Narrative:

Before pushback; the fuel sheet was submitted for the flight crew to review and approve the fuel load. The aircraft fuel totalizer was checked along with the fuel in each tank as provided by the fuel loading sheet. The fuel required for the flight was 345;000 pounds plus taxi; which required 2;500 pounds for taxi. We registered the fuel in ACARS. Upon reaching cruise; we checked the various synoptics and kept the fuel synoptic up for monitoring. After about three hours into the flight; we noticed the number 3 reserve tank to be diminishing in fuel quantity. We maintained a very good fuel log and there was no way of any fuel leaking from the aircraft since the fuel score was consistent; even though we saw a decrease in reserve tank three quantity. When the main tank three reached 41;500 pounds; the reserve tank began to dump into main tank three. We checked the wing for any sign of fuel leakage and there was none observed. We notified maintenance of the situation and dispatch. We wrote the required maintenance reports for the reserve quantity indication on reserve tank three. It was observed on the fuel loading form that a tolerance level of -300 gallons was allowed. When you calculate utilizing the old method of fuel checking prior to departure; the aircraft was short 2;000 pounds for dispatch; however all indications of a proper fuel load were observed. It is very clear that reserve quantity three was short the 300 gallons of fuel; and the quantity was in error. The weather at destination was very good and we had no other problems with the flight or redispatch requiring an alternate. If the check was made utilizing the old procedure; then the flaw in the loading would have been discovered. The total dependence on the fuel quantity indication system without a back up system to verify the fuel boarded is a potential serious problem regarding the safety of the flight and required fuel for dispatch. I would strongly encourage a process of notifying the flight crew if a negative fuel tolerance was recorded and fuel boarded verified by an alternative method.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B747-400 Captain reported that a fuel loading error was not detected during preflight because a verification procedure excluded a method of double-checking the fuel actually loaded. The fuel was discovered to be 2;000 pounds low during cruise.

Narrative: Before pushback; the fuel sheet was submitted for the flight crew to review and approve the fuel load. The aircraft fuel totalizer was checked along with the fuel in each tank as provided by the fuel loading sheet. The fuel required for the flight was 345;000 pounds plus taxi; which required 2;500 pounds for taxi. We registered the fuel in ACARS. Upon reaching cruise; we checked the various synoptics and kept the fuel synoptic up for monitoring. After about three hours into the flight; we noticed the number 3 reserve tank to be diminishing in fuel quantity. We maintained a very good fuel log and there was no way of any fuel leaking from the aircraft since the fuel score was consistent; even though we saw a decrease in reserve tank three quantity. When the main tank three reached 41;500 pounds; the reserve tank began to dump into main tank three. We checked the wing for any sign of fuel leakage and there was none observed. We notified maintenance of the situation and dispatch. We wrote the required maintenance reports for the Reserve quantity indication on Reserve Tank three. It was observed on the fuel loading form that a tolerance level of -300 gallons was allowed. When you calculate utilizing the old method of fuel checking prior to departure; the aircraft was short 2;000 pounds for dispatch; however all indications of a proper fuel load were observed. It is very clear that reserve quantity three was short the 300 gallons of fuel; and the quantity was in error. The weather at destination was very good and we had no other problems with the flight or redispatch requiring an alternate. If the check was made utilizing the old procedure; then the flaw in the loading would have been discovered. The total dependence on the fuel quantity indication system without a back up system to verify the fuel boarded is a potential serious problem regarding the safety of the flight and required fuel for dispatch. I would strongly encourage a process of notifying the flight crew if a negative fuel tolerance was recorded and fuel boarded verified by an alternative method.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.