Narrative:

We briefed the noise abatement; thrust cutback takeoff procedure off runway 19R at sna. It was night VMC and we were cleared into position and hold on runway 19R. A cessna was cleared into position on runway 19L. ATC instructed the cessna to turn left to a westerly heading after takeoff. Tower specifically advised the cessna that this was not standard and once again directed; 'turn left; not right; to heading XXX; runway 19L cleared for takeoff.' tower then cleared us for takeoff on runway 19R. Hearing the word nonstandard given to the cessna; I decided to keep an eye on him during our takeoff roll. V1 was 104 KTS. At approximately 95 KTS; the cessna (now about 300 ft AGL) began a right turn across our departure runway centerline. Quickly weighing my options; I felt that the cessna would be through our centerline before we would be in conflict. I also believed that a high speed abort near V1 at the shortest runway in our system was far more likely to yield an unpleasant result. I told my first officer that the cessna was going to be an issue. She provided excellent information by remaining focused on the V1 and vr callouts. After rotation; I immediately turned left 20 degrees behind the cessna and shallowed my climb. The cessna passed off our right side (unsure how close) and above our altitude. My first officer believes the cessna's altitude to be approximately 500 ft AGL. We then informed ATC that we were off the departure procedure. Tower acknowledged and then realizing the situation; admonished the cessna. My first officer called 'approaching cutback' at 800 ft; and we cutback the power at 1000 ft while returning to the departure procedure. I have been concerned on previous occasions regarding sna's procedure of having smaller aircraft depart west across the runway centerline. Perhaps; a notification from tower that the aircraft is far enough out to hurry and 'get out of the way.' I would simply caution these pilots that it's far more important and helpful to get it right than to get it fast. As for myself; my takeoff briefing regarding rejected takeoff's now includes a caution to be ready for any other reason than my company's four; listed reasons for a high speed abort.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DURING PARALLEL RWY 19 DEPS FROM SNA; CESSNA TOLD TO TURN L AFTER TKOF FROM THE L RWY TURNS R INSTEAD INTO THE PATH OF DEPARTING B737-700 OFF RWY 19R.

Narrative: WE BRIEFED THE NOISE ABATEMENT; THRUST CUTBACK TKOF PROC OFF RWY 19R AT SNA. IT WAS NIGHT VMC AND WE WERE CLRED INTO POS AND HOLD ON RWY 19R. A CESSNA WAS CLRED INTO POS ON RWY 19L. ATC INSTRUCTED THE CESSNA TO TURN L TO A WESTERLY HDG AFTER TKOF. TWR SPECIFICALLY ADVISED THE CESSNA THAT THIS WAS NOT STANDARD AND ONCE AGAIN DIRECTED; 'TURN L; NOT R; TO HDG XXX; RWY 19L CLRED FOR TKOF.' TWR THEN CLRED US FOR TKOF ON RWY 19R. HEARING THE WORD NONSTANDARD GIVEN TO THE CESSNA; I DECIDED TO KEEP AN EYE ON HIM DURING OUR TKOF ROLL. V1 WAS 104 KTS. AT APPROX 95 KTS; THE CESSNA (NOW ABOUT 300 FT AGL) BEGAN A R TURN ACROSS OUR DEP RWY CTRLINE. QUICKLY WEIGHING MY OPTIONS; I FELT THAT THE CESSNA WOULD BE THROUGH OUR CTRLINE BEFORE WE WOULD BE IN CONFLICT. I ALSO BELIEVED THAT A HIGH SPD ABORT NEAR V1 AT THE SHORTEST RWY IN OUR SYS WAS FAR MORE LIKELY TO YIELD AN UNPLEASANT RESULT. I TOLD MY FO THAT THE CESSNA WAS GOING TO BE AN ISSUE. SHE PROVIDED EXCELLENT INFO BY REMAINING FOCUSED ON THE V1 AND VR CALLOUTS. AFTER ROTATION; I IMMEDIATELY TURNED L 20 DEGS BEHIND THE CESSNA AND SHALLOWED MY CLB. THE CESSNA PASSED OFF OUR R SIDE (UNSURE HOW CLOSE) AND ABOVE OUR ALT. MY FO BELIEVES THE CESSNA'S ALT TO BE APPROX 500 FT AGL. WE THEN INFORMED ATC THAT WE WERE OFF THE DEP PROC. TWR ACKNOWLEDGED AND THEN REALIZING THE SIT; ADMONISHED THE CESSNA. MY FO CALLED 'APCHING CUTBACK' AT 800 FT; AND WE CUTBACK THE PWR AT 1000 FT WHILE RETURNING TO THE DEP PROC. I HAVE BEEN CONCERNED ON PREVIOUS OCCASIONS REGARDING SNA'S PROC OF HAVING SMALLER ACFT DEPART W ACROSS THE RWY CTRLINE. PERHAPS; A NOTIFICATION FROM TWR THAT THE ACFT IS FAR ENOUGH OUT TO HURRY AND 'GET OUT OF THE WAY.' I WOULD SIMPLY CAUTION THESE PLTS THAT IT'S FAR MORE IMPORTANT AND HELPFUL TO GET IT RIGHT THAN TO GET IT FAST. AS FOR MYSELF; MY TKOF BRIEFING REGARDING RTO'S NOW INCLUDES A CAUTION TO BE READY FOR ANY OTHER REASON THAN MY COMPANY'S FOUR; LISTED REASONS FOR A HIGH SPD ABORT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.