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A B727-200 fatigued flight crew; after flying all night in weather; were cleared for a visual approach at their destination; but headed toward a nearby airport with the same runway orientation until alerted by ATC.
| Attributes | |
| ACN | 951251 |
| Time | |
| Date | 201105 |
| Local Time Of Day | 0601-1200 |
| Place | |
| Locale Reference | ZZZ.TRACON |
| State Reference | US |
| Environment | |
| Flight Conditions | VMC |
| Light | Daylight |
| Aircraft 1 | |
| Make Model Name | B727-200 |
| Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
| Flight Phase | Final Approach |
| Route In Use | Visual Approach |
| Flight Plan | IFR |
| Person 1 | |
| Function | Check Pilot Flight Engineer / Second Officer |
| Qualification | Flight Crew Commercial Flight Crew Flight Engineer Flight Crew Instrument Flight Crew Multiengine |
| Experience | Flight Crew Last 90 Days 125 Flight Crew Total 12500 Flight Crew Type 4200 |
| Person 2 | |
| Function | Captain Pilot Not Flying |
| Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) Flight Crew Flight Instructor |
| Experience | Flight Crew Last 90 Days 110 Flight Crew Total 12000 Flight Crew Type 1500 |
| Events | |
| Anomaly | Deviation - Procedural Clearance Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy Deviation - Track / Heading All Types |
Narrative:
On base leg to runway 1L; we were cleared for the visual approach; the captain (pilot not flying) accepted the visual approach to 1L. The first officer (pilot flying) did not have the airport visually and had the incorrect localizer inbound course set in his HSI. I also did not have the runway insight nor did I recognize that the first officer had the wrong course set in his HSI. The captain had identified the wrong airport and do to the improper localizer course set in the HSI; we flew through the final approach course. We were asked by approach where we were going and if we had the runway in sight. At this point the captain realized he had identified the wrong airport and I corrected the first officer's inbound localizer course setting. We were vectored around to re-intercept the final approach course and landed without incident. This situation could have been prevented if the captain would have insured the entire crew had identified the proper airport before accepting the visual approach. I should have questioned him on exactly that and instructed approach that we did not have the airport in sight. If we would have insured that all appropriate settings in the flight instruments were set; it would have prevented flying through the final approach course. Lack of attention to detail and actually confirming check list items and CRM; was the contributing factors in this situation.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A B727-200 fatigued flight crew; after flying all night in weather; were cleared for a visual approach at their destination; but headed toward a nearby airport with the same runway orientation until alerted by ATC.
Narrative: On Base leg to Runway 1L; we were cleared for the visual approach; the Captain (pilot not flying) accepted the visual approach to 1L. The First Officer (pilot flying) did not have the airport visually and had the incorrect localizer inbound course set in his HSI. I also did not have the runway insight nor did I recognize that the First Officer had the wrong course set in his HSI. The Captain had identified the wrong airport and do to the improper LOC course set in the HSI; we flew through the final approach course. We were asked by Approach where we were going and if we had the runway in sight. At this point the Captain realized he had identified the wrong airport and I corrected the First Officer's inbound LOC course setting. We were vectored around to re-intercept the final approach course and landed without incident. This situation could have been prevented if the Captain would have insured the entire crew had identified the proper airport before accepting the visual approach. I should have questioned him on exactly that and instructed approach that we did not have the airport in sight. If we would have insured that all appropriate settings in the flight instruments were set; it would have prevented flying through the final approach course. Lack of attention to detail and actually confirming check list items and CRM; was the contributing factors in this situation.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.