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B757-200 captain is concerned that fams aboard his flight were not made aware of his ffdo status. Advised this has happened 'multiple' times since a recent change in boarding protocol.
| Attributes | |
| ACN | 826016 |
| Time | |
| Date | 200903 |
| Local Time Of Day | 1801-2400 |
| Place | |
| Locale Reference | LAX.Airport |
| State Reference | CA |
| Aircraft 1 | |
| Make Model Name | B757-200 |
| Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
| Flight Phase | Parked |
| Flight Plan | IFR |
| Person 1 | |
| Function | Captain Pilot Not Flying |
| Experience | Flight Crew Last 90 Days 250 Flight Crew Total 20000 Flight Crew Type 6500 |
| Events | |
| Anomaly | Deviation - Procedural FAR Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy |
Narrative:
I checked in with the passenger agent at the departure gate in lax and identified myself as an ffdo per SOP. I was advised fams were scheduled aboard the flight and given boarding stubs. Upon arrival in jfk; I learned the fams were never made aware I was on duty as an ffdo in the cockpit. Unfortunately this sort of breach has occurred multiple times since the change in boarding SOP wherein the lead fam no longer checks in with the captain. Obviously; the potential for tragic consequences exists when this type of breakdown occurs. I believe it is imperative the boarding and identification process of fams be changed as soon as possible to prevent a catastrophe.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: B757-200 Captain is concerned that FAMs aboard his flight were not made aware of his FFDO status. Advised this has happened 'multiple' times since a recent change in boarding protocol.
Narrative: I checked in with the Passenger Agent at the departure gate in LAX and identified myself as an FFDO per SOP. I was advised FAMs were scheduled aboard the flight and given boarding stubs. Upon arrival in JFK; I learned the FAMs were never made aware I was on duty as an FFDO in the cockpit. Unfortunately this sort of breach has occurred multiple times since the change in boarding SOP wherein the Lead FAM no longer checks in with the Captain. Obviously; the potential for tragic consequences exists when this type of breakdown occurs. I believe it is imperative the boarding and ID process of FAMs be changed ASAP to prevent a catastrophe.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.