Narrative:

Intermittently during the top of climb and continuously after cruise power was set, we observed the 'right engine hpsov' EICAS message and the right engine 'bleed' light with the associated master caution indications. The procedure was followed, which results in a single bleed, single pack operation. In addition to the obvious factors, there are icing and heading considerations in this confign. The aircraft had a significant maintenance history involving this problem. I elected not to enter into the ETOPS/rvsm environment with the aircraft compromised in this fashion. Communication was initiated with dispatch and maintenance. The end result was the selection of jfk as a diversion destination with a planned aircraft change. Appropriate procedures were accomplished, including those related to fuel dumping and the overweight landing. All 'dumpable' fuel was dumped while at FL290, beginning at XA00, and terminating at XA15. Approximately 14500 pounds of fuel was dumped. I elected to accomplish an overweight landing rather than holding to burn additional 'undumpable' fuel based on flight manual. The condition, damage and risks associated with the hpsov indication were unknown. An emergency was declared due to the operation in excess of an aircraft structural limit. The emergency was declared with jfk approach and priority was given to use runway 31L rather than runway 31R. An uneventful overweight landing was accomplished. Touchdown was smooth at about 334000 pounds gross weight and 72600 pounds of fuel.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B767-300 CREW HAD AN EICAS WARNING 'R ENG HPSOV' THAT RENDERED THE ACFT NON ETOPS CAPABLE. R ENG MALFUNCTION RESULTED IN A DIVERSION WITH AN OVERWT LNDG.

Narrative: INTERMITTENTLY DURING THE TOP OF CLB AND CONTINUOUSLY AFTER CRUISE PWR WAS SET, WE OBSERVED THE 'R ENG HPSOV' EICAS MESSAGE AND THE R ENG 'BLEED' LIGHT WITH THE ASSOCIATED MASTER CAUTION INDICATIONS. THE PROC WAS FOLLOWED, WHICH RESULTS IN A SINGLE BLEED, SINGLE PACK OP. IN ADDITION TO THE OBVIOUS FACTORS, THERE ARE ICING AND HDG CONSIDERATIONS IN THIS CONFIGN. THE ACFT HAD A SIGNIFICANT MAINT HISTORY INVOLVING THIS PROB. I ELECTED NOT TO ENTER INTO THE ETOPS/RVSM ENVIRONMENT WITH THE ACFT COMPROMISED IN THIS FASHION. COM WAS INITIATED WITH DISPATCH AND MAINT. THE END RESULT WAS THE SELECTION OF JFK AS A DIVERSION DEST WITH A PLANNED ACFT CHANGE. APPROPRIATE PROCS WERE ACCOMPLISHED, INCLUDING THOSE RELATED TO FUEL DUMPING AND THE OVERWT LNDG. ALL 'DUMPABLE' FUEL WAS DUMPED WHILE AT FL290, BEGINNING AT XA00, AND TERMINATING AT XA15. APPROX 14500 LBS OF FUEL WAS DUMPED. I ELECTED TO ACCOMPLISH AN OVERWT LNDG RATHER THAN HOLDING TO BURN ADDITIONAL 'UNDUMPABLE' FUEL BASED ON FLT MANUAL. THE CONDITION, DAMAGE AND RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH THE HPSOV INDICATION WERE UNKNOWN. AN EMER WAS DECLARED DUE TO THE OP IN EXCESS OF AN ACFT STRUCTURAL LIMIT. THE EMER WAS DECLARED WITH JFK APCH AND PRIORITY WAS GIVEN TO USE RWY 31L RATHER THAN RWY 31R. AN UNEVENTFUL OVERWT LNDG WAS ACCOMPLISHED. TOUCHDOWN WAS SMOOTH AT ABOUT 334000 LBS GROSS WT AND 72600 LBS OF FUEL.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.