Narrative:

We were cleared the RNAV departure. I had chosen the flight director toga buttons for guidance for the departure. After we were cleared into position and hold on xxl the line up checklist was started and take-off configuration was ok. We were cleared for takeoff and the line up checklist was completed. The thrust was set; after the thrust was set I noticed the captain's hand move from the thrust lever from my peripheral vision. Almost simultaneously all the bells and whistles went off: 'config auto pilot.' this was very confusing to me as I was 100% sure that the take-off configuration was ok. These events happened very fast. I was at this time aware the captain was pushing a button on the flight control panel. I was moving back to the thrust levers to perform memory items when the captain declared an abort command. I asked if he had the controls which he declared that he did. I am unsure at what speed the aborted take-off was started but we had not reached the 100KIAS call out. I informed tower that we had aborted the takeoff and that we could exist at the next taxiway. I informed him we needed no assistance that we could taxi back (prompted by the captain) but would need to pull off and trouble shoot the situation. We were instructed to exit right and taxi back to xxl. After clear of the runway; I was still unclear of what had just occurred to lead to a configuration autopilot warning. I asked the captain what he had done or pushed. At this time he told me he had meant to clear his flight director but inadvertently engaged the autopilot instead. During the taxi back an announcement was made to the passengers by me and I also talked with the flight attendant to ensure that the situation was under control and everyone was ok. We taxied back to the end of xxl where the parking brake was set and a brake cooling off period of 15 minutes was accomplished. The brake temperatures never rose above a 5. We ran the checklist starting at taxi and after 15 minutes were once again cleared for takeoff with the flight director up and departed with no incidence. If all crew members were to strictly adhere to company procedures and policies and not be distracted by minute details (such as a flight director that they do no wish to be displayed) during such a critical phase of flight this occurrence would never have occurred.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A CRJ50 First Officer reported that during the takeoff roll the Captain accidentally engaged the autopilot while meaning to clear his flight director. That caused the 'Config Auto Pilot' alert to annunciate and the takeoff was rejected.

Narrative: We were cleared the RNAV departure. I had chosen the flight director TOGA buttons for guidance for the departure. After we were cleared into position and hold on XXL the line up checklist was started and take-off configuration was OK. We were cleared for takeoff and the line up checklist was completed. The thrust was set; after the thrust was set I noticed the Captain's hand move from the thrust lever from my peripheral vision. Almost simultaneously all the bells and whistles went off: 'Config Auto Pilot.' This was very confusing to me as I was 100% sure that the take-off configuration was ok. These events happened very fast. I was at this time aware the Captain was pushing a button on the flight control panel. I was moving back to the thrust levers to perform memory items when the Captain declared an abort command. I asked if he had the controls which he declared that he did. I am unsure at what speed the aborted take-off was started but we had not reached the 100KIAS call out. I informed Tower that we had aborted the takeoff and that we could exist at the next taxiway. I informed him we needed no assistance that we could taxi back (prompted by the Captain) but would need to pull off and trouble shoot the situation. We were instructed to exit right and taxi back to XXL. After clear of the Runway; I was still unclear of what had just occurred to lead to a configuration autopilot warning. I asked the Captain what he had done or pushed. At this time he told me he had meant to clear his flight director but inadvertently engaged the autopilot instead. During the taxi back an announcement was made to the passengers by me and I also talked with the Flight Attendant to ensure that the situation was under control and everyone was ok. We taxied back to the end of XXL where the parking brake was set and a brake cooling off period of 15 minutes was accomplished. The brake temperatures never rose above a 5. We ran the checklist starting at taxi and after 15 minutes were once again cleared for takeoff with the flight director up and departed with no incidence. If all crew members were to strictly adhere to company procedures and policies and not be distracted by minute details (such as a flight director that they do no wish to be displayed) during such a critical phase of flight this occurrence would never have occurred.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.