Narrative:

This report details one specific event but also describes other aspects leading up to; and after; the event. I took responsibility for radar east. The flm's were conducting a briefing so that one could go on a break. There was a large area of weather across the runway 17L/17R final approach course (facility). The area was approximately 6 miles north of aus; and extended east/west about 10 - 20 miles. PIREPS were indicating light-moderate turbulence; and these were forwarded to flight data for dissemination. Final was combined to radar west at the time; and we were 'sharing the final'. Radar west had one aircraft execute a go-around from runway 17R; and I was told that the aircraft was too high. I initiated an automated point-out for my next arrival to runway 17L; and then started to sequence my arrivals for close-in visuals inside of the band of weather. All pilots were concerned about the weather. Tower said that the area looked dark; but that visuals should work from the east. My first aircraft went around and I informed the new flm and radar west about this situation. When I informed the flm; there were approximately 8 - 10 individuals in the TRACON standing immediately behind me and the radar west controller. I had to step around these folks to coordinate with the radar west controller; as the conversation was too loud and distracting to use the land line. I had to ask the flm to remove these individuals from the TRACON because of the noise and distraction. At the time of my go-around; the weather was well defined on the radar display; and the integrated weather system display indicated that a gust-front was approaching. I asked the flm to tell me what the plan was with regards to a runway change to get the arrivals in and avoid the weather; but there was no response. I was able to get two more arrivals; plus the previous go-around; inside of the weather before the fourth stated that he did not want to land south. I turned this aircraft south and then started vectoring all of the other aircraft for 35L/35R. There were still a bunch of people in the TRACON at the time and the flm still had not assisted with a runway change. Final was still not open. The certified professional controller (cpc) on radar west was relatively new; and I found it difficult to 'share the final' with him during the change because of the 'cross-overs' that were going to take place. About this same time a cpc arrived at my sector to train with a developmental. The cpc had not trained with the developmental in 3 - 5 months; so he/she really wasn't up-to-speed on how the trainee was doing; or even what the trainee's strength/weaknesses were. I was too busy to provide a proper position relieve briefing; so I told them to standby while the mess was sorted-out. The flm was not in sight; and I could not ascertain that any help was being given to any of us. I told the cpc and his/her trainee that they should get a final controller to help before they took the sector. The cpc had to find and ask the flm to open final. The trainee assisted me with land line calls; hand-off's; and coordination. I finally gave-up the radar east sector to the cpc and the trainee and went to take a break. Several minutes later I was called back into the TRACON to work flight data. Several minutes later; an aircraft declared an emergency. The radar east controller shouted-out that he/she had an emergency; but the flm was not in the TRACON. I ran to the TRACON office; but the flm was not there. I went out into the hall; but the flm was not there. I ran back into the TRACON and plugged a headset into a coordinator position to monitor the situation at radar east and coordinated with the tower flm to ring-out the TRACON. We did not have all of the necessary emergency information at the time; but this was eventually given to me; and I was able to forward this information to the tower. The TRACON flm still was not present. I then coordinated with the final controller and the tower flm to have the emergency aircraft placed on our local emergency frequency to assist with airborne and ground communications. The TRACON flm arrived and I told the supervisor briefly what was happening; then I continued to assist with coordination. The tower was launching departures into the weather and the pilots were requesting immediate turns away from the weather. These deviations were impacting training and traffic on radar east. The trainee bailed-out of the sector after losing the picture. I called the tower and stopped east departures; then sat down with the radar east controller to assist with hand-off's; coordination; and to serve as an extra set of eyes. All of this happened while I was signed-on to the flight data position. The radar east trainee asked if separation had been lost between the emergency aircraft and an air carrier on final. I did not see a loss of separation; but there were many things happening at the same time. Recommendation; this is par for the course at aus. We are not getting the help we need on a daily basis. When the traffic level increases; we rarely get speed and/or spacing restrictions at the boundary. When the weather is bad; we rarely get any assistance through pre-planning of flow or runway changes. When an emergency situation arises; we are left to handle much of the coordination on our own. When the strip bays are filled to capacity with inbound flights; final is often closed and underutilized. When the traffic situation display (tsd) indicates that traffic is coming; the decision to open final is almost always too late. When PIREPS indicate that an arrival corner post is about to be shut-down; we wait until there's a back-log of traffic at the corner-post with screaming pilots before we do anything. We operate from a knee-jerk and reactionary position; and many times the response is to simply do nothing until one of the controllers screams for help; or until aircraft are spinning in circles and executing a go-around or missed approach when all of the signs were present? Why must we ask to have final opened? Why must we ask for 250 KTS at the boundary? Why must we ask for 10 miles in-trail from ZHU? Why do we wait until aircraft are going around due to wind-shear or tailwind before initiating a runway change? Why do we allow controllers to go down the tubes before calling for a hand-off position to be open? Why is the TRACON coordinator position never utilized? Why are trainees helping with land line coordination? Why is the flight data controller required to step in and assist with hand-offs; land line coordination; and relaying emergency information when this is not part of the duties associated with flight data? Why are we still 'sharing the final' when we have no defined procedures or practices which allow this to be conducted in a safe manner? Why do I have to ask the flm to get all unnecessary personnel out of the TRACON because they are being a distraction to the operation? Why is aus the most investigated and scrutinized facility in the central service area; yet we continue to repeat the same behavior day after day... Week after week... Month after month? How many teams of FAA 'investigators' have come to aus and how many investigations does it take for someone to stand-up; come forward; and actually address what is happening here?

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AUS Controller provided a detailed account of frustration/s experienced resulting from lack of proper supervision; and poor response to weather conditions; noting the operational conditions are unsafe.

