Narrative:

During vectors for a visual approach into runway 17L at dfw our aircraft overshot the localizer for 17L and flew through the extended centerlines of runway 17C and runway 17R and encroached onto the extended centerline of runway 18L. There was at least one other aircraft on approach to 17C. Upon checking in with regional approach over karla intersection on the BYP5 arrival; regional approach told us to expect a visual approach to runway 17C. He then issued a descent clearance from 11;000 to 5;000 and to fly a 240 heading after covie intersection. The captain; as pilot flying; briefed the visual approach to 17C and the navigation radios and FMS were setup for an approach to runway 17C. After we were established on the 240 heading and descending to 5;000; he handed us off to the final approach controller. Upon checking in with the final approach controller; he told us to expect a visual approach to runway 17C and to fly direct zingg. As we got closer to zingg intersection; we could tell that we were following an md-80 about 7-8 miles ahead of us and that the controller was working another aircraft to 17C behind us that appeared to be getting vectored from a different arrival. The final controller cleared the md-80 in front of us for the visual approach and told him to maintain 180 KTS or greater and handed him off to dfw tower. The final controller issued us a descent clearance to 3;000 and asked us to report dfw in sight; the captain and I both had the airport in sight and the controller cleared us for the visual approach to 17C and to maintain 210 KTS until further advised. About 2-3 miles from intercepting the centerline for runway 17C; the controller changed our runway assignment to runway 17L; issued a descent clearance to 2;300 and cleared us for the visual approach to runway 17L. He then cleared the aircraft behind us for the visual approach to runway 17C and handed us off to dfw tower. After the final controller cleared us for the visual approach to 17L I set the localizer frequency for 17L into the captain's navigation radio; then set it in my radio. After verifying the correct localizer was displayed on the HSI; I informed the captain that the localizer for 17L was up. I then proceeded to reprogram the FMS for 17L. As I executed the FMS revision; I noticed that my HSI looked 'wrong' as the localizer needle was fully deflected left. I looked up (outside) and saw that we had flown past the extended centerlines of 17L; 17C; and 17R and were about midfield between the 17 and 18 runways and were about to encroach on the runway 18 arrivals. I stated to the captain that we needed to turn left; and said that we were about fly into the 18 arrivals. I checked in with dfw tower who issued a change of runway and cleared us to land on 17R. I then tuned the captain's navigation radio to the localizer for 17R; but didn't verify the radio was receiving the correct identifier before telling her she had the localizer for 17R tuned in. The landing was relatively uneventful; and in a telephone conversation with dfw tower after blocking in; the tower supervisor stated that there was no loss of separation between us and the aircraft landing on 17C behind us. Contributing factors: 1. Last minute runway change in close proximity to intercepting the 17C localizer. 2. We were expecting; briefed and set up for 17C. 3. Staying 'heads down' in a critical phase of flight during a rapidly changing situation. 4. I assumed the captain had 17L in sight as well and was maneuvering to intercept the 17L centerline while I was reprogramming the FMS. I should have just tuned the localizer and left the FMS untouched.5. High aircraft speed approaching the localizer intercept (210 KTS until further advised) 6. Crew fatigue - both the captain and I were the 'ready reserve' crew and had been on duty since XA00am and had sat idle at the airport for six hours before being assigned the turn we were just completing. This was the fourth day in a row of ready reserve for this crew. 7. The normally quiet cruise portion of the flight today was not quiet - today it involved weather avoidance that taxed our mental acuity.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A regional jet flight crew failed to comply with multiple runway changes appended to a visual approach clearance.

Narrative: During vectors for a visual approach into Runway 17L at DFW our aircraft overshot the localizer for 17L and flew through the extended centerlines of Runway 17C and Runway 17R and encroached onto the extended centerline of Runway 18L. There was at least one other aircraft on approach to 17C. Upon checking in with Regional Approach over KARLA intersection on the BYP5 Arrival; Regional Approach told us to expect a visual approach to Runway 17C. He then issued a descent clearance from 11;000 to 5;000 and to fly a 240 heading after COVIE intersection. The Captain; as pilot flying; briefed the visual approach to 17C and the NAV radios and FMS were setup for an approach to Runway 17C. After we were established on the 240 heading and descending to 5;000; he handed us off to the final approach controller. Upon checking in with the final approach controller; he told us to expect a visual approach to Runway 17C and to fly direct ZINGG. As we got closer to ZINGG intersection; we could tell that we were following an MD-80 about 7-8 miles ahead of us and that the controller was working another aircraft to 17C behind us that appeared to be getting vectored from a different arrival. The Final Controller cleared the MD-80 in front of us for the visual approach and told him to maintain 180 KTS or greater and handed him off to DFW Tower. The Final Controller issued us a descent clearance to 3;000 and asked us to report DFW in sight; the Captain and I both had the airport in sight and the Controller cleared us for the visual approach to 17C and to maintain 210 KTS until further advised. About 2-3 miles from intercepting the centerline for Runway 17C; the Controller changed our runway assignment to Runway 17L; issued a descent clearance to 2;300 and cleared us for the visual approach to Runway 17L. He then cleared the aircraft behind us for the visual approach to Runway 17C and handed us off to DFW tower. After the Final Controller cleared us for the visual approach to 17L I set the localizer frequency for 17L into the Captain's NAV radio; then set it in my radio. After verifying the correct localizer was displayed on the HSI; I informed the Captain that the localizer for 17L was up. I then proceeded to reprogram the FMS for 17L. As I executed the FMS revision; I noticed that my HSI looked 'wrong' as the localizer needle was fully deflected left. I looked up (outside) and saw that we had flown past the extended centerlines of 17L; 17C; and 17R and were about midfield between the 17 and 18 runways and were about to encroach on the Runway 18 arrivals. I stated to the Captain that we needed to turn left; and said that we were about fly into the 18 arrivals. I checked in with DFW tower who issued a change of runway and cleared us to land on 17R. I then tuned the Captain's NAV radio to the localizer for 17R; but didn't verify the radio was receiving the correct identifier before telling her she had the localizer for 17R tuned in. The landing was relatively uneventful; and in a telephone conversation with DFW tower after blocking in; the Tower supervisor stated that there was no loss of separation between us and the aircraft landing on 17C behind us. Contributing Factors: 1. Last minute runway change in close proximity to intercepting the 17C localizer. 2. We were expecting; briefed and set up for 17C. 3. Staying 'heads down' in a critical phase of flight during a rapidly changing situation. 4. I assumed the Captain had 17L in sight as well and was maneuvering to intercept the 17L centerline while I was reprogramming the FMS. I should have just tuned the localizer and left the FMS untouched.5. High aircraft speed approaching the localizer intercept (210 KTS until further advised) 6. Crew fatigue - both the Captain and I were the 'ready reserve' crew and had been on duty since XA00am and had sat idle at the airport for six hours before being assigned the turn we were just completing. This was the fourth day in a row of ready reserve for this crew. 7. The normally quiet cruise portion of the flight today was not quiet - today it involved weather avoidance that taxed our mental acuity.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.