Narrative:

We were inbound to memphis on the middy arrival, cleared to cross middy at 10000 ft. Center had started us down early, so I was making a flatter than usual descent. When we got the WX, we found we would need to shoot a CAT ii (monitored) approach, so I turned over control to the first officer, and briefed the approach. I was checking his progress off and on to make sure we would make the middy restr, but must have gotten distracted at some point because next time I looked, we were coming close to middy (15 DME or so, I think) at an altitude too high to make the restr using our normal NM equals 2X thousands of ft to go 'how-goes-it' calculation. I pointed this out to the first officer, who immediately pulled full speed brakes and pushed over to barber pole. Center noticed our altitude just as we pushed over, and questioned it. I said we were coming right on downwind and did he want us to make a 360 degree to descend at middy? He said no, because he had another aircraft inbound right behind us and what was our rate of descent? The ivsi was pegged, indicating better than 6000 FPM. He told us to go over to approach frequency, but was clearly not pleased with us. We crossed middy at between 11000 ft and 11500 ft, leveling at 10000 ft at 1-2 mi inside the fix. First officer said that he had erroneously been figuring to cross mem VOR (not middy which is 30 DME from mem) at 10000 ft, and had been distracted by mentally reviewing his role in the coming CAT ii approach. The first officer had to assume control midway through a descent rather than planning and initiating the descent himself, which would have been less prone to error.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B727 FLC FAILED TO MAKE AN ALT XING RESTR AFTER RECEIVING INFO REGARDING THE WX CONDITIONS AT THE ARPT. THE CAPT HAD TRANSFERRED CTL TO THE FO SO THAT HE COULD BRIEF FOR THE CAT II APCH.

Narrative: WE WERE INBOUND TO MEMPHIS ON THE MIDDY ARR, CLRED TO CROSS MIDDY AT 10000 FT. CTR HAD STARTED US DOWN EARLY, SO I WAS MAKING A FLATTER THAN USUAL DSCNT. WHEN WE GOT THE WX, WE FOUND WE WOULD NEED TO SHOOT A CAT II (MONITORED) APCH, SO I TURNED OVER CTL TO THE FO, AND BRIEFED THE APCH. I WAS CHKING HIS PROGRESS OFF AND ON TO MAKE SURE WE WOULD MAKE THE MIDDY RESTR, BUT MUST HAVE GOTTEN DISTRACTED AT SOME POINT BECAUSE NEXT TIME I LOOKED, WE WERE COMING CLOSE TO MIDDY (15 DME OR SO, I THINK) AT AN ALT TOO HIGH TO MAKE THE RESTR USING OUR NORMAL NM EQUALS 2X THOUSANDS OF FT TO GO 'HOW-GOES-IT' CALCULATION. I POINTED THIS OUT TO THE FO, WHO IMMEDIATELY PULLED FULL SPD BRAKES AND PUSHED OVER TO BARBER POLE. CTR NOTICED OUR ALT JUST AS WE PUSHED OVER, AND QUESTIONED IT. I SAID WE WERE COMING R ON DOWNWIND AND DID HE WANT US TO MAKE A 360 DEG TO DSND AT MIDDY? HE SAID NO, BECAUSE HE HAD ANOTHER ACFT INBOUND RIGHT BEHIND US AND WHAT WAS OUR RATE OF DSCNT? THE IVSI WAS PEGGED, INDICATING BETTER THAN 6000 FPM. HE TOLD US TO GO OVER TO APCH FREQ, BUT WAS CLRLY NOT PLEASED WITH US. WE CROSSED MIDDY AT BTWN 11000 FT AND 11500 FT, LEVELING AT 10000 FT AT 1-2 MI INSIDE THE FIX. FO SAID THAT HE HAD ERRONEOUSLY BEEN FIGURING TO CROSS MEM VOR (NOT MIDDY WHICH IS 30 DME FROM MEM) AT 10000 FT, AND HAD BEEN DISTRACTED BY MENTALLY REVIEWING HIS ROLE IN THE COMING CAT II APCH. THE FO HAD TO ASSUME CTL MIDWAY THROUGH A DSCNT RATHER THAN PLANNING AND INITIATING THE DSCNT HIMSELF, WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN LESS PRONE TO ERROR.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.