Narrative:

Aircraft damage on ground. Our flight to lax appeared uneventful. The captain told me that he was just approached by someone who told him that they thought our aircraft's jet exhaust had blown an empty, unsecured cargo container sitting on the ramp into the #1 engine of a B767 aircraft. As I remember the incident, we entered the ramp to an open gate with ready taxi directors. My focus at the time was to ensure that we had adequate wingtip clearance with other aircraft and ramp equipment. I was not paying attention to throttle movements. What I can say for sure is that I would have noticed if either of the engines had spooled up significantly. Supplemental information from acn 614720: a slow down to a stop was required approximately 1 aircraft length from gate due to the wing walkers not completely in position. The guideman was there, the wing walkers were getting into position and the parking brake was never set until fully parked at the gate. Idle power not to exceed (61% N2) was used to continue parking. My recollection was around 58-60% N2 was used to keep the aircraft moving. The use of idle power after both stopping in the alley or stopping short of gate was permitted. Train guidemen of clearing not only wing clrncs, but also clearing behind aircraft during taxi-in. I know they place great importance on pushback clearing, but an emphasis should be made for taxi in and the jet blast associated with it.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN UNSECURED BAGGAGE CART WAS BLOWN INTO AN ACFT, BY A PARKING MD80.

Narrative: ACFT DAMAGE ON GND. OUR FLT TO LAX APPEARED UNEVENTFUL. THE CAPT TOLD ME THAT HE WAS JUST APCHED BY SOMEONE WHO TOLD HIM THAT THEY THOUGHT OUR ACFT'S JET EXHAUST HAD BLOWN AN EMPTY, UNSECURED CARGO CONTAINER SITTING ON THE RAMP INTO THE #1 ENG OF A B767 ACFT. AS I REMEMBER THE INCIDENT, WE ENTERED THE RAMP TO AN OPEN GATE WITH READY TAXI DIRECTORS. MY FOCUS AT THE TIME WAS TO ENSURE THAT WE HAD ADEQUATE WINGTIP CLRNC WITH OTHER ACFT AND RAMP EQUIP. I WAS NOT PAYING ATTN TO THROTTLE MOVEMENTS. WHAT I CAN SAY FOR SURE IS THAT I WOULD HAVE NOTICED IF EITHER OF THE ENGS HAD SPOOLED UP SIGNIFICANTLY. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 614720: A SLOW DOWN TO A STOP WAS REQUIRED APPROX 1 ACFT LENGTH FROM GATE DUE TO THE WING WALKERS NOT COMPLETELY IN POS. THE GUIDEMAN WAS THERE, THE WING WALKERS WERE GETTING INTO POS AND THE PARKING BRAKE WAS NEVER SET UNTIL FULLY PARKED AT THE GATE. IDLE PWR NOT TO EXCEED (61% N2) WAS USED TO CONTINUE PARKING. MY RECOLLECTION WAS AROUND 58-60% N2 WAS USED TO KEEP THE ACFT MOVING. THE USE OF IDLE PWR AFTER BOTH STOPPING IN THE ALLEY OR STOPPING SHORT OF GATE WAS PERMITTED. TRAIN GUIDEMEN OF CLRING NOT ONLY WING CLRNCS, BUT ALSO CLRING BEHIND ACFT DURING TAXI-IN. I KNOW THEY PLACE GREAT IMPORTANCE ON PUSHBACK CLRING, BUT AN EMPHASIS SHOULD BE MADE FOR TAXI IN AND THE JET BLAST ASSOCIATED WITH IT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.