Narrative:

Captain decided to delay our taxi out to catch up on checklist, advised ground while stopping aircraft. With large transport behind us ready to go, ground requested we 'pull over' to allow him to pass. Moving over the required distance to permit wing tip clearance for the large transport put us just north of the GA tie down area. To my recollection, I was reading our mechanical checklist and modifying our weight and cg #'south in our FMC. We maintained an even, slow taxi at idle thrust moving along the GA parking area and do not recall the need for, nor the addition of, additional thrust as we turned the corner back toward the taxiway to rejoin the sequence for takeoff (our light takeoff weight from stt easily permits taxi at idle thrust). Once airborne our company notified us that we had blown over an small aircraft type parked in the GA area. With hindsight it is obvious that it would have been better to have refused to leave the taxiway to permit the large transport to pass, forcing the tower to have him back taxi down the runway around us, or just suffer the 90 second delay. Perhaps ATC personnel need a little education on residual idle thrust hazards of 61500 pounds engines. We pilots often want to comply with ATC requests to help smooth out their operation. Although it seemed reasonable to do what we did, perhaps a little less cooperation in certain instances would be better for all concerned. Also, I don't think this particular light aircraft was tied down. A risky proposition when parked near intersection taxiway used by heavy jets.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: JET BLAST DAMAGE TO SMA WHEN WDB TAXIED ON GA RAMP.

Narrative: CAPT DECIDED TO DELAY OUR TAXI OUT TO CATCH UP ON CHKLIST, ADVISED GND WHILE STOPPING ACFT. WITH LGT BEHIND US READY TO GO, GND REQUESTED WE 'PULL OVER' TO ALLOW HIM TO PASS. MOVING OVER THE REQUIRED DISTANCE TO PERMIT WING TIP CLRNC FOR THE LGT PUT US JUST N OF THE GA TIE DOWN AREA. TO MY RECOLLECTION, I WAS READING OUR MECHANICAL CHKLIST AND MODIFYING OUR WT AND CG #'S IN OUR FMC. WE MAINTAINED AN EVEN, SLOW TAXI AT IDLE THRUST MOVING ALONG THE GA PARKING AREA AND DO NOT RECALL THE NEED FOR, NOR THE ADDITION OF, ADDITIONAL THRUST AS WE TURNED THE CORNER BACK TOWARD THE TXWY TO REJOIN THE SEQUENCE FOR TKOF (OUR LIGHT TKOF WT FROM STT EASILY PERMITS TAXI AT IDLE THRUST). ONCE AIRBORNE OUR COMPANY NOTIFIED US THAT WE HAD BLOWN OVER AN SMA TYPE PARKED IN THE GA AREA. WITH HINDSIGHT IT IS OBVIOUS THAT IT WOULD HAVE BEEN BETTER TO HAVE REFUSED TO LEAVE THE TXWY TO PERMIT THE LGT TO PASS, FORCING THE TWR TO HAVE HIM BACK TAXI DOWN THE RWY AROUND US, OR JUST SUFFER THE 90 SEC DELAY. PERHAPS ATC PERSONNEL NEED A LITTLE EDUCATION ON RESIDUAL IDLE THRUST HAZARDS OF 61500 LBS ENGS. WE PLTS OFTEN WANT TO COMPLY WITH ATC REQUESTS TO HELP SMOOTH OUT THEIR OPERATION. ALTHOUGH IT SEEMED REASONABLE TO DO WHAT WE DID, PERHAPS A LITTLE LESS COOPERATION IN CERTAIN INSTANCES WOULD BE BETTER FOR ALL CONCERNED. ALSO, I DON'T THINK THIS PARTICULAR LIGHT ACFT WAS TIED DOWN. A RISKY PROPOSITION WHEN PARKED NEAR INTXN TXWY USED BY HVY JETS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.