Narrative:

Flight en route nrt-ord at approximately 227. TCASII advised 'traffic' followed immediately by RA descend showing green at 1500 ft plus. Began descent, visually sighted aircraft, (a B747) at approximately 1-5 mi. So reported 400 ft on TCASII as aircraft passed over. The incident took only seconds. Approximately act loss 500-600 ft. We had climbed to 350 at AM42 after asking tyo (through HF) for 350 from 330. Tokyo cleared us to 350 -- report reaching. We reported 350 to tyo who acknowledged. Called tyo immediately after incident to check on any other wbound traffic on 4-59o at 350. Told to 'standby.' asked for patch to ATC. Told, 'unable.' monitored tyo for response, but called hnl to verify 350 clear on A-590. Were advised that anc ATC showed us flight plan at 350 and no conflicting traffic. No further response from tyo after advising them of incident. Talked with other aircraft after incident. Captain reported he had climb resolution while we had descend resolution. His load: 401 passenger plus crew. Our load: 251 passenger plus crew. Nearly 700 people owe their lives to TCASII. Pulled circuit breaker on voice recorder to capture the clearance to climb, the acknowledgement and the level 350 call. The incident was also on the tape, air carrier refused to pull the tape. We flew back to tokyo the next day, we were not debriefed by anybody until later. It would seem the crew should have been debriefed to determine the wisdom of flying the very next day to tokyo. I personally slept only 2 hours. Supplemental information from acn 272173: altitude hold was taken off and the pitch wheel of the autoplt was turned in the down direction -- by the captain, who was flying. The response was to go slow, so he overrode the autoplt and forced the aircraft to begin descending. The so turned the seatbelt sign and ignition on. We went as low as FL342 before reclbing to FL350. We then decided to pull the voice recorder circuit breaker as it had all radio conversations and clrncs we had received. It also included discussions with other 747. After he went by we thought it would be valuable information needed for the investigation to follow. We notified the company of the incident and our actions. Was surprised upon landing 10 hours later in ord that no one, company, FAA, airline pilots assn met to debrief us or left any messages. Recommendations - - do not use autoplt as it is too slow. We were in a very small operational envelope between high speed buffet and low speed stall. Even so the reaction needs to be quicker though more notification from TCASII would be nice. We were closing at almost 1000 NM per hour. The instrument only shows a range of about 6 mi. The initial alert of traffic was off scale and hard to initially determine the other aircraft's altitude. A better response from tokyo ATC was needed. They stonewalled us when we needed help.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: NMAC.

Narrative: FLT ENRTE NRT-ORD AT APPROX 227. TCASII ADVISED 'TFC' FOLLOWED IMMEDIATELY BY RA DSND SHOWING GREEN AT 1500 FT PLUS. BEGAN DSCNT, VISUALLY SIGHTED ACFT, (A B747) AT APPROX 1-5 MI. SO RPTED 400 FT ON TCASII AS ACFT PASSED OVER. THE INCIDENT TOOK ONLY SECONDS. APPROX ACT LOSS 500-600 FT. WE HAD CLBED TO 350 AT AM42 AFTER ASKING TYO (THROUGH HF) FOR 350 FROM 330. TOKYO CLRED US TO 350 -- RPT REACHING. WE RPTED 350 TO TYO WHO ACKNOWLEDGED. CALLED TYO IMMEDIATELY AFTER INCIDENT TO CHK ON ANY OTHER WBOUND TFC ON 4-59O AT 350. TOLD TO 'STANDBY.' ASKED FOR PATCH TO ATC. TOLD, 'UNABLE.' MONITORED TYO FOR RESPONSE, BUT CALLED HNL TO VERIFY 350 CLR ON A-590. WERE ADVISED THAT ANC ATC SHOWED US FLT PLAN AT 350 AND NO CONFLICTING TFC. NO FURTHER RESPONSE FROM TYO AFTER ADVISING THEM OF INCIDENT. TALKED WITH OTHER ACFT AFTER INCIDENT. CAPT RPTED HE HAD CLB RESOLUTION WHILE WE HAD DSND RESOLUTION. HIS LOAD: 401 PAX PLUS CREW. OUR LOAD: 251 PAX PLUS CREW. NEARLY 700 PEOPLE OWE THEIR LIVES TO TCASII. PULLED CIRCUIT BREAKER ON VOICE RECORDER TO CAPTURE THE CLRNC TO CLB, THE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT AND THE LEVEL 350 CALL. THE INCIDENT WAS ALSO ON THE TAPE, ACR REFUSED TO PULL THE TAPE. WE FLEW BACK TO TOKYO THE NEXT DAY, WE WERE NOT DEBRIEFED BY ANYBODY UNTIL LATER. IT WOULD SEEM THE CREW SHOULD HAVE BEEN DEBRIEFED TO DETERMINE THE WISDOM OF FLYING THE VERY NEXT DAY TO TOKYO. I PERSONALLY SLEPT ONLY 2 HRS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 272173: ALT HOLD WAS TAKEN OFF AND THE PITCH WHEEL OF THE AUTOPLT WAS TURNED IN THE DOWN DIRECTION -- BY THE CAPT, WHO WAS FLYING. THE RESPONSE WAS TO GO SLOW, SO HE OVERRODE THE AUTOPLT AND FORCED THE ACFT TO BEGIN DSNDING. THE SO TURNED THE SEATBELT SIGN AND IGNITION ON. WE WENT AS LOW AS FL342 BEFORE RECLBING TO FL350. WE THEN DECIDED TO PULL THE VOICE RECORDER CIRCUIT BREAKER AS IT HAD ALL RADIO CONVERSATIONS AND CLRNCS WE HAD RECEIVED. IT ALSO INCLUDED DISCUSSIONS WITH OTHER 747. AFTER HE WENT BY WE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE VALUABLE INFO NEEDED FOR THE INVESTIGATION TO FOLLOW. WE NOTIFIED THE COMPANY OF THE INCIDENT AND OUR ACTIONS. WAS SURPRISED UPON LNDG 10 HRS LATER IN ORD THAT NO ONE, COMPANY, FAA, AIRLINE PLTS ASSN MET TO DEBRIEF US OR LEFT ANY MESSAGES. RECOMMENDATIONS - - DO NOT USE AUTOPLT AS IT IS TOO SLOW. WE WERE IN A VERY SMALL OPERATIONAL ENVELOPE BTWN HIGH SPD BUFFET AND LOW SPD STALL. EVEN SO THE REACTION NEEDS TO BE QUICKER THOUGH MORE NOTIFICATION FROM TCASII WOULD BE NICE. WE WERE CLOSING AT ALMOST 1000 NM PER HR. THE INST ONLY SHOWS A RANGE OF ABOUT 6 MI. THE INITIAL ALERT OF TFC WAS OFF SCALE AND HARD TO INITIALLY DETERMINE THE OTHER ACFT'S ALT. A BETTER RESPONSE FROM TOKYO ATC WAS NEEDED. THEY STONEWALLED US WHEN WE NEEDED HELP.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.