Narrative:

I was captain of air carrier X. As is normal under visual conditions we were initially cleared to cross sfo VOR at 11000, 250 KTS and shortly before arriving there we were given a vector to 100 degrees and cleared to 6000 ft. The WX conditions were approximately 15 scattered 20 broken 20 visibility. Nearing the VOR at 11000 ft I could see the airport clearly, but clouds obscured most of the western half of the san mateo bridge and the foster city area. During the descent to 6000 ft we were given a frequency change and I instructed the first officer to ask the new controller 'how far out are you going to take us?' his response indicated that we were #1 for 28L and that the position of our base leg was our option. The first officer, who is nearly as new in his seat as I am in mine, transmitted that we had the airport in sight, without considering the aircraft's confign of position, or the position of the clouds in relation to the airport and before we could discuss these things, we were cleared for the visual approach to 28L. At this point we were about 7000 ft, gear down, flaps 5 degrees, speed brakes up, 200 KTS and I could see the eastern half of the san mateo bridge and turned base. As we continued to descend steeply, our sight angle to the runway eventually was obscured by clouds, and visual contact was lost. I could see coyote point, the yacht basin and the bay through the broken clouds below us and in retrospect wish I'd have made a missed approach at this point. But I turned parallel to the final approach course about 1/4 mi east of it in order to descend through a break in the clouds. We reacquired the airport at about 1000 ft, made a left turn to align with the 28L extended centerline, then landed normally. This situation happened because I allowed an overly aggressive first officer to push me into attempting/continuing a visual approach for which the aircraft was not properly positioned and configured (too high, too fast, too close) and in attempting to confront these problems and their inherent high workload completely forgot the requirement to keep the runway in sight, and the option of executing a missed approach. I am satisfied that we both understand how clouds in the vicinity of the bridge complicate and compromise the ability to legally execute the 'slam dunk' approach, and am convinced that our extensive debrief will allow us to recognize this problem in the future.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR X ENTERED IMC WHILE EXECUTING A VISUAL APCH TO SFO. PLTDEV.

Narrative: I WAS CAPT OF ACR X. AS IS NORMAL UNDER VISUAL CONDITIONS WE WERE INITIALLY CLRED TO CROSS SFO VOR AT 11000, 250 KTS AND SHORTLY BEFORE ARRIVING THERE WE WERE GIVEN A VECTOR TO 100 DEGS AND CLRED TO 6000 FT. THE WX CONDITIONS WERE APPROX 15 SCATTERED 20 BROKEN 20 VISIBILITY. NEARING THE VOR AT 11000 FT I COULD SEE THE ARPT CLRLY, BUT CLOUDS OBSCURED MOST OF THE WESTERN HALF OF THE SAN MATEO BRIDGE AND THE FOSTER CITY AREA. DURING THE DSCNT TO 6000 FT WE WERE GIVEN A FREQ CHANGE AND I INSTRUCTED THE FO TO ASK THE NEW CTLR 'HOW FAR OUT ARE YOU GOING TO TAKE US?' HIS RESPONSE INDICATED THAT WE WERE #1 FOR 28L AND THAT THE POS OF OUR BASE LEG WAS OUR OPTION. THE FO, WHO IS NEARLY AS NEW IN HIS SEAT AS I AM IN MINE, XMITTED THAT WE HAD THE ARPT IN SIGHT, WITHOUT CONSIDERING THE ACFT'S CONFIGN OF POS, OR THE POS OF THE CLOUDS IN RELATION TO THE ARPT AND BEFORE WE COULD DISCUSS THESE THINGS, WE WERE CLRED FOR THE VISUAL APCH TO 28L. AT THIS POINT WE WERE ABOUT 7000 FT, GEAR DOWN, FLAPS 5 DEGS, SPD BRAKES UP, 200 KTS AND I COULD SEE THE EASTERN HALF OF THE SAN MATEO BRIDGE AND TURNED BASE. AS WE CONTINUED TO DSND STEEPLY, OUR SIGHT ANGLE TO THE RWY EVENTUALLY WAS OBSCURED BY CLOUDS, AND VISUAL CONTACT WAS LOST. I COULD SEE COYOTE POINT, THE YACHT BASIN AND THE BAY THROUGH THE BROKEN CLOUDS BELOW US AND IN RETROSPECT WISH I'D HAVE MADE A MISSED APCH AT THIS POINT. BUT I TURNED PARALLEL TO THE FINAL APCH COURSE ABOUT 1/4 MI E OF IT IN ORDER TO DSND THROUGH A BREAK IN THE CLOUDS. WE REACQUIRED THE ARPT AT ABOUT 1000 FT, MADE A L TURN TO ALIGN WITH THE 28L EXTENDED CTRLINE, THEN LANDED NORMALLY. THIS SITUATION HAPPENED BECAUSE I ALLOWED AN OVERLY AGGRESSIVE FO TO PUSH ME INTO ATTEMPTING/CONTINUING A VISUAL APCH FOR WHICH THE ACFT WAS NOT PROPERLY POSITIONED AND CONFIGURED (TOO HIGH, TOO FAST, TOO CLOSE) AND IN ATTEMPTING TO CONFRONT THESE PROBLEMS AND THEIR INHERENT HIGH WORKLOAD COMPLETELY FORGOT THE REQUIREMENT TO KEEP THE RWY IN SIGHT, AND THE OPTION OF EXECUTING A MISSED APCH. I AM SATISFIED THAT WE BOTH UNDERSTAND HOW CLOUDS IN THE VICINITY OF THE BRIDGE COMPLICATE AND COMPROMISE THE ABILITY TO LEGALLY EXECUTE THE 'SLAM DUNK' APCH, AND AM CONVINCED THAT OUR EXTENSIVE DEBRIEF WILL ALLOW US TO RECOGNIZE THIS PROBLEM IN THE FUTURE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.