|37000 Feet||Browse and search NASA's
Aviation Safety Reporting System
|Local Time Of Day||0601 To 1200|
|Locale Reference||airport : zzz.airport|
|Altitude||agl single value : 0|
|Operator||common carrier : air carrier|
|Make Model Name||A320|
|Operating Under FAR Part||Part 121|
|Flight Phase||climbout : takeoff|
|Affiliation||company : air carrier|
|Function||flight crew : captain|
oversight : pic
|Experience||flight time last 90 days : 170|
flight time total : 19500
flight time type : 4800
|Affiliation||company : air carrier|
|Function||flight crew : first officer|
|Experience||flight time last 90 days : 200|
flight time total : 10000
flight time type : 1500
|Anomaly||non adherence : published procedure|
non adherence : company policies
|Independent Detector||other flight crewa|
other flight crewb
|Resolutory Action||flight crew : rejected takeoff|
|Problem Areas||Flight Crew Human Performance|
|Primary Problem||Flight Crew Human Performance|
The day began in ZZZ with an early morning departure to ZZZ1. The aircraft had numerous DF and cf items most of note an inoperative APU (electrical ok) due to low psi during engine start; and a hot air valve inoperative which degrades the aircraft system to a default mode. My past experience with this aircraft issue has been aircraft that became almost impossible to control the temperature in either the cabin or cockpit at comfortable levels. Due to lack of APU air; external air was on the aircraft when we arrived but was only able to heat the cabin to a chilly 60 degrees. I remember being annoyed at the fact that a flight crew had brought this airplane to a station such as ZZZ in such a degraded mechanical condition--legal but; in my opinion; not smart. The first officer and I had a conversation about the crew and how the lack of an APU and lack of support from the station along with other factors had led to a runway incursion. We both agreed how these mechanical nuisances can adversely affect the safety of the operation. I remember remarking to the station personnel that if we had trouble controling the temperature in the plane we would be returning to ZZZ. During an air cart start; the psi indicator on the #1 engine turned amber several times and the engine experienced a hung start. All ECAM actions and appropriate checklists were followed for all procedures. A second start attempt of the #1 engine was successful and a xbleed was used to start #2. The first officer and I discussed the possibility of some other problem with the aircraft -- other than what was assumed to be low APU air pressure (duct lead or starter problem). Taxi out and takeoff were uneventful. En route; the flight attendants notified us that the 'cids' caution light had come on and various cabin lights were malfunctioning. The first officer and I again had a conversation about the sorry condition of this aircraft and agreed not to fly it on any subsequent legs until maintenance action to further troubleshoot low psi during engine start experienced on both previous APU starts and ground cart start. The cabin temperature was easily ctlable and was not a factor. Papers were pulled up for our next leg; and sure enough we were planned to take the same aircraft on flight to ZZZ3. I sent an ACARS message to both dispatch and maintenance refusing to take aircraft due to low psi during start and previous psi start problems. Landing and taxi in ZZZ1 were normal. Aircraft technician met us at the gate and let us know that we would be remaining with the aircraft and they would troubleshoot problems. Technician later informed us that they had started the engines on APU air several times and noted no low psi issues. I agreed to accept the aircraft. Just prior to pushback; I noticed that my navigation display 'map not available' message and no map on the navigation display. I pulled up the present position page and noted no position shown for FMGC 1 or 2. The first officer asked me if I had turned the IRS's on (they were in the 'on' position) and I stated that I had not. He had not turned them on either. We then figured that technician must have turned them back on during their activity. We then turned the IRS's off then on to realign them. When the realignment was complete; we pushed back and began the engine start sequence. During both engine #1 and engine #2 start; the psi appeared lower than normal; flickering amber at times. Engines did start normal; but we agreed that the psi was low as was the air cart earlier. We both commented again on the poor condition of this aircraft and made a comment about how this #7 was not a lucky one. Takeoff was planned on runway 17R under cavu conditions. We were cleared for takeoff prior to being done with our checklists and told the tower we would let them know when we were ready. I was the PF and advanced the throttles to 1.05 to stabilize; and then advanced the levers to the mct/flex detent. This was done while rolling and not done from a standing start. When the mct/flex detent was selected I noted no appropriate FMA's (man flex/srs/runway). I have seen this before when I had forgotten to select my flight director on. I immediately pushed my flight director button but still no FMA's. I vocalized the lack of FMA's to the first officer and then announced my intention to abort. I did not hear the 80 KT callout as I don't believe it was made. This I don't believe was missed by the first officer; as the abort was begun right at about the time he would be making the call. I retarded the throttles and started manual braking. I perceived the aircraft to be in a low speed state as minimal braking was required to slow and exit the runway. The first officer notified the tower and I made a PA to remain seated as the aircraft was decelerating. The first officer then stated that his flight director was also off. We discussed the abort and checked all performance and other data to ensure all was still present and valid as we waited for several of the brake temperatures to come down a bit. We determined the lack of FMA's to be caused by the flight directors being off and elected to take off provided all FMA's normal. On the following takeoff; I held the brakes until the mct/flex detent was reached. All FMA's were normal; brakes were released and takeoff was normal. Supplemental information from acn 813869: as a final note; this was day 4 of a 4-DAY trip and both of us felt well rested and I do not feel that fatigue was an issue. I do feel that somewhere in the mix of maintenance working on the airplane and us dealing with the issues; somehow the flight directors were either missed or turned off at some point after the realignment -- I just don't know how they turned off. I do feel confident that we had them on at some point. I have seen one pilot or the other miss their flight director over the yrs; but as I previously said; I have never seen both pilots forget to turn them on.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: AN A320 CREW DISTRACTED BY MAINTENANCE ISSUES FAILED TO TURN ON THE FLIGHT DIRECTORS WHICH MAINTENANCE TURNED OFF. THE TAKEOFF WAS REJECTED BECAUSE OF NO FMA ILLUMINATION. AFTER THE FLIGHT DIRECTORS WERE TURNED ON A NORMAL TAKEOFF FOLLOWED.
