Narrative:

We were inbound to ord on the BRD3. Irk transition STAR. Captain was PF. Flight time for leg was 1 hour 45 mins about 1 hour prior to arrival, we planned to call for the flight papers for our next leg, after receipt of new ord ATIS, as calling for flight papers ties up commercial radio. The new ATIS came out about 10 mins late at 10 mins past the hour. Shortly thereafter, we called for flight papers and our purser brought us our breakfast meals. We had been off the gate about 1 hour 20 mins and airborne 1 hour. Our flight papers were delivered piecemeal and slower than normal. The result was, I was eating, flight planning, running the radio, planning our arrival and monitoring the captain's flying simultaneously. While more than 200 NM from ord, we were given a clearance to cross keokk intersection at FL330. Captain acknowledged the clearance and programmed the FMGC for it. Captain thereafter missed beginning the descent at the FMGC calculated top-of-descent point by less than 10 NM. The captain first pushed the FCU altitude knob wishing to engage a VNAV descent. However, airbus logic presumes a cruise descent at 1000 FPM for dscnts begun more than 200 NM from the destination. By the time the captain realized that the autoplt was not descending fast enough it was too late. Captain disengaged the autoplt and autothrust and employed full speed brakes, but crossed keokk still about 800 ft high. We were given an ATC frequency change just prior to keokk, and neither controller mentioned our deviation or any loss of separation. Level at FL330, captain re-engaged autoplt 1 and moved the trust levers to the climb detent, intending to re-engage autothrust. However, unbeknownst to us, he failed to push the autothrust button on the FCU (the second step in engaging the autothrust system). Because of this, he had in reality manually set climb thrust, which had no adverse affect for our short segment at FL330. Soon followed clearance to FL290. Captain commanded a vertical speed descent of 1000 FPM. However, because the autothrust was not engaged, the thrust did not retard. The combination of 1000 FPM descent and climb thrust caused a momentary overspd of 2-5 KTS. Captain reduced thrust manually and decreased the descent rate to prevent more overspd. This overspd could have been easily prevented had either of us read the FMA's indicated on our primary flight displays as we have been trained to do over and over again throughout our careers as 'glass' aircraft pilots. Causes, either wholly or partly: 1) trying to do too many things at one time. 2) fatigue: short layover coupled with XA30 O'clock in the morning wake-up and a challenging/demanding departure out of den with deicing and winter operations. 3) low blood sugar: 14 hours since my last meal. 4) overconfidence on my part regarding this captain's fallibility, as this was our 26TH leg together this month throughout which he showed superior airmanship. And 5) late food, late ATIS, slow and piecemeal flight paper delivery.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A320 FLC EXCEEDS THE ACFT MAX SPD (VMO) DURING DSCNT AND MISSES THE ASSIGNED XING RESTR.

