Narrative:

Following takeoff by captain from san at about 2500', captain accelerated to 270 KTS. I reminded him of the 250 KT airspeed. He did not comment nor show. I said that radar would likely pick up his extra speed. He commented that 'I'll tell them you said something,' but did not immediately slow until a few moments later. While climbing rapidly through 13500' (with a clearance limit of 14000') we were given a frequency change. It took a few moments to establish contact with new controller (#1 communication was intermittent and then frequency congestion). As I was changing frequency captain continued climb through 14000'. I reminded him '14000'.' he didn't push over significantly and din't reduce power. I said 'we're only cleared to 14000' captain.' (as we went through 14200' I yelled louder: '14000 captain.') he kept saying, 'get up higher.' finally controller said to maintain 14000' for 2 mins. Captain reluctantly reduced power as we leveled at 14280' and fast speed (350 KTS). He was annoyed at me for what he perceived as delay in getting higher. He said he deliberately went to the overshoot altitude, but was planning to level at 14300' (which he perceived as limit for being written up). We continued flight to sfo. Cleared for runway 28 profile descent and later the quiet bridge visual to runway 28L. As we continued inbound on the oak 151 degree right (to intercept the sfo 102 degree right), bay approach called traffic inbound for runway 28R. The flight engineer and I were actively checking traffic to determine which light was our traffic. After a while, back into cockpit, we were told by bay approach (I'm not entirely sure whether we were on bay or sfo tower) to 'avoid foster city.' I checked the vors and the captain (set on sfo 102 degree right, I believe) and I was still on oak 151 degree right. Visually checking the terrain I told the captain he was too far left. He should only fly over the very tip of foster city and he needed to go further right. (We were probably right over sql airport, far to the south of the 102 degree right.) captain said he didn't want to go right now because of the incoming traffic to runway 28R. I said we were too far left of radial and we needed to reintercept radial and we'd still be clear of traffic to runway 28R. He reluctantly amended his heading but never intercepted the radial properly. Conclusion: the captain is an individual. All month he was taking shortcuts (5 or 10 degrees from assigned heading to more quickly intercept a radial over a shorter course or a 5-10 degree heading change for a scenic point of interest, west/O controller clearance of course!) the increased airspeed out of san was likely attributable to the going home leg. The altitude bust was likely attributable to his technique in which he hates to unnecessarily reduce throttle setting (because the passenger would hear it). The route deviation was likely attributable to his propensity for short cuts (ie, not wanting to continue on the 151 degree right oak until the sfo 102 degree right, but rather, apparently flying a heading to the left of the radial which wouldn't have intercepted until past foster city). All month he was concerned with company fuel monitoring system. (Company ranks caps by fuel burn and shares this information with the capts. Although the company says they no longer officially counsel the capts with the rankings, check capts will frequently share their copy of the fuel ranking during the chkride). This captain was proud of his low fuel burn, and much of his flying reflected this concern. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following: reporter says captain made statement that he is a 1/1 on the grid system, which means he has no standards and is not autocratic. First officer and second officer laughed at the time, but it proved to be true. Reporter feels he is lazy and has very low standards for himself. Reporter checked with professional standards committee of union. Feels strongly that new coplts will be negatively influenced by these poor standards.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AIRSPEED, ALT AND ROUTE EXCURSIONS.

