Narrative:

We left our departure airport at xa:30 [and] arrived in our first destination seven hours later. We waited in the aircraft for the next flight plan paperwork to arrive while the load master changed loads. Our maintenance representative came to the aircraft to find out what we needed for fuel for the next leg. It was approximately xj:30; 15 minutes before the flight was scheduled to depart and the flight plan had not arrived from our handler. The maintenance representative called dispatch and got the dispatcher to give him a fuel load of 107.9. He was given a final fuel load of 111.0 because we believed we were going to be there for another hour or so. The flight plan arrived a few moments from the handler who had been waiting for an hour trying to get our dispatch office to fax or email the paperwork. We were then told by the load master that there were no changes to the weights. Since we wanted to depart on time; the captain did the performance on the efb; I loaded the FMS; and the relief pilot did the weight and balance. We checked each others work and then waited for the doors to close. The load master came to the cockpit to say that they needed to rebuild some of the pallets and we would be here another hour or so. We closed the doors at xk:35 and pushed back with no indications of trouble at xk:45. Departed normally and reached cruising altitude going to our next destination forty minutes after departure of xk:58. At top of climb; the captain began entering winds into the FMS. After entering winds we received an 'insufficient fuel message' and proceeded to look further at the cause. We found that the TOGW was significantly lower than that of the weight and balance. Dispatch was called; and we requested an enroute alternate to get more fuel but our dispatcher had been in contact with our vice president of operations and told us to return to our departure airport as soon as possible. We had to jettison approximately 11;000 pounds of fuel to get to maximum landing weight. Returned without further incident and refueled and proceeded to continue on to the final destination. When inputting the winds at altitude the FMS computes new times based on the winds entered. The insufficient fuel warning on the FMS alerted the crew there was a problem. Pressure to get out on time for company and arrival slot into our destination; lack of further input by the dispatch office to verify proper information and receipt; possible load mistakes because of the changes to the pallets and then lack of coordination to the dispatcher handling the flight; [and] lack of further verification of the paperwork by the crew between each other. Once the information was determined to be correct; dispatch was notified to get an alternative plan in place. The company decided that the best course of action was to return to the departure airport. A new line item on the flight plan that stays at the station should be put into place where flight crews would have to fill in the calculated (weight and balance) numbers right under flight plan take-off and landing weights. Load masters and dispatch should also be required to confirm the weights they calculated before a flight plan is dispatched to that flight.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B777 returned to the departure airport because an INSUFFICIENT FUEL message alerted at cruise after the FMS winds were entered while airborne.

Narrative: We left our departure airport at XA:30 [and] arrived in our first destination seven hours later. We waited in the aircraft for the next flight plan paperwork to arrive while the Load Master changed loads. Our Maintenance Representative came to the aircraft to find out what we needed for fuel for the next leg. It was approximately XJ:30; 15 minutes before the flight was scheduled to depart and the flight plan had not arrived from our handler. The Maintenance Representative called Dispatch and got the Dispatcher to give him a fuel load of 107.9. He was given a final fuel load of 111.0 because we believed we were going to be there for another hour or so. The flight plan arrived a few moments from the handler who had been waiting for an hour trying to get our Dispatch office to fax or email the paperwork. We were then told by the Load Master that there were no changes to the weights. Since we wanted to depart on time; The Captain did the performance on the EFB; I loaded the FMS; and the Relief Pilot did the weight and balance. We checked each others work and then waited for the doors to close. The Load Master came to the cockpit to say that they needed to rebuild some of the pallets and we would be here another hour or so. We closed the doors at XK:35 and pushed back with no indications of trouble at XK:45. Departed normally and reached cruising altitude going to our next destination forty minutes after departure of XK:58. At top of climb; the Captain began entering winds into the FMS. After entering winds we received an 'Insufficient Fuel Message' and proceeded to look further at the cause. We found that the TOGW was significantly lower than that of the weight and balance. Dispatch was called; and we requested an enroute alternate to get more fuel but our Dispatcher had been in contact with our Vice President of Operations and told us to return to our departure airport as soon as possible. We had to jettison approximately 11;000 LBS of fuel to get to maximum landing weight. Returned without further incident and refueled and proceeded to continue on to the final destination. When inputting the winds at altitude the FMS computes new times based on the winds entered. The insufficient fuel warning on the FMS alerted the crew there was a problem. Pressure to get out on time for company and arrival slot into our destination; lack of further input by the Dispatch office to verify proper information and receipt; possible load mistakes because of the changes to the pallets and then lack of coordination to the Dispatcher handling the flight; [and] lack of further verification of the paperwork by the crew between each other. Once the information was determined to be correct; Dispatch was notified to get an alternative plan in place. The Company decided that the best course of action was to return to the departure airport. A new line item on the flight plan that stays at the station should be put into place where flight crews would have to fill in the calculated (weight and balance) numbers right under flight plan take-off and landing weights. Load Masters and Dispatch should also be required to confirm the weights they calculated before a flight plan is dispatched to that flight.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.