Narrative:

After exiting runway 9 at intersection east at svmi we were given instructions to taxi F, C to the ramp. Unable to determine if the next intersection was taxiway F or runway 8 due to both having runway markings and no taxiway designators, the aircraft was stopped just prior to the edge markings, but inside the edge lighting. I then asked ground to confirm our position as 'F' or runway 8 and was told to 'hold position.' the ground controller now acting as tower told another aircraft to line up runway 8. Three times I then told the ground controller that we may be on runway 8 and not to position an aircraft on the runway. After each call aircraft X was told 'hold position.' the third 'hold position' was followed by clearance for the other aircraft to takeoff on runway 8. Fearing the potential for a collision, the captain then came onto the radio to tell ground that we were on runway 8/26 and not to clear the aircraft for takeoff. Simultaneously, the captain added power to cross the runway as the other aircraft took the runway and turned on his landing lights for takeoff. We cleared the runway as the other aircraft aborted its takeoff roll. Afterwards, we held our position in the ramp area west of runway 8 till a follow me truck was called before proceeding further. From his position in the tower it might have appeared that we were clear of the runway, but there is no excuse to ignore warnings from crews that could affect safety of flight. The lack of taxiway signs, markings, runway hold short bars and a controller handling clearance, ground and tower at night while disregarding warnings from pilots could have led to a disastrous situation. Supplemental information from acn 588566: after landing at svmi on runway 9, we cleared at east and were instructed to contact ground control. We were instructed by ground control to turn on F to C to the gate. We did not notice the unlighted and unmarked inactive 9R or F due to it's close proximity to runway 9 at east and the time delay clearing the runway and contacting ground. The lighted, approaching runway was thought to be F/9R, but the offset alignment helped us determine that it was in fact runway 8/26. We stopped the aircraft just short of the white side lines, but inside the edge lights. We immediately notified ground of our position and were told to 'hold position.' I soon noticed a S80 taxiing toward runway 8. We again notified ground of our position on runway 8/26 with all our available lights 'on.' we were again told to 'hold position.' as the S80 approached runway 8 we noticed his landing lights illuminate and his probable intention to initiate a rolling takeoff. We again notified ground controller of our position on the active runway 8 holding our position as instructed. He again instructed us to 'hold position'. I interpreted the situation as ground control not being able to communication effectively in english along with the S80 being unaware of the situation due to being on tower frequency. I assess the developing situation and to avoid an impending collision, I take emergency action to taxi clear of runway 8/26 while again notifying ground that we were on runway 8/26. Again with the S80 starting takeoff roll and us expediting clear of runway 8/26, we were told to 'hold position.' after runway alignment, the S80 sees us aborts his takeoff. Subsequent communications confirmed the lack of english speaking abilities. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter indicated that he has operated into the airport numerous times and that the taxiway that runs parallel to runway 9 is used as a runway at times. The lighting is confusing and on the evening of the event the lights on the taxiway were not lighted. This was doubly confusing to the reporter and his first officer. Additionally, this was the first time that the flight crew had exited at 'east' taxiway. Normally they have used taxiway 'D' which is closer to the terminal. They were not familiar with this area of the airport. After exiting the runway and taking the wrong taxiway the reporter indicated that the lighting was very confusing and the signage was nonexistent. They taxied over the edge lines on the adjacent active runway before realizing they had. They notified the ground controller of this fact. The language barrier was so poor that the controller did not understand the position of the aircraft and continued to say 'hold your position.' this sequence of attempting to communication their position with the controller went on for several mins. The controller was working both local and ground frequency. Finally the flight crew observed another aircraft (S80) take the runway and turn on their lights for takeoff. With their aircraft over the edge lines of the runway and the possibility of a collision eminent the flight crew elected to cross the runway rapidly to a safer area. The reporter indicated that the air carrier does supply an additional page to the normal commercial chart (10-7) which has warnings and notes regarding specific problems with the airport. Supplemental report to acn 588227: reporter contacted for additional information regarding the time of day and conditions. Reporter stated that the arrival was at night and it was very dark. The meteorological conditions were clear. Reporter indicated that they (flight crew) were aware that the parallel taxiway was used as a runway on occasion. This information was available as a supplemental to their 10-9 page. However, after clearing the active they were looking for the runway (parallel taxiway) and the lighting was so poor that they continued forward until they inadvertently entered the intersecting runway. The lighting on the parallel taxiway consisted of 'a line of green lights,' which confused them. Additionally, the reporter reiterated that the language barrier was causing such a distraction that they became frustrated and this may have led to their mistake.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 FLT CREW HAS RWY INCURSION AFTER LNDG AT SVMI.

