Narrative:

While on approach to runway 9L in fll at 5;000 ft MSL; I observed a gulfstream at our 2 o'clock position; 700 ft low; climbing; on a direct intercept heading (heading north-northeast). I pointed out the traffic to the first officer who was the pilot flying. I expressed my concern to the first officer regarding the gulfstream's flight path and advised him to prepare for a TCAS RA as the vertical separation decreased to -400 ft. The first officer visually acquired the aircraft and also expressed concern regarding its flight path. The ATC frequency was very congested and there was no ATC TA regarding the gulfstream. TCAS issued a TA; followed quickly by commanding a very significant climb RA. The first officer complied with the TCAS guidance in accordance with the fom procedure. I advised ATC of the RA and the controller replied that the gulfstream was supposed to have maintained visual separation and assigned us a 060 degree heading and a climb to 6;000 ft MSL. We leveled at 7;200 ft MSL and I visually reacquired the gulfstream at 4 O'clock position on a slightly diverging course. We rejoined the approach and landed uneventfully at fll. I discussed the incident with the flight attendants. They were uninjured but 1 flight attendant had to drop to 1 knee to catch herself from falling. They stated that some passengers appeared startled by the TCAS RA directed climb. I contacted the manager of mia approach. He reviewed the radar tapes of the incident and felt that although the gulfstream pilot had technically complied with the visual separation requirement; there was no reasonable explanation from an ATC perspective why he would choose such an aggressive flight path that results in minimal separation. In my opinion; the gulfstream pilot was either maintaining visual separation on the wrong aircraft or exercised extremely poor/reckless judgement in choosing such an aggressive flight path that resulted in minimal separation. Prior to the flight attendant; I commented to the first officer; 'is this guy trying to hit us?' the first officer shared my concern. I think the FAA needs to re-address the requirements of visual separation. As this case illustrates; relying on one pilot to maintain visual separation provides insufficient redundancy for traffic de-confliction.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: On approach to FLL; B737NG complied with TCAS RA with respect to a Gulfstream departing MIA that was climbing beneath them with a clearance to maintain visual separation.

Narrative: While on approach to Runway 9L in FLL at 5;000 FT MSL; I observed a Gulfstream at our 2 o'clock position; 700 FT low; climbing; on a direct intercept heading (heading north-northeast). I pointed out the traffic to the First Officer who was the Pilot Flying. I expressed my concern to the First Officer regarding the Gulfstream's flight path and advised him to prepare for a TCAS RA as the vertical separation decreased to -400 FT. The First Officer visually acquired the aircraft and also expressed concern regarding its flight path. The ATC frequency was very congested and there was no ATC TA regarding the Gulfstream. TCAS issued a TA; followed quickly by commanding a very significant climb RA. The First Officer complied with the TCAS guidance in accordance with the FOM procedure. I advised ATC of the RA and the Controller replied that the Gulfstream was supposed to have maintained visual separation and assigned us a 060 degree heading and a climb to 6;000 FT MSL. We leveled at 7;200 FT MSL and I visually reacquired the Gulfstream at 4 O'clock position on a slightly diverging course. We rejoined the approach and landed uneventfully at FLL. I discussed the incident with the Flight Attendants. They were uninjured but 1 Flight Attendant had to drop to 1 knee to catch herself from falling. They stated that some passengers appeared startled by the TCAS RA directed climb. I contacted the Manager of MIA Approach. He reviewed the radar tapes of the incident and felt that although the Gulfstream pilot had technically complied with the visual separation requirement; there was no reasonable explanation from an ATC perspective why he would choose such an aggressive flight path that results in minimal separation. In my opinion; the Gulfstream pilot was either maintaining visual separation on the wrong aircraft or exercised extremely poor/reckless judgement in choosing such an aggressive flight path that resulted in minimal separation. Prior to the Flight Attendant; I commented to the First Officer; 'Is this guy trying to hit us?' The First Officer shared my concern. I think the FAA needs to re-address the requirements of visual separation. As this case illustrates; relying on one pilot to maintain visual separation provides insufficient redundancy for traffic de-confliction.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.