Narrative: THE DAY BEGAN IN ZZZ WITH AN EARLY MORNING DEP TO ZZZ1. THE ACFT HAD NUMEROUS DF AND CF ITEMS MOST OF NOTE AN INOP APU (ELECTRICAL OK) DUE TO LOW PSI DURING ENG START; AND A HOT AIR VALVE INOP WHICH DEGRADES THE ACFT SYSTEM TO A DEFAULT MODE. MY PAST EXPERIENCE WITH THIS ACFT ISSUE HAS BEEN ACFT THAT BECAME ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE TO CONTROL THE TEMP IN EITHER THE CABIN OR COCKPIT AT COMFORTABLE LEVELS. DUE TO LACK OF APU AIR; EXTERNAL AIR WAS ON THE ACFT WHEN WE ARRIVED BUT WAS ONLY ABLE TO HEAT THE CABIN TO A CHILLY 60 DEGS. I REMEMBER BEING ANNOYED AT THE FACT THAT A FLT CREW HAD BROUGHT THIS AIRPLANE TO A STATION SUCH AS ZZZ IN SUCH A DEGRADED MECHANICAL CONDITION--LEGAL BUT; IN MY OPINION; NOT SMART. THE FO AND I HAD A CONVERSATION ABOUT THE CREW AND HOW THE LACK OF AN APU AND LACK OF SUPPORT FROM THE STATION ALONG WITH OTHER FACTORS HAD LED TO A RWY INCURSION. WE BOTH AGREED HOW THESE MECHANICAL NUISANCES CAN ADVERSELY AFFECT THE SAFETY OF THE OP. I REMEMBER REMARKING TO THE STATION PERSONNEL THAT IF WE HAD TROUBLE CTLING THE TEMP IN THE PLANE WE WOULD BE RETURNING TO ZZZ. DURING AN AIR CART START; THE PSI INDICATOR ON THE #1 ENG TURNED AMBER SEVERAL TIMES AND THE ENG EXPERIENCED A HUNG START. ALL ECAM ACTIONS AND APPROPRIATE CHKLISTS WERE FOLLOWED FOR ALL PROCS. A SECOND START ATTEMPT OF THE #1 ENG WAS SUCCESSFUL AND A XBLEED WAS USED TO START #2. THE FO AND I DISCUSSED THE POSSIBILITY OF SOME OTHER PROB WITH THE ACFT -- OTHER THAN WHAT WAS ASSUMED TO BE LOW APU AIR PRESSURE (DUCT LEAD OR STARTER PROB). TAXI OUT AND TKOF WERE UNEVENTFUL. ENRTE; THE FLT ATTENDANTS NOTIFIED US THAT THE 'CIDS' CAUTION LIGHT HAD COME ON AND VARIOUS CABIN LIGHTS WERE MALFUNCTIONING. THE FO AND I AGAIN HAD A CONVERSATION ABOUT THE SORRY CONDITION OF THIS ACFT AND AGREED NOT TO FLY IT ON ANY SUBSEQUENT LEGS UNTIL MAINT ACTION TO FURTHER TROUBLESHOOT LOW PSI DURING ENG START EXPERIENCED ON BOTH PREVIOUS APU STARTS AND GND CART START. THE CABIN TEMP WAS EASILY CTLABLE AND WAS NOT A FACTOR. PAPERS WERE PULLED UP FOR OUR NEXT LEG; AND SURE ENOUGH WE WERE PLANNED TO TAKE THE SAME ACFT ON FLT TO ZZZ3. I SENT AN ACARS MESSAGE TO BOTH DISPATCH AND MAINT REFUSING TO TAKE ACFT DUE TO LOW PSI DURING START AND PREVIOUS PSI START PROBS. LNDG AND TAXI IN ZZZ1 WERE NORMAL. ACFT TECHNICIAN MET US AT THE GATE AND LET US KNOW THAT WE WOULD BE REMAINING WITH THE ACFT AND THEY WOULD TROUBLESHOOT PROBS. TECHNICIAN LATER INFORMED US THAT THEY HAD STARTED THE ENGS ON APU AIR SEVERAL TIMES AND NOTED NO LOW PSI ISSUES. I AGREED TO ACCEPT THE ACFT. JUST PRIOR TO PUSHBACK; I NOTICED THAT MY NAV DISPLAY 'MAP NOT AVAILABLE' MESSAGE AND NO MAP ON THE NAV DISPLAY. I PULLED UP THE PRESENT POSITION PAGE AND NOTED NO POSITION SHOWN FOR FMGC 1 OR 2. THE FO ASKED ME IF I HAD TURNED THE IRS'S ON (THEY WERE IN THE 