Narrative: This report details one specific event but also describes other aspects leading up to; and after; the event. I took responsibility for RADAR East. The FLM's were conducting a briefing so that one could go on a break. There was a large area of weather across the Runway 17L/17R Final Approach Course (FAC). The area was approximately 6 miles north of AUS; and extended east/west about 10 - 20 miles. PIREPS were indicating light-moderate turbulence; and these were forwarded to Flight Data for dissemination. Final was combined to RADAR West at the time; and we were 'sharing the final'. RADAR West had one aircraft execute a go-around from Runway 17R; and I was told that the aircraft was too high. I initiated an automated point-out for my next arrival to Runway 17L; and then started to sequence my arrivals for close-in visuals inside of the band of weather. All pilots were concerned about the weather. Tower said that the area looked dark; but that visuals should work from the east. My first aircraft went around and I informed the new FLM and RADAR West about this situation. When I informed the FLM; there were approximately 8 - 10 individuals in the TRACON standing immediately behind me and the RADAR West Controller. I had to step around these folks to coordinate with the RADAR West Controller; as the conversation was too loud and distracting to use the land line. I had to ask the FLM to remove these individuals from the TRACON because of the noise and distraction. At the time of my go-around; the weather was well defined on the RADAR display; and the Integrated Weather System Display indicated that a gust-front was approaching. I asked the FLM to tell me what the plan was with regards to a runway change to get the arrivals in and avoid the weather; but there was no response. I was able to get two more arrivals; plus the previous go-around; inside of the weather before the fourth stated that he did not want to land south. I turned this aircraft south and then started vectoring all of the other aircraft for 35L/35R. There were still a bunch of people in the TRACON at the time and the FLM still had not assisted with a runway change. Final was still not open. The Certified Professional Controller (CPC) on RADAR West was relatively new; and I found it difficult to 'share the final' with him during the change because of the 'cross-overs' that were going to take place. About this same time a CPC arrived at my sector to train with a Developmental. The CPC had not trained with the Developmental in 3 - 5 months; so he/she really wasn't up-to-speed on how the Trainee was doing; or even what the Trainee's strength/weaknesses were. I was too busy to provide a proper Position Relieve Briefing; so I told them to standby while the mess was sorted-out. The FLM was not in sight; and I could not ascertain that any help was being given to any of us. I told the CPC and his/her Trainee that they should get a Final Controller to help before they took the sector. The CPC had to find and ask the FLM to open Final. The Trainee assisted me with land line calls; hand-off's; and coordination. I finally gave-up the RADAR East Sector to the CPC and the Trainee and went to take a break. Several minutes later I was called back into the TRACON to work Flight Data. Several minutes later; an aircraft declared an emergency. The RADAR East Controller shouted-out that he/she had an emergency; but the FLM was not in the TRACON. I ran to the TRACON office; but the FLM was not there. I went out into the hall; but the FLM was not there. I ran back into the TRACON and plugged a headset into a Coordinator position to monitor the situation at RADAR East and coordinated with the Tower FLM to ring-out the TRACON. We did not have all of the necessary emergency information at the time; but this was eventually given to me; and I was able to forward this information to the Tower. The TRACON FLM still was not present. I then coordinated with the Final Controller and the Tower FLM to have the emergency aircraft placed on our local emergency frequency to assist with airborne and ground communications. The TRACON FLM arrived and I told the Supervisor briefly what was happening; then I continued to assist with coordination. The Tower was launching departures into the weather and the pilots were requesting immediate turns away from the weather. These deviations were impacting training and traffic on RADAR East. The Trainee bailed-out of the sector after losing the picture. I called the Tower and stopped east departures; then sat down with the RADAR East Controller to assist with hand-off's; coordination; and to serve as an extra set of eyes. All of this happened while I was signed-on to the Flight Data position. The RADAR East trainee asked if separation had been lost between the emergency aircraft and an air carrier on final. I did not see a loss of separation; but there were many things happening at the same time. Recommendation; this is par for the course at AUS. We are not getting the help we need on a daily basis. When the traffic level increases; we rarely get speed and/or spacing restrictions at the boundary. When the weather is bad; we rarely get any assistance through pre-planning of flow or runway changes. When an emergency situation arises; we are left to handle much of the coordination on our own. When the strip bays are filled to capacity with inbound flights; Final is often closed and underutilized. When the Traffic Situation Display (TSD) indicates that traffic is coming; the decision to open Final is almost always too late. When PIREPS indicate that an arrival corner post is about to be shut-down; we wait until there's a back-log of traffic at the corner-post with screaming pilots before we do anything. We operate from a knee-jerk and reactionary position; and many times the response is to simply do nothing until one of the controllers screams for help; or until aircraft are spinning in circles and executing a go-around or missed approach when all of the signs were present? Why must we ask to have Final opened? Why must we ask for 250 KTS at the boundary? Why must we ask for 10 miles in-trail from ZHU? Why do we wait until aircraft are going around due to wind-shear or tailwind before initiating a runway change? Why do we allow controllers to go down the tubes before calling for a hand-off position to be open? Why is the TRACON Coordinator position never utilized? Why are trainees helping with land line coordination? Why is the Flight Data Controller required to step in and assist with hand-offs; land line coordination; and relaying emergency information when this is not part of the duties associated with Flight Data? Why are we still 'sharing the Final' when we have no defined procedures or practices which allow this to be conducted in a safe manner? Why do I have to ask the FLM to get all unnecessary personnel out of the TRACON because they are being a distraction to the operation? Why is AUS the most investigated and scrutinized facility in the Central Service Area; yet we continue to repeat the same behavior day after day... week after week... month after month? How many teams of FAA 'investigators' have come to AUS and how many investigations does it take for someone to stand-up; come forward; and actually address what is happening here?

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.