Narrative:

During an international, overwater commercial run on a refile flight plan, I noticed a slow degradation of fuel status commencing at chkpoint 2 and continuing at chkpoint 3. After looking into the most obvious potential causes, I requested the weight sheet from the second officer and discovered a 50000 pounds discrepancy between flight plan and actual payloads. Calculations indicated that not only would we be unable to reach the refile point with required fuel, continuing to our destination would be unsafe and imprudent. I contacted dispatch to see if they were aware of our actual payload (they were not). And our deteriorating fuel situation (they were). I requested and received clearance back to our departure point where an uneventful landing was accomplished. Notwithstanding the fact that this error should have been discovered on the load planning worksheet (there are adequate checks and balances built into the form), the ultimate responsibility for verification of payload and gross weight as compared to the computer flight plan was to rest with the crew. As most of us in commercial aviation are aware, #south are usually received on company frequency during taxi, sometimes just prior to taking the active runway. This is (or should be) a time of maximum concentration to verify aircraft confign, power settings and external conditions. Confirmation of payload as compared to flight plan is not quite as important to us as effecting a safe takeoff. In the future, for this pilot, validation of payload and gross weight will be included as a last minute check. A taxi return to gate for additional fuel is much less expensive than an air return.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: OCEANIC FLT HAS TO RETURN TO DEP POINT ACCOUNT INSUFFICIENT FUEL.

Narrative: DURING AN INTL, OVERWATER COMMERCIAL RUN ON A REFILE FLT PLAN, I NOTICED A SLOW DEGRADATION OF FUEL STATUS COMMENCING AT CHKPOINT 2 AND CONTINUING AT CHKPOINT 3. AFTER LOOKING INTO THE MOST OBVIOUS POTENTIAL CAUSES, I REQUESTED THE WT SHEET FROM THE S/O AND DISCOVERED A 50000 LBS DISCREPANCY BTWN FLT PLAN AND ACTUAL PAYLOADS. CALCULATIONS INDICATED THAT NOT ONLY WOULD WE BE UNABLE TO REACH THE REFILE POINT WITH REQUIRED FUEL, CONTINUING TO OUR DEST WOULD BE UNSAFE AND IMPRUDENT. I CONTACTED DISPATCH TO SEE IF THEY WERE AWARE OF OUR ACTUAL PAYLOAD (THEY WERE NOT). AND OUR DETERIORATING FUEL SITUATION (THEY WERE). I REQUESTED AND RECEIVED CLRNC BACK TO OUR DEP POINT WHERE AN UNEVENTFUL LNDG WAS ACCOMPLISHED. NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT THIS ERROR SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISCOVERED ON THE LOAD PLANNING WORKSHEET (THERE ARE ADEQUATE CHKS AND BALANCES BUILT INTO THE FORM), THE ULTIMATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR VERIFICATION OF PAYLOAD AND GROSS WT AS COMPARED TO THE COMPUTER FLT PLAN WAS TO REST WITH THE CREW. AS MOST OF US IN COMMERCIAL AVIATION ARE AWARE, #S ARE USUALLY RECEIVED ON COMPANY FREQ DURING TAXI, SOMETIMES JUST PRIOR TO TAKING THE ACTIVE RWY. THIS IS (OR SHOULD BE) A TIME OF MAX CONCENTRATION TO VERIFY ACFT CONFIGN, PWR SETTINGS AND EXTERNAL CONDITIONS. CONFIRMATION OF PAYLOAD AS COMPARED TO FLT PLAN IS NOT QUITE AS IMPORTANT TO US AS EFFECTING A SAFE TKOF. IN THE FUTURE, FOR THIS PLT, VALIDATION OF PAYLOAD AND GROSS WT WILL BE INCLUDED AS A LAST MINUTE CHK. A TAXI RETURN TO GATE FOR ADDITIONAL FUEL IS MUCH LESS EXPENSIVE THAN AN AIR RETURN.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.