first officer was the PF on this leg and we briefed the procedure prior the takeoff per the company SOP. We preset the altitude selector to 2000 ft and discussed the leveloff at 1500 ft. (I believe that this was the first error as 1500 ft should have been selected in the altitude select.) after takeoff the first officer/PF followed the procedure but failed to level off at 1500 ft and instead continued to 2000 ft. At 1200 ft I indicted to the first officer/PF that we need to level off but the command was not heard. We reached 2000 ft at approximately 2.3 DME. Our initial call to departure control was ignored due to heavy radio traffic. Later the controller radar identified us and instructed us to be more vigilant of the departure procedure in the future. He also advised us of B717 traffic off our nine O'clock and 1.5 mi. The TCAS did not show the traffic and visual contact was not established. During the subsequent discussion with the first officer; she indicated that she did not hear my command due to high volume of the ATC radio and low volume of the intercom system. She indicated that she changed the volume on the ground because it was too loud. She also indicated that she forgot about the leveloff and continued to the altitude shown in the altitude selector. I believe that the cause of this deviation was the improper input into the altitude selector. Miscom between the crew during the departure phase. Improper volume selection of the intercom system; and failure on my part to take more aggressive corrective action during the event. Also; the heavy cockpit workload required by the departure procedure and the busy environment in which it exists make the procedure extremely difficult. Supplemental information from acn 690543: taxiing out I mentioned to captain (PNF) that ground and tower controllers seemed loud in my headset. Took off. I heard captain call V1 vr rotate; and couldn't hear or understand what he was saying after that. After takeoff; climbed runway heading to 1500 ft; then turned to 280 degrees. Looked at altitude selector which read 2000 ft; continued climb to 2000 ft at about 3.5 DME off of teb VOR instead of waiting till 4.5 DME as stated on approach plate.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: C560 FLT CREW OVERSHOOTS THE ALT RESTR ON THE TEB 5 DEP.

Narrative: THE ALTDEV OCCURRED DURING THE DEP FROM TEB WHILE ON THE TEB 5 DEP PROC. DURING THE CLB OUT; THE PROC CALLS FOR A LEVELOFF AT 1500 FT THEN A TURN TO 280 DEG HEADING AND UPON REACHING 4.5 DME A CLB TO 2000 FT. THE FO WAS THE PF ON THIS LEG AND WE BRIEFED THE PROC PRIOR THE TAKEOFF PER THE COMPANY SOP. WE PRESET THE ALT SELECTOR TO 2000 FT AND DISCUSSED THE LEVELOFF AT 1500 FT. (I BELIEVE THAT THIS WAS THE FIRST ERROR AS 1500 FT SHOULD HAVE BEEN SELECTED IN THE ALT SELECT.) AFTER TKOF THE FO/PF FOLLOWED THE PROC BUT FAILED TO LEVEL OFF AT 1500 FT AND INSTEAD CONTINUED TO 2000 FT. AT 1200 FT I INDICTED TO THE FO/PF THAT WE NEED TO LEVEL OFF BUT THE COMMAND WAS NOT HEARD. WE REACHED 2000 FT AT APPROX 2.3 DME. OUR INITIAL CALL TO DEP CTL WAS IGNORED DUE TO HEAVY RADIO TFC. LATER THE CTLR RADAR IDENTIFIED US AND INSTRUCTED US TO BE MORE VIGILANT OF THE DEP PROC IN THE FUTURE. HE ALSO ADVISED US OF B717 TFC OFF OUR NINE O'CLOCK AND 1.5 MI. THE TCAS DID NOT SHOW THE TFC AND VISUAL CONTACT WAS NOT ESTABLISHED. DURING THE SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION WITH THE FO; SHE INDICATED THAT SHE DID NOT HEAR MY COMMAND DUE TO HIGH VOLUME OF THE ATC RADIO AND LOW VOLUME OF THE INTERCOM SYSTEM. SHE INDICATED THAT SHE CHANGED THE VOLUME ON THE GND BECAUSE IT WAS TOO LOUD. SHE ALSO INDICATED THAT SHE FORGOT ABOUT THE LEVELOFF AND CONTINUED TO THE ALT SHOWN IN THE ALTITUDE SELECTOR. I BELIEVE THAT THE CAUSE OF THIS DEVIATION WAS THE IMPROPER INPUT INTO THE ALT SELECTOR. MISCOM BETWEEN THE CREW DURING THE DEP PHASE. IMPROPER VOLUME SELECTION OF THE INTERCOM SYSTEM; AND FAILURE ON MY PART TO TAKE MORE AGGRESSIVE CORRECTIVE ACTION DURING THE EVENT. ALSO; THE HEAVY COCKPIT WORKLOAD REQUIRED BY THE DEP PROC AND THE BUSY ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH IT EXISTS MAKE THE PROC EXTREMELY DIFFICULT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 690543: TAXIING OUT I MENTIONED TO CAPT (PNF) THAT GROUND AND TOWER CTLRS SEEMED LOUD IN MY HEADSET. TOOK OFF. I HEARD CAPT CALL V1 VR ROTATE; AND COULDN'T HEAR OR UNDERSTAND WHAT HE WAS SAYING AFTER THAT. AFTER TKOF; CLBED RWY HEADING TO 1500 FT; THEN TURNED TO 280 DEGS. LOOKED AT ALT SELECTOR WHICH READ 2000 FT; CONTINUED CLB TO 2000 FT AT ABOUT 3.5 DME OFF OF TEB VOR INSTEAD OF WAITING TILL 4.5 DME AS STATED ON APCH PLATE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.