Narrative:

We pushed back from the gate at or near the scheduled departure time. WX conditions at the time included an overcast sky and snow. There was snow and ice on the ramp and taxiway surface. Painted markings on the pavement were not visible due to snow and ice accumulation. Taxiway edge lights were visible. We taxied from the gate to the D-8 deicing area. The aircraft was then treated with the deice solution. Following deicing, we proceeded to taxi in accordance with our clearance. The aircraft was pwred by a single engine (#1). While turning south on taxiway D from taxiway D-9, I felt the nosewheel begin to slide. I then applied full main wheel brakes and reverse thrust on the #1 engine. The nosewheel continued to slide until it exited the taxiway. The remainder of the aircraft remained on the taxiway. I shut down the #1 engine. I contacted ground control and maintenance. Maintenance personnel then came to the aircraft. A maintenance supervisor was on the scene. Maintenance contacted the flight crew by aircraft intercom. The maintenance personnel advised that the nosewheel was not very far from the edge of the taxiway, and that both main gear were on the taxiway. Maintenance further stated that the nosewheel 'did not sink in' and that the nosewheel had not struck a taxiway edge lights. Upon further inspection, maintenance advised that they would be unable to extricate the nosewheel through use of the tug. Maintenance also advised that there was no damage to the nose gear. Maintenance then suggested that the crew employ engine reverse to back the aircraft. I determined that the use of engine reverse would be the safest and most appropriate course of action. The crew then briefed on the use of reverse thrust. We briefed the flight attendants and passenger on both the status of the situation, and of our intention to back the aircraft on the taxiway. We then started all 3 engines. Engines #1 and #3 were placed in idle reverse. A small amount of reverse thrust was placed on #2. The aircraft returned to the taxiway without difficulty. This movement was coordinated with ground marshallers, who informed us that the area was clear, and signaled when the nosewheel returned to the taxiway. Maintenance then inspected the nose gear and advised that there was no damage. We then taxied the aircraft to the gate where maintenance personnel again inspected the nose gear, and a logbook entry was made. Maintenance advised that there was no mud above the tire chines. Maintenance also advised that there was no damage to the aircraft. Upon being redispatched, we continued the flight without further incident. Supplemental information from acn 260588: the cause of our problem was the slippery taxiway that could have possibly been cleared of the snow/ice or possibly sanded to assure better turning/stopping capability. The runway on our arrival and departure were in good condition. If the txwys were even in half as good a condition as the runway, I feel this incident would have never happened.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR MLG EXPERIENCES TXWY EXCURSION IN A NIGHT OP. LOSS OF ACFT CTL.

Narrative: WE PUSHED BACK FROM THE GATE AT OR NEAR THE SCHEDULED DEP TIME. WX CONDITIONS AT THE TIME INCLUDED AN OVCST SKY AND SNOW. THERE WAS SNOW AND ICE ON THE RAMP AND TXWY SURFACE. PAINTED MARKINGS ON THE PAVEMENT WERE NOT VISIBLE DUE TO SNOW AND ICE ACCUMULATION. TXWY EDGE LIGHTS WERE VISIBLE. WE TAXIED FROM THE GATE TO THE D-8 DEICING AREA. THE ACFT WAS THEN TREATED WITH THE DEICE SOLUTION. FOLLOWING DEICING, WE PROCEEDED TO TAXI IN ACCORDANCE WITH OUR CLRNC. THE ACFT WAS PWRED BY A SINGLE ENG (#1). WHILE TURNING S ON TXWY D FROM TXWY D-9, I FELT THE NOSEWHEEL BEGIN TO SLIDE. I THEN APPLIED FULL MAIN WHEEL BRAKES AND REVERSE THRUST ON THE #1 ENG. THE NOSEWHEEL CONTINUED TO SLIDE UNTIL IT EXITED THE TXWY. THE REMAINDER OF THE ACFT REMAINED ON THE TXWY. I SHUT DOWN THE #1 ENG. I CONTACTED GND CTL AND MAINT. MAINT PERSONNEL THEN CAME TO THE ACFT. A MAINT SUPVR WAS ON THE SCENE. MAINT CONTACTED THE FLC BY ACFT INTERCOM. THE MAINT PERSONNEL ADVISED THAT THE NOSEWHEEL WAS NOT VERY FAR FROM THE EDGE OF THE TXWY, AND THAT BOTH MAIN GEAR WERE ON THE TXWY. MAINT FURTHER STATED THAT THE NOSEWHEEL 'DID NOT SINK IN' AND THAT THE NOSEWHEEL HAD NOT STRUCK A TXWY EDGE LIGHTS. UPON FURTHER INSPECTION, MAINT ADVISED THAT THEY WOULD BE UNABLE TO EXTRICATE THE NOSEWHEEL THROUGH USE OF THE TUG. MAINT ALSO ADVISED THAT THERE WAS NO DAMAGE TO THE NOSE GEAR. MAINT THEN SUGGESTED THAT THE CREW EMPLOY ENG REVERSE TO BACK THE ACFT. I DETERMINED THAT THE USE OF ENG REVERSE WOULD BE THE SAFEST AND MOST APPROPRIATE COURSE OF ACTION. THE CREW THEN BRIEFED ON THE USE OF REVERSE THRUST. WE BRIEFED THE FLT ATTENDANTS AND PAX ON BOTH THE STATUS OF THE SIT, AND OF OUR INTENTION TO BACK THE ACFT ON THE TXWY. WE THEN STARTED ALL 3 ENGS. ENGS #1 AND #3 WERE PLACED IN IDLE REVERSE. A SMALL AMOUNT OF REVERSE THRUST WAS PLACED ON #2. THE ACFT RETURNED TO THE TXWY WITHOUT DIFFICULTY. THIS MOVEMENT WAS COORDINATED WITH GND MARSHALLERS, WHO INFORMED US THAT THE AREA WAS CLR, AND SIGNALED WHEN THE NOSEWHEEL RETURNED TO THE TXWY. MAINT THEN INSPECTED THE NOSE GEAR AND ADVISED THAT THERE WAS NO DAMAGE. WE THEN TAXIED THE ACFT TO THE GATE WHERE MAINT PERSONNEL AGAIN INSPECTED THE NOSE GEAR, AND A LOGBOOK ENTRY WAS MADE. MAINT ADVISED THAT THERE WAS NO MUD ABOVE THE TIRE CHINES. MAINT ALSO ADVISED THAT THERE WAS NO DAMAGE TO THE ACFT. UPON BEING REDISPATCHED, WE CONTINUED THE FLT WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FROM ACN 260588: THE CAUSE OF OUR PROB WAS THE SLIPPERY TXWY THAT COULD HAVE POSSIBLY BEEN CLRED OF THE SNOW/ICE OR POSSIBLY SANDED TO ASSURE BETTER TURNING/STOPPING CAPABILITY. THE RWY ON OUR ARR AND DEP WERE IN GOOD CONDITION. IF THE TXWYS WERE EVEN IN HALF AS GOOD A CONDITION AS THE RWY, I FEEL THIS INCIDENT WOULD HAVE NEVER HAPPENED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.