Narrative:

[We were] vectored to final for VOR DME runway 22L at jfk. Planned; set up; and briefed procedure to include using LNAV and VNAV on the procedure. Very suddenly [we were] vectored inside of capit straight for wugal. Capit was active waypoint on FMC. Although we had been cleared out of 3;000 MSL for 2;000 we had barely left 3;000. Although we had started slowing to 180 KTS; we were barely below 210. In the effort to slow down; descend; track final; configure the aircraft and contact tower while being nearly 1;000 ft high; fast; and suddenly less than 8 DME; we did not have the opportunity to extend the LNAV course from a closer in waypoint and the FMC did not automatically update to wugal as the active waypoint; so the armed LNAV did not intercept final. We overshot the VOR final approach course and actually overshot the runway centerline. Tower called; asked if we had a visual on the airport and upon answering yes; gave us a visual approach. We stabilized the aircraft and landed normally via a visual approach. The aforementioned; distraction was worsened by my inability to activate VNAV (due to bad active waypoint management); a previously handled situation with an ill passenger; and my fatigue. This was a four day trip that started with a shortened rest due to a later than usual reserve notification. The 2 nights previous to this situation had ended with early morning arrivals. Loud morning maid service in hotels had interrupted my rest several times. Although; I thought I was in good form during the vectors to final at jfk; we were nearly 2 hours late; and it was very early; and I was tired. This cumulative fatigue made me feel as though I were in a fog. When things started to go wrong; recognition and trouble shooting abilities were downgraded.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B757 Captain planning a LNAV/VNAV VOR DME Runway 22L at JFK is vectored inside the active waypoint CAPIT and is unable to reconfigure the FMC to intercept the final approach course. An overshoot occurs and the reporter is recleared for the visual approach. Fatigue was cited as a factor.

Narrative: [We were] vectored to final for VOR DME Runway 22L at JFK. Planned; set up; and briefed procedure to include using LNAV and VNAV on the procedure. Very suddenly [we were] vectored inside of CAPIT straight for WUGAL. CAPIT was active waypoint on FMC. Although we had been cleared out of 3;000 MSL for 2;000 we had barely left 3;000. Although we had started slowing to 180 KTS; we were barely below 210. In the effort to slow down; descend; track final; configure the aircraft and contact Tower while being nearly 1;000 FT high; fast; and suddenly less than 8 DME; we did not have the opportunity to extend the LNAV course from a closer in waypoint and the FMC did not automatically update to WUGAL as the active waypoint; so the armed LNAV did not intercept final. We overshot the VOR final approach course and actually overshot the runway centerline. Tower called; asked if we had a visual on the airport and upon answering yes; gave us a visual approach. We stabilized the aircraft and landed normally via a visual approach. The aforementioned; distraction was worsened by my inability to activate VNAV (due to bad active waypoint management); a previously handled situation with an ill passenger; and my fatigue. This was a four day trip that started with a shortened rest due to a later than usual reserve notification. The 2 nights previous to this situation had ended with early morning arrivals. Loud morning maid service in hotels had interrupted my rest several times. Although; I thought I was in good form during the vectors to final at JFK; we were nearly 2 hours late; and it was very early; and I was tired. This cumulative fatigue made me feel as though I were in a fog. When things started to go wrong; recognition and trouble shooting abilities were downgraded.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.