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37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
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| Attributes | |
| ACN | 713846 |
| Time | |
| Date | 200610 |
| Local Time Of Day | 0601 To 1200 |
| Place | |
| Locale Reference | airport : tpa.airport |
| State Reference | FL |
| Environment | |
| Flight Conditions | Marginal |
| Light | Daylight |
| Aircraft 1 | |
| Controlling Facilities | tracon : tpa.tracon |
| Operator | general aviation : personal |
| Make Model Name | Super King Air 300 |
| Operating Under FAR Part | Part 91 |
| Flight Phase | descent : approach landing : missed approach |
| Person 1 | |
| Affiliation | government : faa |
| Function | controller : local |
| Qualification | controller : radar |
| Experience | controller radar : 18 |
| ASRS Report | 713846 |
| Person 2 | |
| Affiliation | other |
| Function | flight crew : single pilot |
| Events | |
| Independent Detector | other controllera |
| Resolutory Action | none taken : anomaly accepted |
| Supplementary | |
| Problem Areas | FAA |
| Primary Problem | FAA |
| Situations | |
| ATC Facility | procedure or policy : tpa.tower |
Narrative:
The management at tpa ATCT instituted a new procedure at tpa; commonly referred to as the bridge. Aircraft overfly tpa international airport at altitudes between 2100 ft and 4000 ft. The problem is; they didn't brief the entire workforce before instituting the procedure. I was working in the tower as cabin attendant coordinator; and observed a king air execute a missed approach. As I was not briefed on the new procedure; I could have easily coordinated a missed approach that would have conflicted with aircraft in the bridge. This lack of ensuring that everyone has been informed of the new work rules could have easily caused a midair collision.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: TPA CTLR EXPRESSED CONCERN REGARDING NEW ARPT OVERFLT PROC THAT WAS NOT ADEQUATELY BRIEFED PRIOR TO IMPLEMENTATION.
Narrative: THE MGMNT AT TPA ATCT INSTITUTED A NEW PROC AT TPA; COMMONLY REFERRED TO AS THE BRIDGE. ACFT OVERFLY TPA INTL ARPT AT ALTS BTWN 2100 FT AND 4000 FT. THE PROB IS; THEY DIDN'T BRIEF THE ENTIRE WORKFORCE BEFORE INSTITUTING THE PROC. I WAS WORKING IN THE TWR AS CAB COORDINATOR; AND OBSERVED A KING AIR EXECUTE A MISSED APCH. AS I WAS NOT BRIEFED ON THE NEW PROC; I COULD HAVE EASILY COORDINATED A MISSED APCH THAT WOULD HAVE CONFLICTED WITH ACFT IN THE BRIDGE. THIS LACK OF ENSURING THAT EVERYONE HAS BEEN INFORMED OF THE NEW WORK RULES COULD HAVE EASILY CAUSED A MIDAIR COLLISION.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.