Narrative:

IFR flight from row to hob. Prior to departing row crew checked WX of last hob observation. This indicated that although ceilings were low (700'), there was the required visibility to shoot the approach. However, the tower (and WX observing) closed at 2200 and our flight arrived some time later, received an approach clearance, executed the approach to a missed approach. I believe that we should not have shot the approach because we could not determine the current visibility prior to commencing the approach. Crew should have discussed and agreed prior to making a go decision. Fatigue may have been a factor since it was the last segment of a 10 hour duty day. Also crew workload was greatly increased during the few last mins before the approach by a center controller who cleared us for 'cruise 6000.' neither pilot was sure what this meant, so I as the PNF requested approach clearance. The controller replied, 'do you know what cruise clearance means?' I said, 'request clarification on the clearance,' and the controller would not even respond, even after 2 requests. Controller workload was light and judging by controller's prior tone of voice, it sounded like he had lost his patience. 1/2-way along the DME arc for the ILS 3 controller said ILS was OTS, so we did a VOR 3 instead at the last moment. Later research revealed that the ILS was in service at that time, and we did have a good identify of it. We had plenty of fuel and should have requested holding instructions to get caught up before shooting any approach, and then only if we had the current visibility requirements.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: COMMUTER LTT EXECUTES APCH TO HOB WITH QUESTIONABLE AVAILABILITY OF WX REPORTING.

Narrative: IFR FLT FROM ROW TO HOB. PRIOR TO DEPARTING ROW CREW CHKED WX OF LAST HOB OBSERVATION. THIS INDICATED THAT ALTHOUGH CEILINGS WERE LOW (700'), THERE WAS THE REQUIRED VISIBILITY TO SHOOT THE APCH. HOWEVER, THE TWR (AND WX OBSERVING) CLOSED AT 2200 AND OUR FLT ARRIVED SOME TIME LATER, RECEIVED AN APCH CLRNC, EXECUTED THE APCH TO A MISSED APCH. I BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD NOT HAVE SHOT THE APCH BECAUSE WE COULD NOT DETERMINE THE CURRENT VISIBILITY PRIOR TO COMMENCING THE APCH. CREW SHOULD HAVE DISCUSSED AND AGREED PRIOR TO MAKING A GO DECISION. FATIGUE MAY HAVE BEEN A FACTOR SINCE IT WAS THE LAST SEGMENT OF A 10 HR DUTY DAY. ALSO CREW WORKLOAD WAS GREATLY INCREASED DURING THE FEW LAST MINS BEFORE THE APCH BY A CENTER CTLR WHO CLRED US FOR 'CRUISE 6000.' NEITHER PLT WAS SURE WHAT THIS MEANT, SO I AS THE PNF REQUESTED APCH CLRNC. THE CTLR REPLIED, 'DO YOU KNOW WHAT CRUISE CLRNC MEANS?' I SAID, 'REQUEST CLARIFICATION ON THE CLRNC,' AND THE CTLR WOULD NOT EVEN RESPOND, EVEN AFTER 2 REQUESTS. CTLR WORKLOAD WAS LIGHT AND JUDGING BY CTLR'S PRIOR TONE OF VOICE, IT SOUNDED LIKE HE HAD LOST HIS PATIENCE. 1/2-WAY ALONG THE DME ARC FOR THE ILS 3 CTLR SAID ILS WAS OTS, SO WE DID A VOR 3 INSTEAD AT THE LAST MOMENT. LATER RESEARCH REVEALED THAT THE ILS WAS IN SVC AT THAT TIME, AND WE DID HAVE A GOOD IDENT OF IT. WE HAD PLENTY OF FUEL AND SHOULD HAVE REQUESTED HOLDING INSTRUCTIONS TO GET CAUGHT UP BEFORE SHOOTING ANY APCH, AND THEN ONLY IF WE HAD THE CURRENT VISIBILITY REQUIREMENTS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.