Narrative:

En route to mckellar airport from M01 I tuned in to 123.6 approximately 20 mi west and listened to advisories giving winds as 340 at 9 KTS and runway 2 as the active runway. I called FSS at 10 mi west and received an airport advisory giving what I understood as runway 2 as the active runway with winds still at 340. Several other aircraft were reported in the area conducting IFR training holding over the VOR and shooting practice approachs. I advised I would be entering left downwind for runway 2 and actively began scanning for traffic. I saw no traffic but shortly before turning downwind I heard another aircraft on approach for runway 20. At this time, the fact that the other airplane was on approach to the reciprocal runway did not register, perhaps due to the similarity in numbers of the runways (2 and 20). I broadcast entering downwind and asked for the location of the other aircraft who replied he was on final for 20. As I continued on a long downwind and turned base leg, I saw an airplane in the position where I expected to find the other airplane and called out that I had the traffic on final to runway 20 in sight. This airplane continued north without landing and I continued my approach, broadcasting that I was on final for runway 20 when I was in fact on final for runway 2. Approximately 1/2 mi from the threshold, I heard another aircraft ask if I was on final for runway 2 or runway 20. At the same time I observed the other airplane off to my 2 O'clock position in a steep climbing left turn approximately 300 ft above me and 1000 ft away. At this time I recognized that I had been on a conflicting approach with this aircraft and initiated a right climbing turn following the other airplane on a left downwind to runway 20. I advised over the radio that I had misunderstood the active runway and broadcast my intention to follow the aircraft downwind for runway 20 and land behind him. The other airplane continued north out of the traffic pattern and I landed on runway 20. About 10 mins after I landed, the other airplane landed and I approached the pilot to discuss the incident and explain my actions. The other occupant of the plane idented himself as a FAA designated examiner and became very irate. I was unable to carry on a rational discussion with him, so I apologized and left. I still do not know the name of the pilot or the passenger in the other aircraft. In retrospect, I believe this incident occurred because of my reaction to the initial information I heard over the advisory and the similarity in runway numbers. What I initially heard on the advisory frequency was runway 2 and winds 340 at 9 KTS. This seemed to be the logical runway for the wind conditions and I simply did not comprehend the change in runway when the wind remained the same and the runway. And it's reciprocal sounded so much alike. After this, I will forever be careful of heading 020 and the reciprocal of 200. Perhaps these could be pronounced in a different way. It has long been recognized that 5 and 9 require special attention. I submit that being on a heading of 0-2-0 is easily misconstrued to be the approach heading to runway 2-0. This incident has destroyed my complacency and led to my rethinking of radio terminology. Henceforth, when there is any chance of misunderstanding, I will use radio terminology which includes the nearest cardinal heading such as runway 2-0 to the south or runway 2 landing to the north.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: 2 SMAS WERE NOSE TO NOSE ON LNDG APCH TO RWYS 2 AND 20.