Narrative: AFTER EXITING RWY 9 AT INTXN E AT SVMI WE WERE GIVEN INSTRUCTIONS TO TAXI F, C TO THE RAMP. UNABLE TO DETERMINE IF THE NEXT INTXN WAS TXWY F OR RWY 8 DUE TO BOTH HAVING RWY MARKINGS AND NO TXWY DESIGNATORS, THE ACFT WAS STOPPED JUST PRIOR TO THE EDGE MARKINGS, BUT INSIDE THE EDGE LIGHTING. I THEN ASKED GND TO CONFIRM OUR POS AS 'F' OR RWY 8 AND WAS TOLD TO 'HOLD POSITION.' THE GND CTLR NOW ACTING AS TWR TOLD ANOTHER ACFT TO LINE UP RWY 8. THREE TIMES I THEN TOLD THE GND CTLR THAT WE MAY BE ON RWY 8 AND NOT TO POSITION AN ACFT ON THE RWY. AFTER EACH CALL ACFT X WAS TOLD 'HOLD POSITION.' THE THIRD 'HOLD POSITION' WAS FOLLOWED BY CLRNC FOR THE OTHER ACFT TO TKOF ON RWY 8. FEARING THE POTENTIAL FOR A COLLISION, THE CAPT THEN CAME ONTO THE RADIO TO TELL GND THAT WE WERE ON RWY 8/26 AND NOT TO CLR THE ACFT FOR TKOF. SIMULTANEOUSLY, THE CAPT ADDED POWER TO CROSS THE RWY AS THE OTHER ACFT TOOK THE RWY AND TURNED ON HIS LNDG LIGHTS FOR TKOF. WE CLRED THE RWY AS THE OTHER ACFT ABORTED ITS TKOF ROLL. AFTERWARDS, WE HELD OUR POS IN THE RAMP AREA W OF RWY 8 TILL A FOLLOW ME TRUCK WAS CALLED BEFORE PROCEEDING FURTHER. FROM HIS POSITION IN THE TWR IT MIGHT HAVE APPEARED THAT WE WERE CLR OF THE RWY, BUT THERE IS NO EXCUSE TO IGNORE WARNINGS FROM CREWS THAT COULD AFFECT SAFETY OF FLT. THE LACK OF TXWY SIGNS, MARKINGS, RWY HOLD SHORT BARS AND A CTLR HANDLING CLRNC, GND AND TWR AT NIGHT WHILE DISREGARDING WARNINGS FROM PLTS COULD HAVE LED TO A DISASTROUS SIT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 588566: AFTER LNDG AT SVMI ON RWY 9, WE CLRED AT E AND WERE INSTRUCTED TO CONTACT GND CTL. WE WERE INSTRUCTED BY GND CTL TO TURN ON F TO C TO THE GATE. WE DID NOT NOTICE THE UNLIGHTED AND UNMARKED INACTIVE 9R OR F DUE TO IT'S CLOSE PROXIMITY TO RWY 9 AT E AND THE TIME DELAY CLEARING THE RWY AND CONTACTING GND. THE LIGHTED, APCHING RWY WAS THOUGHT TO BE F/9R, BUT THE OFFSET ALIGNMENT HELPED US DETERMINE THAT IT WAS IN FACT RWY 8/26. WE STOPPED THE ACFT JUST SHORT OF THE WHITE SIDE LINES, BUT INSIDE THE EDGE LIGHTS. WE IMMEDIATELY NOTIFIED GND OF OUR POSITION AND WERE TOLD TO 'HOLD POSITION.' I SOON NOTICED A S80 TAXIING TOWARD RWY 8. WE AGAIN NOTIFIED GND OF OUR POSITION ON RWY 8/26 WITH ALL OUR AVAILABLE LIGHTS 'ON.' WE WERE AGAIN TOLD TO 'HOLD POSITION.' AS THE S80 APCHED RWY 8 WE NOTICED HIS LNDG LIGHTS ILLUMINATE AND HIS PROBABLE INTENTION TO INITIATE A ROLLING TKOF. WE AGAIN NOTIFIED GND CTLR OF OUR POSITION ON THE ACTIVE RWY 8 HOLDING OUR POSITION AS INSTRUCTED. HE AGAIN INSTRUCTED US TO 'HOLD POSITION'. I INTERPRETED THE SIT AS GND CTL NOT BEING ABLE TO COM EFFECTIVELY IN ENGLISH ALONG WITH THE S80 BEING UNAWARE OF THE SIT DUE TO BEING ON TWR FREQ. I ASSESS THE DEVELOPING SIT AND TO AVOID AN IMPENDING COLLISION, I TAKE EMER ACTION TO TAXI CLR OF RWY 8/26 WHILE AGAIN NOTIFYING GND THAT WE WERE ON RWY 8/26. AGAIN WITH THE S80 STARTING TKOF ROLL AND US EXPEDITING CLR OF RWY 8/26, WE WERE TOLD TO 'HOLD POSITION.' AFTER RWY ALIGNMENT, THE S80 SEES US ABORTS HIS TKOF. SUBSEQUENT COMS CONFIRMED THE LACK OF ENGLISH SPEAKING ABILITIES. