Narrative:

Ready to depart bradshaw international, st kitts. Tower refused to pass our IFR clearance but let us position and hold. I asked if we were merely awaiting IFR release, in which case we could still copy the clearance, but the controller didn't seem to understand the distinction. In the absence of a clearance, I briefed a right turn on takeoff to join G633 wbound. Active runway took of eastbound. This would keep us clear of mountainous terrain to the north. When tower finally gave us our clearance, it was 'G633, as filed, left turnout.' he was insistent on the left turnout. He also cleared us for immediate takeoff. There is no published IFR departure so the left turnout raised questions. The clearance didn't specify how to join G633 at the NDB which was 2 NM wnw of the field, fly 15 NM north around the mountains, or turn continuously and join G633 west of the NDB. I chose the latter. This meant that I would have to get above the 4800 ft MSA before turning back over the island where mountains were obscured by twring cumulus. Not wanting to drive 15 NM east before turning around, I followed the coast north and told the captain that I would hold the turn until I could be assured of reaching 4800 ft before the mountains. In accordance with normal procedure, the captain PNF had set 160 KIAS in the flight director in order to steepen the climb. However, I was holding the attitude above the flight director bars (140 KIAS). The captain saw what I was doing and understood without our discussing it. As we passed about 4500 ft, I began the turn west, and the captain turned his attention to company communications. I wanted to stay VMC to avoid terrain and turbulence so I continued climbing to top the clouds at a saddle between twring cumulus. Eventually, I noticed that the first officer bars were awfully low for the mere 20 KT split between what I was flying and what was set. I crosschecked the altitude setting in the flight director -- it was set for our assigned altitude of 5000 ft -- we were passing 6000 ft. We dove back to our assigned altitude. After leveling, we inferred from radio traffic that opposite direction traffic was reason for our hold down. We got back to 5000 ft with about 17 NM to spare before the traffic passed. Factors contributing to the error: rushing. A late (and unexpected) clearance combined with arriving traffic squeezed us into taking off without a solid, briefed plan. Lack of available SID procedure. PNF attention to secondary tasks during transition (leveloff). The paradigm that we should avoid turbulence -- even though the passenger are strapped in. The desire to clear terrain (even though the MSA already provides adequate clearance). Improper use of the flight director. The captain and I concluded that I would have leveled off properly if I had called for a lower airspeed to be set and then followed the bars rather than disregarding them.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLC OVERSHOT ASSIGNED ALT DURING CLBOUT FROM SKB.

Narrative: READY TO DEPART BRADSHAW INTL, ST KITTS. TWR REFUSED TO PASS OUR IFR CLRNC BUT LET US POS AND HOLD. I ASKED IF WE WERE MERELY AWAITING IFR RELEASE, IN WHICH CASE WE COULD STILL COPY THE CLRNC, BUT THE CTLR DIDN'T SEEM TO UNDERSTAND THE DISTINCTION. IN THE ABSENCE OF A CLRNC, I BRIEFED A R TURN ON TKOF TO JOIN G633 WBOUND. ACTIVE RWY TOOK OF EBOUND. THIS WOULD KEEP US CLR OF MOUNTAINOUS TERRAIN TO THE N. WHEN TWR FINALLY GAVE US OUR CLRNC, IT WAS 'G633, AS FILED, L TURNOUT.' HE WAS INSISTENT ON THE L TURNOUT. HE ALSO CLRED US FOR IMMEDIATE TKOF. THERE IS NO PUBLISHED IFR DEP SO THE L TURNOUT RAISED QUESTIONS. THE CLRNC DIDN'T SPECIFY HOW TO JOIN G633 AT THE NDB WHICH WAS 2 NM WNW OF THE FIELD, FLY 15 NM N AROUND THE MOUNTAINS, OR TURN CONTINUOUSLY AND JOIN G633 W OF THE NDB. I CHOSE THE LATTER. THIS MEANT THAT I WOULD HAVE TO GET ABOVE THE 4800 FT MSA BEFORE TURNING BACK OVER THE ISLAND WHERE MOUNTAINS WERE OBSCURED BY TWRING CUMULUS. NOT WANTING TO DRIVE 15 NM E BEFORE TURNING AROUND, I FOLLOWED THE COAST N AND TOLD THE CAPT THAT I WOULD HOLD THE TURN UNTIL I COULD BE ASSURED OF REACHING 4800 FT BEFORE THE MOUNTAINS. IN ACCORDANCE WITH NORMAL PROC, THE CAPT PNF HAD SET 160 KIAS IN THE FLT DIRECTOR IN ORDER TO STEEPEN THE CLB. HOWEVER, I WAS HOLDING THE ATTITUDE ABOVE THE FLT DIRECTOR BARS (140 KIAS). THE CAPT SAW WHAT I WAS DOING AND UNDERSTOOD WITHOUT OUR DISCUSSING IT. AS WE PASSED ABOUT 4500 FT, I BEGAN THE TURN W, AND THE CAPT TURNED HIS ATTN TO COMPANY COMS. I WANTED TO STAY VMC TO AVOID TERRAIN AND TURB SO I CONTINUED CLBING TO TOP THE CLOUDS AT A SADDLE BTWN TWRING CUMULUS. EVENTUALLY, I NOTICED THAT THE FO BARS WERE AWFULLY LOW FOR THE MERE 20 KT SPLIT BTWN WHAT I WAS FLYING AND WHAT WAS SET. I XCHKED THE ALT SETTING IN THE FLT DIRECTOR -- IT WAS SET FOR OUR ASSIGNED ALT OF 5000 FT -- WE WERE PASSING 6000 FT. WE DOVE BACK TO OUR ASSIGNED ALT. AFTER LEVELING, WE INFERRED FROM RADIO TFC THAT OPPOSITE DIRECTION TFC WAS REASON FOR OUR HOLD DOWN. WE GOT BACK TO 5000 FT WITH ABOUT 17 NM TO SPARE BEFORE THE TFC PASSED. FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE ERROR: RUSHING. A LATE (AND UNEXPECTED) CLRNC COMBINED WITH ARRIVING TFC SQUEEZED US INTO TAKING OFF WITHOUT A SOLID, BRIEFED PLAN. LACK OF AVAILABLE SID PROC. PNF ATTN TO SECONDARY TASKS DURING TRANSITION (LEVELOFF). THE PARADIGM THAT WE SHOULD AVOID TURB -- EVEN THOUGH THE PAX ARE STRAPPED IN. THE DESIRE TO CLR TERRAIN (EVEN THOUGH THE MSA ALREADY PROVIDES ADEQUATE CLRNC). IMPROPER USE OF THE FLT DIRECTOR. THE CAPT AND I CONCLUDED THAT I WOULD HAVE LEVELED OFF PROPERLY IF I HAD CALLED FOR A LOWER AIRSPD TO BE SET AND THEN FOLLOWED THE BARS RATHER THAN DISREGARDING THEM.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.