Narrative: FOLLOWING TKOF BY CAPT FROM SAN AT ABOUT 2500', CAPT ACCELERATED TO 270 KTS. I REMINDED HIM OF THE 250 KT AIRSPD. HE DID NOT COMMENT NOR SHOW. I SAID THAT RADAR WOULD LIKELY PICK UP HIS EXTRA SPD. HE COMMENTED THAT 'I'LL TELL THEM YOU SAID SOMETHING,' BUT DID NOT IMMEDIATELY SLOW UNTIL A FEW MOMENTS LATER. WHILE CLBING RAPIDLY THROUGH 13500' (WITH A CLRNC LIMIT OF 14000') WE WERE GIVEN A FREQ CHANGE. IT TOOK A FEW MOMENTS TO ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH NEW CTLR (#1 COM WAS INTERMITTENT AND THEN FREQ CONGESTION). AS I WAS CHANGING FREQ CAPT CONTINUED CLB THROUGH 14000'. I REMINDED HIM '14000'.' HE DIDN'T PUSH OVER SIGNIFICANTLY AND DIN'T REDUCE PWR. I SAID 'WE'RE ONLY CLRED TO 14000' CAPT.' (AS WE WENT THROUGH 14200' I YELLED LOUDER: '14000 CAPT.') HE KEPT SAYING, 'GET UP HIGHER.' FINALLY CTLR SAID TO MAINTAIN 14000' FOR 2 MINS. CAPT RELUCTANTLY REDUCED PWR AS WE LEVELED AT 14280' AND FAST SPD (350 KTS). HE WAS ANNOYED AT ME FOR WHAT HE PERCEIVED AS DELAY IN GETTING HIGHER. HE SAID HE DELIBERATELY WENT TO THE OVERSHOOT ALT, BUT WAS PLANNING TO LEVEL AT 14300' (WHICH HE PERCEIVED AS LIMIT FOR BEING WRITTEN UP). WE CONTINUED FLT TO SFO. CLRED FOR RWY 28 PROFILE DSCNT AND LATER THE QUIET BRIDGE VISUAL TO RWY 28L. AS WE CONTINUED INBND ON THE OAK 151 DEG R (TO INTERCEPT THE SFO 102 DEG R), BAY APCH CALLED TFC INBND FOR RWY 28R. THE FE AND I WERE ACTIVELY CHKING TFC TO DETERMINE WHICH LIGHT WAS OUR TFC. AFTER A WHILE, BACK INTO COCKPIT, WE WERE TOLD BY BAY APCH (I'M NOT ENTIRELY SURE WHETHER WE WERE ON BAY OR SFO TWR) TO 'AVOID FOSTER CITY.' I CHKED THE VORS AND THE CAPT (SET ON SFO 102 DEG R, I BELIEVE) AND I WAS STILL ON OAK 151 DEG R. VISUALLY CHKING THE TERRAIN I TOLD THE CAPT HE WAS TOO FAR L. HE SHOULD ONLY FLY OVER THE VERY TIP OF FOSTER CITY AND HE NEEDED TO GO FURTHER R. (WE WERE PROBABLY RIGHT OVER SQL ARPT, FAR TO THE S OF THE 102 DEG R.) CAPT SAID HE DIDN'T WANT TO GO R NOW BECAUSE OF THE INCOMING TFC TO RWY 28R. I SAID WE WERE TOO FAR L OF RADIAL AND WE NEEDED TO REINTERCEPT RADIAL AND WE'D STILL BE CLEAR OF TFC TO RWY 28R. HE RELUCTANTLY AMENDED HIS HDG BUT NEVER INTERCEPTED THE RADIAL PROPERLY. CONCLUSION: THE CAPT IS AN INDIVIDUAL. ALL MONTH HE WAS TAKING SHORTCUTS (5 OR 10 DEGS FROM ASSIGNED HDG TO MORE QUICKLY INTERCEPT A RADIAL OVER A SHORTER COURSE OR A 5-10 DEG HDG CHANGE FOR A SCENIC POINT OF INTEREST, W/O CTLR CLRNC OF COURSE!) THE INCREASED AIRSPD OUT OF SAN WAS LIKELY ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE GOING HOME LEG. THE ALT BUST WAS LIKELY ATTRIBUTABLE TO HIS TECHNIQUE IN WHICH HE HATES TO UNNECESSARILY REDUCE THROTTLE SETTING (BECAUSE THE PAX WOULD HEAR IT). THE RTE DEVIATION WAS LIKELY ATTRIBUTABLE TO HIS PROPENSITY FOR SHORT CUTS (IE, NOT WANTING TO CONTINUE ON THE 151 DEG R OAK UNTIL THE SFO 102 DEG R, BUT RATHER, APPARENTLY FLYING A HDG TO THE LEFT OF THE RADIAL WHICH WOULDN'T HAVE INTERCEPTED UNTIL PAST FOSTER CITY). ALL MONTH HE WAS CONCERNED WITH COMPANY FUEL MONITORING SYS. (COMPANY RANKS CAPS BY FUEL BURN AND SHARES THIS INFO WITH THE CAPTS. ALTHOUGH THE COMPANY SAYS THEY NO LONGER OFFICIALLY COUNSEL THE CAPTS WITH THE RANKINGS, CHK CAPTS WILL FREQUENTLY SHARE THEIR COPY OF THE FUEL RANKING DURING THE CHKRIDE). THIS CAPT WAS PROUD OF HIS LOW FUEL BURN, AND MUCH OF HIS FLYING REFLECTED THIS CONCERN. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING: RPTR SAYS CAPT MADE STATEMENT THAT HE IS A 1/1 ON THE GRID SYS, WHICH MEANS HE HAS NO STANDARDS AND IS NOT AUTOCRATIC. F/O AND S/O LAUGHED AT THE TIME, BUT IT PROVED TO BE TRUE. RPTR FEELS HE IS LAZY AND HAS VERY LOW STANDARDS FOR HIMSELF. RPTR CHKED WITH PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS COMMITTEE OF UNION. FEELS STRONGLY THAT NEW COPLTS WILL BE NEGATIVELY INFLUENCED BY THESE POOR STANDARDS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.