Narrative:

While working local control and controller in charge in the tower, with the WX very IFR (1 overcast 1/2 mi in fog, RVR 3000 ft), I was placed in a very unworkable situation with 2 aircraft on converging ILS approachs. The first one was an aircraft X (lifeguard flight) on the ILS for one runway and aircraft Y and a regional jet on the ILS for another runway. The rj had just been sent around on his previous approach due to insufficient separation on final with a C172. On his go around, I told the rj pilot we would get him right back around. He replied to the effect, 'good, because we can't do that again.' he had been holding for about 1 hour waiting for the fog to break. 2 other aircraft landed after the rj's go around -- a B757 and another rj. Next, aircraft X called me on about a 7 or 8 mi final for runway. I told him to give me his best forward speed on final due to approach vectoring the rj in tight on the ILS. He told me he could give me 115 KTS. On initial contact with the rj, I told him to reduce to his final approach speed so I wouldn't have to send him around again. I asked aircraft X if it was possible to send him around if I had to, or did he need to get on the ground? He said he needed to get on the ground. Even though he didn't say it, I assumed the rj was either at minimum fuel or very close to it due to his earlier comment. At this point, the aircraft were both within 5 mi of the runways. Within 30-45 seconds of the time I began talking to the rj, they had lost the required separation. I was placed in a position to have to send a minimum fuel aircraft around or a lifeguard aircraft -- neither of which was a good choice. I let the situation continue, working with both pilots to achieve a suitable outcome. I had the pilot of the lifeguard flight (aircraft X) tell me when he had the runway in sight, then expedite through the intersection. He was turning off the end of the runway when the rj went through the intersection. While they would not have hit, it was a bad situation all around. I didn't forward the pilot's comments from the rj to the radar room because I felt sure they would get him back around safely. After talking to the approach controller, he said he thought he had enough separation when he switched them to me and never paid any more attention to them. He was moderately busy and working all radar position combined. In the future, I will ensure everyone is aware of any comments pilots make about being unable to do certain things, and will talk to approach earlier to avoid the conflict I was put into. By the way, I had actually called in sick for this shift, but decided to come in anyway because I didn't want the rest of the people to have to work short. In the future, I will keep my sick leave and stay home when I don't feel 100% capable of performing my duties. I informally discussed this with the supervisor on duty that day.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ZZZ LCL CTLR ALLOWS DEVELOPING OPERROR DUE TO LACK OF APPROPRIATE CTL ACTIONS AND LACK OF INTERFAC COORD ABOUT POTENTIAL LOW FUEL SIT.

Narrative: WHILE WORKING LCL CTL AND CIC IN THE TWR, WITH THE WX VERY IFR (1 OVCST 1/2 MI IN FOG, RVR 3000 FT), I WAS PLACED IN A VERY UNWORKABLE SIT WITH 2 ACFT ON CONVERGING ILS APCHS. THE FIRST ONE WAS AN ACFT X (LIFEGUARD FLT) ON THE ILS FOR ONE RWY AND ACFT Y AND A REGIONAL JET ON THE ILS FOR ANOTHER RWY. THE RJ HAD JUST BEEN SENT AROUND ON HIS PREVIOUS APCH DUE TO INSUFFICIENT SEPARATION ON FINAL WITH A C172. ON HIS GAR, I TOLD THE RJ PLT WE WOULD GET HIM RIGHT BACK AROUND. HE REPLIED TO THE EFFECT, 'GOOD, BECAUSE WE CAN'T DO THAT AGAIN.' HE HAD BEEN HOLDING FOR ABOUT 1 HR WAITING FOR THE FOG TO BREAK. 2 OTHER ACFT LANDED AFTER THE RJ'S GAR -- A B757 AND ANOTHER RJ. NEXT, ACFT X CALLED ME ON ABOUT A 7 OR 8 MI FINAL FOR RWY. I TOLD HIM TO GIVE ME HIS BEST FORWARD SPD ON FINAL DUE TO APCH VECTORING THE RJ IN TIGHT ON THE ILS. HE TOLD ME HE COULD GIVE ME 115 KTS. ON INITIAL CONTACT WITH THE RJ, I TOLD HIM TO REDUCE TO HIS FINAL APCH SPD SO I WOULDN'T HAVE TO SEND HIM AROUND AGAIN. I ASKED ACFT X IF IT WAS POSSIBLE TO SEND HIM AROUND IF I HAD TO, OR DID HE NEED TO GET ON THE GND? HE SAID HE NEEDED TO GET ON THE GND. EVEN THOUGH HE DIDN'T SAY IT, I ASSUMED THE RJ WAS EITHER AT MINIMUM FUEL OR VERY CLOSE TO IT DUE TO HIS EARLIER COMMENT. AT THIS POINT, THE ACFT WERE BOTH WITHIN 5 MI OF THE RWYS. WITHIN 30-45 SECONDS OF THE TIME I BEGAN TALKING TO THE RJ, THEY HAD LOST THE REQUIRED SEPARATION. I WAS PLACED IN A POS TO HAVE TO SEND A MINIMUM FUEL ACFT AROUND OR A LIFEGUARD ACFT -- NEITHER OF WHICH WAS A GOOD CHOICE. I LET THE SIT CONTINUE, WORKING WITH BOTH PLTS TO ACHIEVE A SUITABLE OUTCOME. I HAD THE PLT OF THE LIFEGUARD FLT (ACFT X) TELL ME WHEN HE HAD THE RWY IN SIGHT, THEN EXPEDITE THROUGH THE INTXN. HE WAS TURNING OFF THE END OF THE RWY WHEN THE RJ WENT THROUGH THE INTXN. WHILE THEY WOULD NOT HAVE HIT, IT WAS A BAD SIT ALL AROUND. I DIDN'T FORWARD THE PLT'S COMMENTS FROM THE RJ TO THE RADAR ROOM BECAUSE I FELT SURE THEY WOULD GET HIM BACK AROUND SAFELY. AFTER TALKING TO THE APCH CTLR, HE SAID HE THOUGHT HE HAD ENOUGH SEPARATION WHEN HE SWITCHED THEM TO ME AND NEVER PAID ANY MORE ATTN TO THEM. HE WAS MODERATELY BUSY AND WORKING ALL RADAR POS COMBINED. IN THE FUTURE, I WILL ENSURE EVERYONE IS AWARE OF ANY COMMENTS PLTS MAKE ABOUT BEING UNABLE TO DO CERTAIN THINGS, AND WILL TALK TO APCH EARLIER TO AVOID THE CONFLICT I WAS PUT INTO. BY THE WAY, I HAD ACTUALLY CALLED IN SICK FOR THIS SHIFT, BUT DECIDED TO COME IN ANYWAY BECAUSE I DIDN'T WANT THE REST OF THE PEOPLE TO HAVE TO WORK SHORT. IN THE FUTURE, I WILL KEEP MY SICK LEAVE AND STAY HOME WHEN I DON'T FEEL 100% CAPABLE OF PERFORMING MY DUTIES. I INFORMALLY DISCUSSED THIS WITH THE SUPVR ON DUTY THAT DAY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.