Narrative:

During climb, the fire warning fault light flickered. I tested the fire warning and determined we had a bad 'B' loop on #2 engine. Retested with selector on 'a' and got good test. Moments later we observed a #1 overheat. Proceeded with the 'engine overheat' procedure. When the light did not go out, I started a turn back to alb and proceeded with the 'engine fire/severe damage or sep' checklist. As I was about to start the checklist, the overheat light went out. I continued to alb, declared an emergency and landed uneventfully with both engines running. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: after the aircraft had safely landed, the mechanics went into the computer box that is the controller for the fire and overheat indications and found moisture in the box. Mechanics observed that the moisture in the controling boxes, had an oily film on them which they feel came from anti-ice fluid. As anti-ice is sprayed under pressure, they feel quite certain that the fluid was forced into the electrical control boxes which caused the erroneous fire and overheat indications.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737-300 ACFT RECEIVES A FIRE WARNING FAULT LIGHT ON #2 ENG AND THEN AN OVERHEAT LIGHT ON #1 ENG.

Narrative: DURING CLB, THE FIRE WARNING FAULT LIGHT FLICKERED. I TESTED THE FIRE WARNING AND DETERMINED WE HAD A BAD 'B' LOOP ON #2 ENG. RETESTED WITH SELECTOR ON 'A' AND GOT GOOD TEST. MOMENTS LATER WE OBSERVED A #1 OVERHEAT. PROCEEDED WITH THE 'ENG OVERHEAT' PROC. WHEN THE LIGHT DID NOT GO OUT, I STARTED A TURN BACK TO ALB AND PROCEEDED WITH THE 'ENG FIRE/SEVERE DAMAGE OR SEP' CHKLIST. AS I WAS ABOUT TO START THE CHKLIST, THE OVERHEAT LIGHT WENT OUT. I CONTINUED TO ALB, DECLARED AN EMER AND LANDED UNEVENTFULLY WITH BOTH ENGS RUNNING. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: AFTER THE ACFT HAD SAFELY LANDED, THE MECHS WENT INTO THE COMPUTER BOX THAT IS THE CTLR FOR THE FIRE AND OVERHEAT INDICATIONS AND FOUND MOISTURE IN THE BOX. MECHS OBSERVED THAT THE MOISTURE IN THE CTLING BOXES, HAD AN OILY FILM ON THEM WHICH THEY FEEL CAME FROM ANTI-ICE FLUID. AS ANTI-ICE IS SPRAYED UNDER PRESSURE, THEY FEEL QUITE CERTAIN THAT THE FLUID WAS FORCED INTO THE ELECTRICAL CTL BOXES WHICH CAUSED THE ERRONEOUS FIRE AND OVERHEAT INDICATIONS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.