Narrative: ENRTE TO MCKELLAR ARPT FROM M01 I TUNED IN TO 123.6 APPROX 20 MI W AND LISTENED TO ADVISORIES GIVING WINDS AS 340 AT 9 KTS AND RWY 2 AS THE ACTIVE RWY. I CALLED FSS AT 10 MI W AND RECEIVED AN ARPT ADVISORY GIVING WHAT I UNDERSTOOD AS RWY 2 AS THE ACTIVE RWY WITH WINDS STILL AT 340. SEVERAL OTHER ACFT WERE RPTED IN THE AREA CONDUCTING IFR TRAINING HOLDING OVER THE VOR AND SHOOTING PRACTICE APCHS. I ADVISED I WOULD BE ENTERING L DOWNWIND FOR RWY 2 AND ACTIVELY BEGAN SCANNING FOR TFC. I SAW NO TFC BUT SHORTLY BEFORE TURNING DOWNWIND I HEARD ANOTHER ACFT ON APCH FOR RWY 20. AT THIS TIME, THE FACT THAT THE OTHER AIRPLANE WAS ON APCH TO THE RECIPROCAL RWY DID NOT REGISTER, PERHAPS DUE TO THE SIMILARITY IN NUMBERS OF THE RWYS (2 AND 20). I BROADCAST ENTERING DOWNWIND AND ASKED FOR THE LOCATION OF THE OTHER ACFT WHO REPLIED HE WAS ON FINAL FOR 20. AS I CONTINUED ON A LONG DOWNWIND AND TURNED BASE LEG, I SAW AN AIRPLANE IN THE POS WHERE I EXPECTED TO FIND THE OTHER AIRPLANE AND CALLED OUT THAT I HAD THE TFC ON FINAL TO RWY 20 IN SIGHT. THIS AIRPLANE CONTINUED N WITHOUT LNDG AND I CONTINUED MY APCH, BROADCASTING THAT I WAS ON FINAL FOR RWY 20 WHEN I WAS IN FACT ON FINAL FOR RWY 2. APPROX 1/2 MI FROM THE THRESHOLD, I HEARD ANOTHER ACFT ASK IF I WAS ON FINAL FOR RWY 2 OR RWY 20. AT THE SAME TIME I OBSERVED THE OTHER AIRPLANE OFF TO MY 2 O'CLOCK POS IN A STEEP CLBING L TURN APPROX 300 FT ABOVE ME AND 1000 FT AWAY. AT THIS TIME I RECOGNIZED THAT I HAD BEEN ON A CONFLICTING APCH WITH THIS ACFT AND INITIATED A R CLBING TURN FOLLOWING THE OTHER AIRPLANE ON A L DOWNWIND TO RWY 20. I ADVISED OVER THE RADIO THAT I HAD MISUNDERSTOOD THE ACTIVE RWY AND BROADCAST MY INTENTION TO FOLLOW THE ACFT DOWNWIND FOR RWY 20 AND LAND BEHIND HIM. THE OTHER AIRPLANE CONTINUED N OUT OF THE TFC PATTERN AND I LANDED ON RWY 20. ABOUT 10 MINS AFTER I LANDED, THE OTHER AIRPLANE LANDED AND I APCHED THE PLT TO DISCUSS THE INCIDENT AND EXPLAIN MY ACTIONS. THE OTHER OCCUPANT OF THE PLANE IDENTED HIMSELF AS A FAA DESIGNATED EXAMINER AND BECAME VERY IRATE. I WAS UNABLE TO CARRY ON A RATIONAL DISCUSSION WITH HIM, SO I APOLOGIZED AND LEFT. I STILL DO NOT KNOW THE NAME OF THE PLT OR THE PAX IN THE OTHER ACFT. IN RETROSPECT, I BELIEVE THIS INCIDENT OCCURRED BECAUSE OF MY REACTION TO THE INITIAL INFO I HEARD OVER THE ADVISORY AND THE SIMILARITY IN RWY NUMBERS. WHAT I INITIALLY HEARD ON THE ADVISORY FREQ WAS RWY 2 AND WINDS 340 AT 9 KTS. THIS SEEMED TO BE THE LOGICAL RWY FOR THE WIND CONDITIONS AND I SIMPLY DID NOT COMPREHEND THE CHANGE IN RWY WHEN THE WIND REMAINED THE SAME AND THE RWY. AND IT'S RECIPROCAL SOUNDED SO MUCH ALIKE. AFTER THIS, I WILL FOREVER BE CAREFUL OF HDG 020 AND THE RECIPROCAL OF 200. PERHAPS THESE COULD BE PRONOUNCED IN A DIFFERENT WAY. IT HAS LONG BEEN RECOGNIZED THAT 5 AND 9 REQUIRE SPECIAL ATTN. I SUBMIT THAT BEING ON A HDG OF 0-2-0 IS EASILY MISCONSTRUED TO BE THE APCH HDG TO RWY 2-0. THIS INCIDENT HAS DESTROYED MY COMPLACENCY AND LED TO MY RETHINKING OF RADIO TERMINOLOGY. HENCEFORTH, WHEN THERE IS ANY CHANCE OF MISUNDERSTANDING, I WILL USE RADIO TERMINOLOGY WHICH INCLUDES THE NEAREST CARDINAL HDG SUCH AS RWY 2-0 TO THE S OR RWY 2 LNDG TO THE N.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.