Narrative:

As captain; I was making up my bunk after briefing the relief pilots. Before I was able to complete making up the bunk; the relief pilots rang the call bell. I returned to the cockpit where the relief pilots pointed out the loss of #4 engine (eng). Several EICAS messages were in view. The engine instruments indicated about 26% N2 and 0% N1. Oil pressure was 0; no excessive egt had been identified before the engine failure. We were at FL350 on track 3 with several aircraft in our vicinity; the closest at FL340 about 10 NM behind us. I elected to attempt a restart of eng #4. When the #4 fuel cutoff was placed in run; the eng 4 fuel valve EICAS returned. We aborted the start attempt. We reviewed the irregular for this EICAS which indicated; 'no restart to be attempted.' we had already selected eo (engine out) speed on the VNAV page because of our altitude and proximity to the traffic below. We asked for descent to FL300 and were denied due to traffic. We declared an emergency; transmitted on VHF 123.45 our position and intentions; turned on all landing lights and proceeded to offset 15 NM south of track and started our descent to FL300 maintaining separation from our closest and only displayed traffic with reference to the TCAS display. Paralleling our track now at FL300 with #4 engine shut down; we discussed; via satcom; our situation with dispatch and maintenance. Discussions included selection of an appropriate diversion station. Continuation to our filed destination would have resulted in a significant increase in expected fuel flow/burn with an estimated arrival fuel of 15;000 pounds as computed by the FMC. I selected a nearer domestic airport as our diversion site with the concurrence of dispatch. We received clearance via cpdlc to proceed direct. Reviewing our checklists and procedures; we selected lrc on the VNAV page which resulted in a much more comfortable indicated speed (we were still in east/O speed because of our limitation on descent clearance earlier in the event). The flight attendants were kept in the loop as much as possible as early as possible considering the high demands of communication required outside the aircraft. They later mentioned that when all the landing lights came on they were expecting a call referencing some irregularity. They got the call and were told about the engine shut down. Passengers were provided with a briefing from me about the events that had taken place when we were about two hours from landing. We were met with several emergency vehicles because of our classification as an emergency aircraft. The pilot crew performed with the highest degree of professionalism in a difficult; sleep deprived situation. Coordination and mutual backup was evident and welcome in nearly every aspect of this event.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B747-400 engine flamed out at FL340 during oceanic cruise. Crew was unable to restart it. An emergency was declared; the track offset; a descent to FL300 completed and the flight diverted to a domestic airport.

Narrative: As Captain; I was making up my bunk after briefing the relief pilots. Before I was able to complete making up the bunk; the relief pilots rang the call bell. I returned to the cockpit where the relief pilots pointed out the loss of #4 Engine (Eng). Several EICAS messages were in view. The engine instruments indicated about 26% N2 and 0% N1. Oil pressure was 0; no excessive EGT had been identified before the engine failure. We were at FL350 on Track 3 with several aircraft in our vicinity; the closest at FL340 about 10 NM behind us. I elected to attempt a restart of Eng #4. When the #4 fuel cutoff was placed in run; the Eng 4 Fuel Valve EICAS returned. We aborted the start attempt. We reviewed the irregular for this EICAS which indicated; 'No Restart to be Attempted.' We had already selected EO (Engine Out) Speed on the VNAV page because of our altitude and proximity to the traffic below. We asked for descent to FL300 and were denied due to traffic. We declared an emergency; transmitted on VHF 123.45 our position and intentions; turned on all landing lights and proceeded to offset 15 NM south of track and started our descent to FL300 maintaining separation from our closest and only displayed traffic with reference to the TCAS display. Paralleling our track now at FL300 with #4 engine shut down; we discussed; via SATCOM; our situation with Dispatch and Maintenance. Discussions included selection of an appropriate diversion station. Continuation to our filed destination would have resulted in a significant increase in expected fuel flow/burn with an estimated arrival fuel of 15;000 LBS as computed by the FMC. I selected a nearer domestic airport as our diversion site with the concurrence of Dispatch. We received clearance via CPDLC to proceed direct. Reviewing our checklists and procedures; we selected LRC on the VNAV page which resulted in a much more comfortable indicated speed (we were still in E/O SPD because of our limitation on descent clearance earlier in the event). The flight attendants were kept in the loop as much as possible as early as possible considering the high demands of communication required outside the aircraft. They later mentioned that when all the landing lights came on they were expecting a call referencing some irregularity. They got the call and were told about the engine shut down. Passengers were provided with a briefing from me about the events that had taken place when we were about two hours from landing. We were met with several emergency vehicles because of our classification as an Emergency Aircraft. The pilot crew performed with the highest degree of professionalism in a difficult; sleep deprived situation. Coordination and mutual backup was evident and welcome in nearly every aspect of this event.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.