'ON' POSITION) AND I STATED THAT I HAD NOT. HE HAD NOT TURNED THEM ON EITHER. WE THEN FIGURED THAT TECHNICIAN MUST HAVE TURNED THEM BACK ON DURING THEIR ACTIVITY. WE THEN TURNED THE IRS'S OFF THEN ON TO REALIGN THEM. WHEN THE REALIGNMENT WAS COMPLETE; WE PUSHED BACK AND BEGAN THE ENG START SEQUENCE. DURING BOTH ENG #1 AND ENG #2 START; THE PSI APPEARED LOWER THAN NORMAL; FLICKERING AMBER AT TIMES. ENGS DID START NORMAL; BUT WE AGREED THAT THE PSI WAS LOW AS WAS THE AIR CART EARLIER. WE BOTH COMMENTED AGAIN ON THE POOR CONDITION OF THIS ACFT AND MADE A COMMENT ABOUT HOW THIS #7 WAS NOT A LUCKY ONE. TKOF WAS PLANNED ON RWY 17R UNDER CAVU CONDITIONS. WE WERE CLRED FOR TKOF PRIOR TO BEING DONE WITH OUR CHKLISTS AND TOLD THE TWR WE WOULD LET THEM KNOW WHEN WE WERE READY. I WAS THE PF AND ADVANCED THE THROTTLES TO 1.05 TO STABILIZE; AND THEN ADVANCED THE LEVERS TO THE MCT/FLEX DETENT. THIS WAS DONE WHILE ROLLING AND NOT DONE FROM A STANDING START. WHEN THE MCT/FLEX DETENT WAS SELECTED I NOTED NO APPROPRIATE FMA'S (MAN FLEX/SRS/RWY). I HAVE SEEN THIS BEFORE WHEN I HAD FORGOTTEN TO SELECT MY FLT DIRECTOR ON. I IMMEDIATELY PUSHED MY FLT DIRECTOR BUTTON BUT STILL NO FMA'S. I VOCALIZED THE LACK OF FMA'S TO THE FO AND THEN ANNOUNCED MY INTENTION TO ABORT. I DID NOT HEAR THE 80 KT CALLOUT AS I DON'T BELIEVE IT WAS MADE. THIS I DON'T BELIEVE WAS MISSED BY THE FO; AS THE ABORT WAS BEGUN RIGHT AT ABOUT THE TIME HE WOULD BE MAKING THE CALL. I RETARDED THE THROTTLES AND STARTED MANUAL BRAKING. I PERCEIVED THE ACFT TO BE IN A LOW SPD STATE AS MINIMAL BRAKING WAS REQUIRED TO SLOW AND EXIT THE RWY. THE FO NOTIFIED THE TWR AND I MADE A PA TO REMAIN SEATED AS THE ACFT WAS DECELERATING. THE FO THEN STATED THAT HIS FLT DIRECTOR WAS ALSO OFF. WE DISCUSSED THE ABORT AND CHKED ALL PERFORMANCE AND OTHER DATA TO ENSURE ALL WAS STILL PRESENT AND VALID AS WE WAITED FOR SEVERAL OF THE BRAKE TEMPS TO COME DOWN A BIT. WE DETERMINED THE LACK OF FMA'S TO BE CAUSED BY THE FLT DIRECTORS BEING OFF AND ELECTED TO TAKE OFF PROVIDED ALL FMA'S NORMAL. ON THE FOLLOWING TKOF; I HELD THE BRAKES UNTIL THE MCT/FLEX DETENT WAS REACHED. ALL FMA'S WERE NORMAL; BRAKES WERE RELEASED AND TKOF WAS NORMAL. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 813869: AS A FINAL NOTE; THIS WAS DAY 4 OF A 4-DAY TRIP AND BOTH OF US FELT WELL RESTED AND I DO NOT FEEL THAT FATIGUE WAS AN ISSUE. I DO FEEL THAT SOMEWHERE IN THE MIX OF MAINT WORKING ON THE AIRPLANE AND US DEALING WITH THE ISSUES; SOMEHOW THE FLT DIRECTORS WERE EITHER MISSED OR TURNED OFF AT SOME POINT AFTER THE REALIGNMENT -- I JUST DON'T KNOW HOW THEY TURNED OFF. I DO FEEL CONFIDENT THAT WE HAD THEM ON AT SOME POINT. I HAVE SEEN ONE PLT OR THE OTHER MISS THEIR FLT DIRECTOR OVER THE YRS; BUT AS I PREVIOUSLY SAID; I HAVE NEVER SEEN BOTH PLTS FORGET TO TURN THEM ON.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.