Narrative:

While in cruise at FL310, the #1 flight attendant reported that the #4 flight attendant had observed a light bulb pop in the vicinity of the overhead bin by row 12 and smelled smoke. A few mins later she reported that the smoke appeared to be increasing. The captain initiated a divert to nashville airport and I began performing the checklist procedures for electrical fire or smoke -- unknown source. While the checklist was being performed, the flight attendants determined that a small fire had started behind a panel by the overhead compartment at row 12 and used 2 fire extinguishers to extinguish the flames. The diversion was completed to nashville in VMC conditions without further incident. Although coordination between cockpit and cabin crews was excellent. I learned in subsequent discussions with the flight attendants that they did not have an accurate comprehension of the scope of our checklist procedures. They thought that we basically 'turned all the electricity off'. In actuality, the checklist isolates various portions of the electrical system until the source of ignition/smoke is discovered. Though not a factor in this incident, this lack of understanding about the checklist procedures by the cabin crew could result in a delay in isolating the ignition source or, worse yet, a misident of the source. While I'm not suggesting that flight attendants be familiar with all cockpit emergency procedures, the general scope of procedures for an electrical fire is the same for all large turbojet aircraft and a working knowledge of this would greatly enhance crew coordination between the front and back ends. I'm not familiar with flight attendant training requirements, but in retrospect it seems like a great idea to have them briefed on what the cockpit crew is doing in a situation like this and vice versa.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ELECTRICAL FIRE BEHIND LIGHT PANEL IN CABIN, CTLED BY CABIN ATTENDANTS. FLC MADE LNDG AT NEAREST SUITABLE ARPT.

Narrative: WHILE IN CRUISE AT FL310, THE #1 FLT ATTENDANT RPTED THAT THE #4 FLT ATTENDANT HAD OBSERVED A LIGHT BULB POP IN THE VICINITY OF THE OVERHEAD BIN BY ROW 12 AND SMELLED SMOKE. A FEW MINS LATER SHE RPTED THAT THE SMOKE APPEARED TO BE INCREASING. THE CAPT INITIATED A DIVERT TO NASHVILLE ARPT AND I BEGAN PERFORMING THE CHKLIST PROCS FOR ELECTRICAL FIRE OR SMOKE -- UNKNOWN SOURCE. WHILE THE CHKLIST WAS BEING PERFORMED, THE FLT ATTENDANTS DETERMINED THAT A SMALL FIRE HAD STARTED BEHIND A PANEL BY THE OVERHEAD COMPARTMENT AT ROW 12 AND USED 2 FIRE EXTINGUISHERS TO EXTINGUISH THE FLAMES. THE DIVERSION WAS COMPLETED TO NASHVILLE IN VMC CONDITIONS WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. ALTHOUGH COORD BTWN COCKPIT AND CABIN CREWS WAS EXCELLENT. I LEARNED IN SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSIONS WITH THE FLT ATTENDANTS THAT THEY DID NOT HAVE AN ACCURATE COMPREHENSION OF THE SCOPE OF OUR CHKLIST PROCS. THEY THOUGHT THAT WE BASICALLY 'TURNED ALL THE ELECTRICITY OFF'. IN ACTUALITY, THE CHKLIST ISOLATES VARIOUS PORTIONS OF THE ELECTRICAL SYS UNTIL THE SOURCE OF IGNITION/SMOKE IS DISCOVERED. THOUGH NOT A FACTOR IN THIS INCIDENT, THIS LACK OF UNDERSTANDING ABOUT THE CHKLIST PROCS BY THE CABIN CREW COULD RESULT IN A DELAY IN ISOLATING THE IGNITION SOURCE OR, WORSE YET, A MISIDENT OF THE SOURCE. WHILE I'M NOT SUGGESTING THAT FLT ATTENDANTS BE FAMILIAR WITH ALL COCKPIT EMER PROCS, THE GENERAL SCOPE OF PROCS FOR AN ELECTRICAL FIRE IS THE SAME FOR ALL LARGE TURBOJET ACFT AND A WORKING KNOWLEDGE OF THIS WOULD GREATLY ENHANCE CREW COORD BTWN THE FRONT AND BACK ENDS. I'M NOT FAMILIAR WITH FLT ATTENDANT TRAINING REQUIREMENTS, BUT IN RETROSPECT IT SEEMS LIKE A GREAT IDEA TO HAVE THEM BRIEFED ON WHAT THE COCKPIT CREW IS DOING IN A SITUATION LIKE THIS AND VICE VERSA.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.