Narrative:

On landing rollout on 22L, received the following instructions, 'turn (left?) on papa, hold short of 22R at alpha.' had taxiway chart out and ready, but in effort to expedite, continued our right turn around north on papa, as previous aircraft had done 90 seconds earlier. While in the turn, we located alpha on taxi diagram as south of our position (should have been a left turn). Controller informed us of our error. Both of us had thought we heard 'turn right.' new instructions were now given to 'hold short of 22R at echo.' as we were approaching echo, I was rechking taxi diagram. As I looked up, we were just entering 22R, tower was cancelling previous 22R takeoff clearance given to another aircraft. In an instant we realized what had happened and hurried across (captain thought he had heard 'cleared to cross 22R at echo.') traffic that was cleared for takeoff was not yet on the roll and possibly not yet on the runway to the best of our knowledge. (We saw no landing lights in position on runway) we reported clear of runway. We believe that the distraction of the first miscue contributed to the occurrence of the second. Also, the non-standard labeling of taxiways and non-standard signage can at times complicate the procedure of taxiing the aircraft. To preempt such a situation in the future, I plan to spend a few moments in flight (time permitting) reviewing unfamiliar airport diagrams for taxiway labeling and trying to anticipate routing after landing. Supplemental information from acn 191441. On landing rollout told to make 'right' turn on papa but meant right turnoff runway 22L and left turn on 'papa to hold short at' alpha. After making right turn on 'papa' she informed us we were suppose to make left turn instead. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information. Reporter states he feels the initial taxi instructions were issued at a time which was distracting as crew was trying to slow aircraft and locate the high speed turnoff. Also there is no choice but to turn right off the runway, so when they turned onto the high speed they turned right as directed. Only problem was that was not what controller meant. They were quite upset with themselves which probably contributed to the following incident. Real problem came when first officer heard clearance properly. Looked at airport diagram to figure where echo was. Captain was sure he heard cross 22R and did so before first officer could stop him.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR CROSSES RWY WITHOUT CLRNC.

Narrative: ON LNDG ROLLOUT ON 22L, RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS, 'TURN (L?) ON PAPA, HOLD SHORT OF 22R AT ALPHA.' HAD TAXIWAY CHART OUT AND READY, BUT IN EFFORT TO EXPEDITE, CONTINUED OUR R TURN AROUND N ON PAPA, AS PREVIOUS ACFT HAD DONE 90 SECONDS EARLIER. WHILE IN THE TURN, WE LOCATED ALPHA ON TAXI DIAGRAM AS S OF OUR POS (SHOULD HAVE BEEN A L TURN). CTLR INFORMED US OF OUR ERROR. BOTH OF US HAD THOUGHT WE HEARD 'TURN R.' NEW INSTRUCTIONS WERE NOW GIVEN TO 'HOLD SHORT OF 22R AT ECHO.' AS WE WERE APCHING ECHO, I WAS RECHKING TAXI DIAGRAM. AS I LOOKED UP, WE WERE JUST ENTERING 22R, TWR WAS CANCELLING PREVIOUS 22R TKOF CLRNC GIVEN TO ANOTHER ACFT. IN AN INSTANT WE REALIZED WHAT HAD HAPPENED AND HURRIED ACROSS (CAPT THOUGHT HE HAD HEARD 'CLRED TO CROSS 22R AT ECHO.') TFC THAT WAS CLRED FOR TKOF WAS NOT YET ON THE ROLL AND POSSIBLY NOT YET ON THE RWY TO THE BEST OF OUR KNOWLEDGE. (WE SAW NO LNDG LIGHTS IN POS ON RWY) WE RPTED CLR OF RWY. WE BELIEVE THAT THE DISTR OF THE FIRST MISCUE CONTRIBUTED TO THE OCCURRENCE OF THE SECOND. ALSO, THE NON-STANDARD LABELING OF TAXIWAYS AND NON-STANDARD SIGNAGE CAN AT TIMES COMPLICATE THE PROC OF TAXIING THE ACFT. TO PREEMPT SUCH A SITUATION IN THE FUTURE, I PLAN TO SPEND A FEW MOMENTS IN FLT (TIME PERMITTING) REVIEWING UNFAMILIAR ARPT DIAGRAMS FOR TAXIWAY LABELING AND TRYING TO ANTICIPATE RTING AFTER LNDG. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 191441. ON LNDG ROLLOUT TOLD TO MAKE 'R' TURN ON PAPA BUT MEANT R TURNOFF RWY 22L AND L TURN ON 'PAPA TO HOLD SHORT AT' ALPHA. AFTER MAKING R TURN ON 'PAPA' SHE INFORMED US WE WERE SUPPOSE TO MAKE L TURN INSTEAD. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO. RPTR STATES HE FEELS THE INITIAL TAXI INSTRUCTIONS WERE ISSUED AT A TIME WHICH WAS DISTRACTING AS CREW WAS TRYING TO SLOW ACFT AND LOCATE THE HIGH SPD TURNOFF. ALSO THERE IS NO CHOICE BUT TO TURN R OFF THE RWY, SO WHEN THEY TURNED ONTO THE HIGH SPD THEY TURNED R AS DIRECTED. ONLY PROBLEM WAS THAT WAS NOT WHAT CTLR MEANT. THEY WERE QUITE UPSET WITH THEMSELVES WHICH PROBABLY CONTRIBUTED TO THE FOLLOWING INCIDENT. REAL PROBLEM CAME WHEN FO HEARD CLRNC PROPERLY. LOOKED AT ARPT DIAGRAM TO FIGURE WHERE ECHO WAS. CAPT WAS SURE HE HEARD CROSS 22R AND DID SO BEFORE FO COULD STOP HIM.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.