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR INDICATED THAT HE HAS OPERATED INTO THE ARPT NUMEROUS TIMES AND THAT THE TXWY THAT RUNS PARALLEL TO RWY 9 IS USED AS A RWY AT TIMES. THE LIGHTING IS CONFUSING AND ON THE EVENING OF THE EVENT THE LIGHTS ON THE TXWY WERE NOT LIGHTED. THIS WAS DOUBLY CONFUSING TO THE RPTR AND HIS FO. ADDITIONALLY, THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME THAT THE FLT CREW HAD EXITED AT 'E' TXWY. NORMALLY THEY HAVE USED TXWY 'D' WHICH IS CLOSER TO THE TERMINAL. THEY WERE NOT FAMILIAR WITH THIS AREA OF THE ARPT. AFTER EXITING THE RWY AND TAKING THE WRONG TXWY THE RPTR INDICATED THAT THE LIGHTING WAS VERY CONFUSING AND THE SIGNAGE WAS NONEXISTENT. THEY TAXIED OVER THE EDGE LINES ON THE ADJACENT ACTIVE RWY BEFORE REALIZING THEY HAD. THEY NOTIFIED THE GND CTLR OF THIS FACT. THE LANGUAGE BARRIER WAS SO POOR THAT THE CTLR DID NOT UNDERSTAND THE POSITION OF THE ACFT AND CONTINUED TO SAY 'HOLD YOUR POSITION.' THIS SEQUENCE OF ATTEMPTING TO COM THEIR POSITION WITH THE CTLR WENT ON FOR SEVERAL MINS. THE CTLR WAS WORKING BOTH LOCAL AND GND FREQ. FINALLY THE FLT CREW OBSERVED ANOTHER ACFT (S80) TAKE THE RWY AND TURN ON THEIR LIGHTS FOR TKOF. WITH THEIR ACFT OVER THE EDGE LINES OF THE RWY AND THE POSSIBILITY OF A COLLISION EMINENT THE FLT CREW ELECTED TO CROSS THE RWY RAPIDLY TO A SAFER AREA. THE RPTR INDICATED THAT THE ACR DOES SUPPLY AN ADDITIONAL PAGE TO THE NORMAL COMMERCIAL CHART (10-7) WHICH HAS WARNINGS AND NOTES REGARDING SPECIFIC PROBS WITH THE ARPT. SUPPLEMENTAL RPT TO ACN 588227: RPTR CONTACTED FOR ADDITIONAL INFO REGARDING THE TIME OF DAY AND CONDITIONS. RPTR STATED THAT THE ARRIVAL WAS AT NIGHT AND IT WAS VERY DARK. THE METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS WERE CLR. RPTR INDICATED THAT THEY (FLT CREW) WERE AWARE THAT THE PARALLEL TXWY WAS USED AS A RWY ON OCCASION. THIS INFO WAS AVAILABLE AS A SUPPLEMENTAL TO THEIR 10-9 PAGE. HOWEVER, AFTER CLEARING THE ACTIVE THEY WERE LOOKING FOR THE RWY (PARALLEL TXWY) AND THE LIGHTING WAS SO POOR THAT THEY CONTINUED FORWARD UNTIL THEY INADVERTENTLY ENTERED THE INTERSECTING RWY. THE LIGHTING ON THE PARALLEL TXWY CONSISTED OF 'A LINE OF GREEN LIGHTS,' WHICH CONFUSED THEM. ADDITIONALLY, THE RPTR REITERATED THAT THE LANGUAGE BARRIER WAS CAUSING SUCH A DISTRACTION THAT THEY BECAME FRUSTRATED AND THIS MAY HAVE LED TO THEIR MISTAKE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.