Narrative:

Flight initially told to expect ILS runway 9R. Later told approach would be to runway 8L. While on final approach, outside the OM runway 8L, flight informed the approach was supposed to have been flown to runway 8R, since runway 8L was closed. Flight then given vectors for a missed approach, and subsequent approach and landing on runway 8R. After handoff by ZTL to atl approach control, we were told upon initial contact to, 'expect ILS to 9R.' first officer briefed for 9R ILS approach. After handoff to next approach control sector, were told to, 'expect ILS to 8L, frequency 109.3.' I immediately dialed in 109.3, and read back, 'ILS 8L, 109.3.' I emphasize that at this time I still had my manual open to the page for the ILS 9R. The ILS frequency I set and read back to approach control was 109.3--the correct frequency for the ILS to runway 8L. Since I do not have the ILS frequencys for atl memorized, this clearly indicates that I read back the clearance as given and received--this was not a case of 'miss hearing.' this was further verified by the fact that the first officer heard the same clearance, and briefed for the ILS to runway 8L. Since our arrival was from the south (sinca) to land on the north runway (8L), we were descended to 5000', and given vectors of 360 degrees (base), then, 'heading 120, cross chinn at 5000', cleared approach.' I read back, 'heading 120, 5000' until chinn, cleared ILS 8L approach.' as we rolled out on a heading of 120 degrees, we showed a localizer capture light, CDI centering quickly, and a G/south capture light and centering of the G/south bar in very quick succession. First officer turned to intercept the localizer and began a descent on G/south. (On subsequent approach, it became apparent that there was a strong wind from the south at 5000' [overshoot wind], since it required 10-15 degrees of crab to the south to maintain localizer course.) we did overshoot the localizer by less than 1/4 DOT, and the first officer corrected immediately. At this time we were instructed to contact tower. Upon changing frequencys, the final controller came up immediately and informed us we were north of localizer course. This corresponded with our indications at the time, and I replied that we were correcting. The final controller then instructed us to maintain 4500' until on localizer. At that time we were indicating 4300', and immediately leveled out and started a climb. Within 5-10 seconds, we indicated we were on centerline and turned to track the localizer. We then began a descent toward the G/south. Final controller then informed us we had traffic to our right (south) at 3500' (we were in the clouds), and we were north of centerline and going more north. I stated that we were indicating on centerline. Final controller then stated, 'check localizer frequency 109.9 for runway 8R.' this was the first mention that we had heard of runway 8R. I then asked, 'understand you now want us to transition to ILS for 8R?' final controller then stated, 'that's the problem; you were supposed to be on the approach to 8R.' he then gave us vectors for a missed approach. We then received vectors for a normal approach and landing on runway 8R. From the sequence of events, it appears that runway 8L was closed after we were changed from runway 9R to 8L. We never received any instructions to change approach from runway 8L to 8R. In retrospect, since chinn intersection did not appear on the ILS 8L approach chart, so we should have questioned the approach clearance. However, the altitude and distance was correct for bahrr intersection on the ILS 8L approach, so I assumed the controller meant, 'bahrr at 5000'.' this was our only clue that we were supposed to be on the ILS 8R approach instead of the ILS 8L. 1) since atl normally uses runway 8L and 9R for landing, if another runway is now being used (8R), the controllers should stress that fact by perhaps stating, 'this approach is for 8R, not 8L.' or, 'runway 8L is now closed, approach will be for runway 8R.' 2) more attention needs to be given by controllers to the readback of clrncs.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLT CREW ALIGNED WITH RWY NOT IN USE.

