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| Attributes | |
| ACN | 1515325 | 
| Time | |
| Date | 201801 | 
| Local Time Of Day | 1201-1800 | 
| Place | |
| Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport | 
| State Reference | US | 
| Environment | |
| Light | Daylight | 
| Aircraft 1 | |
| Make Model Name | A320 | 
| Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 | 
| Flight Phase | Parked | 
| Flight Plan | IFR | 
| Component | |
| Aircraft Component | Fuel Distribution System | 
| Person 1 | |
| Function | First Officer Pilot Flying  | 
| Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) | 
| Events | |
| Anomaly | Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy Deviation - Procedural MEL Deviation - Procedural Maintenance  | 
Narrative:
Started the flight approximately 1.5 hours late due to late arrival of the aircraft. During our pre-flight; we noted the following four MEL's regarding outer to inner tank fuel transfer valves listed on the release:28-15-xx (lh valve open) 28-15-yy (rh valve open)28-15-zy (rh valve closed)28-15-zx (lh valve closed)we assessed the situation to be that on both the left and right sides; one outer tank transfer valve was inop/closed and one was inop/open. Because we had questions/concerns regarding this situation; the captain contacted [maintenance control] via the dispatcher; per the guidance in fom. We didn't really have a concern regarding safety (usable vs unusable fuel) since at least one valve per side was inop/open; but wanted to verify the validity of the seemingly conflicting (albeit balanced) MEL's. Even though the 'closed' MEL indicates that one valve is required; we were led to believe the 'inop/open' valve satisfied the intent of the required working valve. The flight was conducted as-dispatched; and operated normally; without incident. Upon arrival; the captain contacted [maintenance control] for an unrelated write-up and was informed at that time that we had a possible issue regarding the application of the fuel MEL's. The final solution was to 'ops-check' the valve functions via circuit breaker reset/configuration checks; and clear the two 'inop/closed' MEL's; leaving the two 'inop/open' MEL's active. Perhaps an experienced maintenance lead/supervisor should double-check the validity of MEL's; especially when multiple related MEL's are applied to the same ship at the same time?
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A320 First Officer reported several fuel tank MEL items required verification after the crew had flown the aircraft.
Narrative: Started the flight approximately 1.5 hours late due to late arrival of the aircraft. During our pre-flight; we noted the following four MEL's regarding outer to inner tank fuel transfer valves listed on the Release:28-15-XX (LH valve open) 28-15-YY (RH valve open)28-15-ZY (RH valve closed)28-15-ZX (LH valve closed)We assessed the situation to be that on both the Left and Right sides; one outer tank transfer valve was inop/closed and one was inop/open. Because we had questions/concerns regarding this situation; the Captain contacted [Maintenance Control] via the Dispatcher; per the guidance in FOM. We didn't really have a concern regarding safety (usable vs unusable fuel) since at least one valve per side was inop/open; but wanted to verify the validity of the seemingly conflicting (albeit balanced) MEL's. Even though the 'closed' MEL indicates that one valve is required; we were led to believe the 'inop/open' valve satisfied the intent of the required working valve. The flight was conducted as-dispatched; and operated normally; without incident. Upon arrival; the Captain contacted [Maintenance Control] for an unrelated write-up and was informed at that time that we had a possible issue regarding the application of the fuel MEL's. The final solution was to 'ops-check' the valve functions via circuit breaker reset/configuration checks; and clear the two 'inop/closed' MEL's; leaving the two 'inop/open' MEL's active. Perhaps an experienced maintenance lead/supervisor should double-check the validity of MEL's; especially when multiple related MEL's are applied to the same ship at the same time?
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.