Narrative: WE WERE INBOUND TO ORD ON THE BRD3. IRK TRANSITION STAR. CAPT WAS PF. FLT TIME FOR LEG WAS 1 HR 45 MINS ABOUT 1 HR PRIOR TO ARR, WE PLANNED TO CALL FOR THE FLT PAPERS FOR OUR NEXT LEG, AFTER RECEIPT OF NEW ORD ATIS, AS CALLING FOR FLT PAPERS TIES UP COMMERCIAL RADIO. THE NEW ATIS CAME OUT ABOUT 10 MINS LATE AT 10 MINS PAST THE HR. SHORTLY THEREAFTER, WE CALLED FOR FLT PAPERS AND OUR PURSER BROUGHT US OUR BREAKFAST MEALS. WE HAD BEEN OFF THE GATE ABOUT 1 HR 20 MINS AND AIRBORNE 1 HR. OUR FLT PAPERS WERE DELIVERED PIECEMEAL AND SLOWER THAN NORMAL. THE RESULT WAS, I WAS EATING, FLT PLANNING, RUNNING THE RADIO, PLANNING OUR ARR AND MONITORING THE CAPT'S FLYING SIMULTANEOUSLY. WHILE MORE THAN 200 NM FROM ORD, WE WERE GIVEN A CLRNC TO CROSS KEOKK INTXN AT FL330. CAPT ACKNOWLEDGED THE CLRNC AND PROGRAMMED THE FMGC FOR IT. CAPT THEREAFTER MISSED BEGINNING THE DSCNT AT THE FMGC CALCULATED TOP-OF-DSCNT POINT BY LESS THAN 10 NM. THE CAPT FIRST PUSHED THE FCU ALT KNOB WISHING TO ENGAGE A VNAV DSCNT. HOWEVER, AIRBUS LOGIC PRESUMES A CRUISE DSCNT AT 1000 FPM FOR DSCNTS BEGUN MORE THAN 200 NM FROM THE DEST. BY THE TIME THE CAPT REALIZED THAT THE AUTOPLT WAS NOT DSNDING FAST ENOUGH IT WAS TOO LATE. CAPT DISENGAGED THE AUTOPLT AND AUTOTHRUST AND EMPLOYED FULL SPD BRAKES, BUT CROSSED KEOKK STILL ABOUT 800 FT HIGH. WE WERE GIVEN AN ATC FREQ CHANGE JUST PRIOR TO KEOKK, AND NEITHER CTLR MENTIONED OUR DEV OR ANY LOSS OF SEPARATION. LEVEL AT FL330, CAPT RE-ENGAGED AUTOPLT 1 AND MOVED THE TRUST LEVERS TO THE CLB DETENT, INTENDING TO RE-ENGAGE AUTOTHRUST. HOWEVER, UNBEKNOWNST TO US, HE FAILED TO PUSH THE AUTOTHRUST BUTTON ON THE FCU (THE SECOND STEP IN ENGAGING THE AUTOTHRUST SYS). BECAUSE OF THIS, HE HAD IN REALITY MANUALLY SET CLB THRUST, WHICH HAD NO ADVERSE AFFECT FOR OUR SHORT SEGMENT AT FL330. SOON FOLLOWED CLRNC TO FL290. CAPT COMMANDED A VERT SPD DSCNT OF 1000 FPM. HOWEVER, BECAUSE THE AUTOTHRUST WAS NOT ENGAGED, THE THRUST DID NOT RETARD. THE COMBINATION OF 1000 FPM DSCNT AND CLB THRUST CAUSED A MOMENTARY OVERSPD OF 2-5 KTS. CAPT REDUCED THRUST MANUALLY AND DECREASED THE DSCNT RATE TO PREVENT MORE OVERSPD. THIS OVERSPD COULD HAVE BEEN EASILY PREVENTED HAD EITHER OF US READ THE FMA'S INDICATED ON OUR PRIMARY FLT DISPLAYS AS WE HAVE BEEN TRAINED TO DO OVER AND OVER AGAIN THROUGHOUT OUR CAREERS AS 'GLASS' ACFT PLTS. CAUSES, EITHER WHOLLY OR PARTLY: 1) TRYING TO DO TOO MANY THINGS AT ONE TIME. 2) FATIGUE: SHORT LAYOVER COUPLED WITH XA30 O'CLOCK IN THE MORNING WAKE-UP AND A CHALLENGING/DEMANDING DEP OUT OF DEN WITH DEICING AND WINTER OPS. 3) LOW BLOOD SUGAR: 14 HRS SINCE MY LAST MEAL. 4) OVERCONFIDENCE ON MY PART REGARDING THIS CAPT'S FALLIBILITY, AS THIS WAS OUR 26TH LEG TOGETHER THIS MONTH THROUGHOUT WHICH HE SHOWED SUPERIOR AIRMANSHIP. AND 5) LATE FOOD, LATE ATIS, SLOW AND PIECEMEAL FLT PAPER DELIVERY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.