Narrative:

On approach; established/coupled to ILS runway 23L localizer; field in sight and clearance of 'maintain 4000 ft cleared for the visual to runway 23L approach.' GS coming down to intercept and both pm and PF aware of aircraft at 1-2 O'clock position descending from the right (north); pointed out in the cockpit and acknowledged. Winds from the north at 4000 ft were from the nnw at 35-45 KTS (overshooting). We were still on approach control when the aircraft approaching from the north was asked; 'air carrier Y; do you have the aircraft at 12 O'clock in sight?' long pause and then we heard a 'no' as the aircraft rolled belly up and slightly high to correct back on course. Pm/first officer clicked off the autoplt and made slight move to south to give overshooting aircraft 'room.' during this the controller asks us; 'are you on a visual?' answer was affirmative as we maneuvered and then stated we had air carrier Y in sight as he corrected back. ATC came back with descend to 3000 ft on the visual. We were just intercepting GS at the time and descended on GS. Contributing factors in my judgement were: overshooting winds of 45 KTS. Too much attention to getting eyes of the aircraft overshooting to an established aircraft on parallel final and not enough attention to deconfliction of vectored aircraft into a 'visual' approach by approach controller. Speed/radius control of intercept taken for granted and not compensated for increased ground speed of intercepting aircraft to overshoot. Eyes out and situational awareness of 2 out of 3 parties.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: HEAVY FREIGHT ACFT IS FORCED TO MANEUVER OFF FINAL APCH COURSE TO AVOID ACFT OVERSHOOTING FINAL TO THE PARALLEL RWY.

Narrative: ON APCH; ESTABLISHED/COUPLED TO ILS RWY 23L LOC; FIELD IN SIGHT AND CLRNC OF 'MAINTAIN 4000 FT CLRED FOR THE VISUAL TO RWY 23L APCH.' GS COMING DOWN TO INTERCEPT AND BOTH PM AND PF AWARE OF ACFT AT 1-2 O'CLOCK POS DSNDING FROM THE R (N); POINTED OUT IN THE COCKPIT AND ACKNOWLEDGED. WINDS FROM THE N AT 4000 FT WERE FROM THE NNW AT 35-45 KTS (OVERSHOOTING). WE WERE STILL ON APCH CTL WHEN THE ACFT APCHING FROM THE N WAS ASKED; 'ACR Y; DO YOU HAVE THE ACFT AT 12 O'CLOCK IN SIGHT?' LONG PAUSE AND THEN WE HEARD A 'NO' AS THE ACFT ROLLED BELLY UP AND SLIGHTLY HIGH TO CORRECT BACK ON COURSE. PM/FO CLICKED OFF THE AUTOPLT AND MADE SLIGHT MOVE TO S TO GIVE OVERSHOOTING ACFT 'ROOM.' DURING THIS THE CTLR ASKS US; 'ARE YOU ON A VISUAL?' ANSWER WAS AFFIRMATIVE AS WE MANEUVERED AND THEN STATED WE HAD ACR Y IN SIGHT AS HE CORRECTED BACK. ATC CAME BACK WITH DSND TO 3000 FT ON THE VISUAL. WE WERE JUST INTERCEPTING GS AT THE TIME AND DSNDED ON GS. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IN MY JUDGEMENT WERE: OVERSHOOTING WINDS OF 45 KTS. TOO MUCH ATTN TO GETTING EYES OF THE ACFT OVERSHOOTING TO AN ESTABLISHED ACFT ON PARALLEL FINAL AND NOT ENOUGH ATTN TO DECONFLICTION OF VECTORED ACFT INTO A 'VISUAL' APCH BY APCH CTLR. SPD/RADIUS CTL OF INTERCEPT TAKEN FOR GRANTED AND NOT COMPENSATED FOR INCREASED GND SPD OF INTERCEPTING ACFT TO OVERSHOOT. EYES OUT AND SITUATIONAL AWARENESS OF 2 OUT OF 3 PARTIES.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.