Narrative: FLT INITIALLY TOLD TO EXPECT ILS RWY 9R. LATER TOLD APCH WOULD BE TO RWY 8L. WHILE ON FINAL APCH, OUTSIDE THE OM RWY 8L, FLT INFORMED THE APCH WAS SUPPOSED TO HAVE BEEN FLOWN TO RWY 8R, SINCE RWY 8L WAS CLOSED. FLT THEN GIVEN VECTORS FOR A MISSED APCH, AND SUBSEQUENT APCH AND LNDG ON RWY 8R. AFTER HDOF BY ZTL TO ATL APCH CTL, WE WERE TOLD UPON INITIAL CONTACT TO, 'EXPECT ILS TO 9R.' F/O BRIEFED FOR 9R ILS APCH. AFTER HDOF TO NEXT APCH CTL SECTOR, WERE TOLD TO, 'EXPECT ILS TO 8L, FREQ 109.3.' I IMMEDIATELY DIALED IN 109.3, AND READ BACK, 'ILS 8L, 109.3.' I EMPHASIZE THAT AT THIS TIME I STILL HAD MY MANUAL OPEN TO THE PAGE FOR THE ILS 9R. THE ILS FREQ I SET AND READ BACK TO APCH CTL WAS 109.3--THE CORRECT FREQ FOR THE ILS TO RWY 8L. SINCE I DO NOT HAVE THE ILS FREQS FOR ATL MEMORIZED, THIS CLEARLY INDICATES THAT I READ BACK THE CLRNC AS GIVEN AND RECEIVED--THIS WAS NOT A CASE OF 'MISS HEARING.' THIS WAS FURTHER VERIFIED BY THE FACT THAT THE F/O HEARD THE SAME CLRNC, AND BRIEFED FOR THE ILS TO RWY 8L. SINCE OUR ARR WAS FROM THE S (SINCA) TO LAND ON THE N RWY (8L), WE WERE DSNDED TO 5000', AND GIVEN VECTORS OF 360 DEGS (BASE), THEN, 'HDG 120, CROSS CHINN AT 5000', CLRED APCH.' I READ BACK, 'HDG 120, 5000' UNTIL CHINN, CLRED ILS 8L APCH.' AS WE ROLLED OUT ON A HDG OF 120 DEGS, WE SHOWED A LOC CAPTURE LIGHT, CDI CENTERING QUICKLY, AND A G/S CAPTURE LIGHT AND CENTERING OF THE G/S BAR IN VERY QUICK SUCCESSION. F/O TURNED TO INTERCEPT THE LOC AND BEGAN A DSNT ON G/S. (ON SUBSEQUENT APCH, IT BECAME APPARENT THAT THERE WAS A STRONG WIND FROM THE S AT 5000' [OVERSHOOT WIND], SINCE IT REQUIRED 10-15 DEGS OF CRAB TO THE S TO MAINTAIN LOC COURSE.) WE DID OVERSHOOT THE LOC BY LESS THAN 1/4 DOT, AND THE F/O CORRECTED IMMEDIATELY. AT THIS TIME WE WERE INSTRUCTED TO CONTACT TWR. UPON CHANGING FREQS, THE FINAL CTLR CAME UP IMMEDIATELY AND INFORMED US WE WERE N OF LOC COURSE. THIS CORRESPONDED WITH OUR INDICATIONS AT THE TIME, AND I REPLIED THAT WE WERE CORRECTING. THE FINAL CTLR THEN INSTRUCTED US TO MAINTAIN 4500' UNTIL ON LOC. AT THAT TIME WE WERE INDICATING 4300', AND IMMEDIATELY LEVELED OUT AND STARTED A CLB. WITHIN 5-10 SECS, WE INDICATED WE WERE ON CENTERLINE AND TURNED TO TRACK THE LOC. WE THEN BEGAN A DSNT TOWARD THE G/S. FINAL CTLR THEN INFORMED US WE HAD TFC TO OUR RIGHT (S) AT 3500' (WE WERE IN THE CLOUDS), AND WE WERE N OF CENTERLINE AND GOING MORE N. I STATED THAT WE WERE INDICATING ON CENTERLINE. FINAL CTLR THEN STATED, 'CHK LOC FREQ 109.9 FOR RWY 8R.' THIS WAS THE FIRST MENTION THAT WE HAD HEARD OF RWY 8R. I THEN ASKED, 'UNDERSTAND YOU NOW WANT US TO TRANSITION TO ILS FOR 8R?' FINAL CTLR THEN STATED, 'THAT'S THE PROB; YOU WERE SUPPOSED TO BE ON THE APCH TO 8R.' HE THEN GAVE US VECTORS FOR A MISSED APCH. WE THEN RECEIVED VECTORS FOR A NORMAL APCH AND LNDG ON RWY 8R. FROM THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS, IT APPEARS THAT RWY 8L WAS CLOSED AFTER WE WERE CHANGED FROM RWY 9R TO 8L. WE NEVER RECEIVED ANY INSTRUCTIONS TO CHANGE APCH FROM RWY 8L TO 8R. IN RETROSPECT, SINCE CHINN INTXN DID NOT APPEAR ON THE ILS 8L APCH CHART, SO WE SHOULD HAVE QUESTIONED THE APCH CLRNC. HOWEVER, THE ALT AND DISTANCE WAS CORRECT FOR BAHRR INTXN ON THE ILS 8L APCH, SO I ASSUMED THE CTLR MEANT, 'BAHRR AT 5000'.' THIS WAS OUR ONLY CLUE THAT WE WERE SUPPOSED TO BE ON THE ILS 8R APCH INSTEAD OF THE ILS 8L. 1) SINCE ATL NORMALLY USES RWY 8L AND 9R FOR LNDG, IF ANOTHER RWY IS NOW BEING USED (8R), THE CTLRS SHOULD STRESS THAT FACT BY PERHAPS STATING, 'THIS APCH IS FOR 8R, NOT 8L.' OR, 'RWY 8L IS NOW CLOSED, APCH WILL BE FOR RWY 8R.' 2) MORE ATTN NEEDS TO BE GIVEN BY CTLRS TO THE READBACK OF CLRNCS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.