Narrative:

On descent a #1 propeller electronic control (pec) caution light illuminated and powerplant message appeared on ed. Np was noted at 1060. We performed the #1 pec caution light checklist which directed us to perform an in-flight engine shutdown. The incident occurred in close proximity to the airport; after we had been cleared for a visual approach; so we elected to contact dispatch after landing. At the time of the caution light illuminating; the first officer was pilot flying. The power levers were both being retarded from 18% torque to flight idle when the caution light illuminated. Both condition levers were at min 850. All indications happened suddenly and simultaneously (caution light; powerplant message; and prop overspeed). Unable to reduce prop RPM below 1060 (even with power at flight idle) until checklist directed us to feather the propeller. Emergency was declared and crash fire rescue equipment vehicles responded. The captain landed the aircraft without further incident. We were unable to contact dispatch and mx control airborne because of task saturation and time constraints. We had approximately 10 pages of checklists to accomplish before landing; which makes for a very high workload. Has anyone proposed or considered any sort of an abbreviated checklist/procedure for similar situations? After the event the first officer and I noted and discussed the lack of guidance we felt we had after accomplishing the single engine landing. Both the checklist and our training seem to end after stopping on the runway. (Ok; I'll freeze the sim and reposition you at the beginning of the runway....)the training clearly reminded us to fly the airplane. I believed it was the most prudent course of action to complete the checklists and land the airplane as soon as possible. Trying to communicate with dispatch; maintenance; and operations would have only added to the amount of time we were flying around on one engine. Since we were only minutes away from destination; I believe landing at that airport would have been mutually agreed upon as the best course of action regardless. Had the malfunction happened farther from the airport; sufficient time would have existed and I would have contacted dispatch; etc. In that situation.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Q400 flight crew experiences a PEC caution light and Np over speed during visual approach. The engine is shut down in accordance with checklist procedures and an emergency is declared before landing.

Narrative: On descent a #1 Propeller Electronic Control (PEC) caution light illuminated and POWERPLANT message appeared on ED. Np was noted at 1060. We performed the #1 PEC caution light checklist which directed us to perform an in-flight engine shutdown. The incident occurred in close proximity to the airport; after we had been cleared for a visual approach; so we elected to contact dispatch after landing. At the time of the caution light illuminating; the FO was pilot flying. The power levers were both being retarded from 18% torque to flight idle when the caution light illuminated. Both condition levers were at MIN 850. All indications happened suddenly and simultaneously (caution light; POWERPLANT message; and prop overspeed). Unable to reduce prop RPM below 1060 (even with power at flight idle) until checklist directed us to feather the propeller. Emergency was declared and CFR vehicles responded. The Captain landed the aircraft without further incident. We were unable to contact dispatch and MX control airborne because of task saturation and time constraints. We had approximately 10 pages of checklists to accomplish before landing; which makes for a very high workload. Has anyone proposed or considered any sort of an abbreviated checklist/procedure for similar situations? After the event the First Officer and I noted and discussed the lack of guidance we felt we had after accomplishing the single engine landing. Both the checklist and our training seem to end after stopping on the runway. (OK; I'll freeze the sim and reposition you at the beginning of the runway....)The training clearly reminded us to fly the airplane. I believed it was the most prudent course of action to complete the checklists and land the airplane as soon as possible. Trying to communicate with dispatch; maintenance; and operations would have only added to the amount of time we were flying around on one engine. Since we were only minutes away from destination; I believe landing at that airport would have been mutually agreed upon as the best course of action regardless. Had the malfunction happened farther from the airport; sufficient time would have existed and I would have contacted dispatch; etc. in that situation.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.