Narrative:

A new self-service fuel facility was put into service on the west end of the north ramp five days prior to the incident. Re-striping the ramp to accommodate the new fueling facility had not yet been performed; but was scheduled to be completed within a few days. So the self-service fueling station was put into service before its entire design had been fully completed. After refueling my aircraft; I taxied to the southwest end of the north ramp following what yellow surface markings were marginally discernable to a point behind the hold bar located between taxiway charlie and the north ramp. I called santa barbara ground control requesting clearance to taxi to the run-up area. The ground controller cleared me to 'taxi to runway 15R via charlie;' and I read the clearance back. As there was a clear line-of-sight between my aircraft and the tower cab; I was confident that the ground controller had my aircraft in sight; and thus knew my aircraft's position on the airport. I immediately followed my clearance instructions by proceeding; from my location at the southwest corner of the north ramp; southbound across the hold bar onto taxiway charlie; and immediately turning left/east on taxiway charlie toward the runway 15R run-up area. I was confident that the 'a clearance to 'taxi to' any point other than an assigned takeoff runway is clearance to cross all runways that intersect the taxi route to that point.' provision of far '91.129(i) afforded me the ability to cross the hold bar and proceed on taxiway charlie as instructed by ATC. I expected the ground controller to instruct me to 'hold short of taxiway charlie for departing traffic;' if that had been a factor. He did not mention any pending departure nor instruct me to hold short of taxiway charlie at any time. Because runway 25 is 6;052 feet in length not including the 245 foot displaced threshold at its east end; and I was not tuned to the tower frequency; it is unreasonable to expect a pilot to be aware that a distant departing airliner has been cleared for departure when the pilot is positioned at the extreme west end of the north ramp far from the departure end of runway 25. The next ATC transmission I received indicated that a 'possible pilot deviation may have occurred.' I acknowledged receipt of that transmission; and proceed to the run-up area. Because the surface markings had not yet been changed/updated to accommodate the new fueling facility; this incomplete implementation of the fueling facility design may have contributed to the incident. I presume the new surface markings will clearly direct aircraft departing the fueling facility to a point east of the taxiway charlie hold bars; so circumstances contributing to this incident will no longer be an issue in the future. I further suggest that yellow strip markings on light colored concrete surfaces be outlined in black to increase their conspicuity as is 'strongly encouraged' in advisory circular 150-5340-1K. AC 150-5340-1K further admonishes; 'markings that cannot be seen by pilots and others operating on marked surfaces are useless.' I suggest that ground controllers be required to hold aircraft positioned to cross hold bars; when crossing those hold bars will precipitate a runway incursion. I suggest that partially implemented airport facility designs not be put into service until they are fully completed and inspected by FAA personnel. I further suggest; that the runway safety group fully inspect those implementations; and establish appropriate operating policies that do not foster incidents such as this. I suggest that the failure to chart holding position marks on national aeronautical charting office taxi diagrams contributes to runway incursions. According to the national transportation safety board's aviation accident report for the year 1999; although general aviation planes and pilots (which outnumber the airlines and military many times over) were responsible for the majority of runway incursions; those that led to accidents or close calls were more likely to involve air carrier aircraft; which already do have taxiway charts in the cockpit. It's not enough to have the charts. Pilots need to be able to see the holding marks too.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A single engine pilot incurred SBA Runway 25 after becoming confused by the taxiway markings and a clearance to taxi to Runway 15R without hold short instructions.

Narrative: A new self-service fuel facility was put into service on the west end of the north ramp five days prior to the incident. Re-striping the ramp to accommodate the new fueling facility had not yet been performed; but was scheduled to be completed within a few days. So the self-service fueling station was put into service before its entire design had been fully completed. After refueling my aircraft; I taxied to the southwest end of the north ramp following what yellow surface markings were marginally discernable to a point behind the hold bar located between Taxiway Charlie and the north ramp. I called Santa Barbara Ground Control requesting clearance to taxi to the run-up area. The Ground Controller cleared me to 'taxi to Runway 15R via Charlie;' and I read the clearance back. As there was a clear line-of-sight between my aircraft and the Tower Cab; I was confident that the Ground Controller had my aircraft in sight; and thus knew my aircraft's position on the airport. I immediately followed my clearance instructions by proceeding; from my location at the southwest corner of the north ramp; southbound across the hold bar onto Taxiway Charlie; and immediately turning left/east on Taxiway Charlie toward the Runway 15R run-up area. I was confident that the 'A clearance to 'taxi to' any point other than an assigned takeoff runway is clearance to cross all runways that intersect the taxi route to that point.' provision of FAR '91.129(i) afforded me the ability to cross the hold bar and proceed on Taxiway Charlie as instructed by ATC. I expected the Ground Controller to instruct me to 'hold short of Taxiway Charlie for departing traffic;' if that had been a factor. He did not mention any pending departure nor instruct me to hold short of Taxiway Charlie at any time. Because Runway 25 is 6;052 feet in length not including the 245 foot displaced threshold at its east end; and I was not tuned to the Tower frequency; it is unreasonable to expect a pilot to be aware that a distant departing airliner has been cleared for departure when the pilot is positioned at the extreme west end of the north ramp far from the departure end of Runway 25. The next ATC transmission I received indicated that a 'possible pilot deviation may have occurred.' I acknowledged receipt of that transmission; and proceed to the run-up area. Because the surface markings had not yet been changed/updated to accommodate the new fueling facility; this incomplete implementation of the fueling facility design may have contributed to the incident. I presume the new surface markings will clearly direct aircraft departing the fueling facility to a point east of the Taxiway Charlie hold bars; so circumstances contributing to this incident will no longer be an issue in the future. I further suggest that yellow strip markings on light colored concrete surfaces be outlined in black to increase their conspicuity as is 'strongly encouraged' in Advisory Circular 150-5340-1K. AC 150-5340-1K further admonishes; 'Markings that cannot be seen by pilots and others operating on marked surfaces are useless.' I suggest that Ground Controllers be required to hold aircraft positioned to cross hold bars; when crossing those hold bars will precipitate a runway incursion. I suggest that partially implemented airport facility designs not be put into service until they are fully completed and inspected by FAA personnel. I further suggest; that the Runway Safety Group fully inspect those implementations; and establish appropriate operating policies that do not foster incidents such as this. I suggest that the failure to chart holding position marks on National Aeronautical Charting Office taxi diagrams contributes to runway incursions. According to the National Transportation Safety Board's aviation accident report for the year 1999; although General Aviation planes and pilots (which outnumber the airlines and military many times over) were responsible for the majority of runway incursions; those that led to accidents or close calls were more likely to involve air carrier aircraft; which already do have taxiway charts in the cockpit. It's not enough to have the charts. Pilots need to be able to see the holding marks too.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.