|37000 Feet||Browse and search NASA's
Aviation Safety Reporting System
|Local Time Of Day||0001 To 0600|
|Locale Reference||atc facility : zau.artcc|
|Controlling Facilities||tower : zzz.tower|
|Affiliation||government : faa|
|Function||controller : radar|
controller : handoff position
|Qualification||controller : radar|
|Experience||controller limited radar : 20|
controller non radar : 21
controller radar : 19
|Independent Detector||other controllera|
|Resolutory Action||none taken : anomaly accepted|
|ATC Facility||procedure or policy : zau.artcc|
Effective mar/xb/07 the east side of ZAU was re-sectorized; concurrent with new/revised arrival and departure rtes for ord and mke. The rtes and sector revisions were implemented with little input from users or controllers; minimal training for controllers; and with no testing or modeling. As a result; numerous flaws became apparent upon activation of the changes. Among the problems noted early on mar/xb/07: 1) the ZOB/ZAU LOA was changed late on mar/xa/07; but ZAU operational personnel were not provided with the changes; which included the addition of a non-RNAV route to ord. This resulted in several aircraft being rerted or refused entry into ZAU due to ZAU personnel believing that the aircraft were on improper routing. 2) ZAU controller charts were incomplete and/or incorrect; eg; incorrect sector numbers; missing frequencys; incorrect boundaries; missing rtes. 3) ZOB moved the boundary between sectors 18 and 28 (also 19/29) without notifying ZAU. 4) numerous aircraft databases had not been updated for the new rtes. In some cases single aircraft; in other cases classes of aircraft. 5) new mke departure rtes were poorly implemented; resulting in greatly increased controller workload; and much longer rtes. 6) automation problems: some automatic-handoff parameters were incorrect. All dtw arrs on polar STAR failed to 'pass' from ZAU to ZOB. 7) poorly planned sayrs STAR: a) no published holding pattern at sayrs waypoint. B) sector boundary placement causes increased and additional coordination. C) published 'expect to cross ghost at 10000 ft' is incorrect. D) staly holding pattern too close to adjacent airspace to be useful. 8) several sectors had incomplete vscs updates; but this was quickly corrected. Many; if not most; of these issues could have been avoided by involving the workforce in the planning stages. Most of the personnel creating the rtes; etc; had no experience in the affected areas of specialization. Many of the ideas were adapted from incomplete high altitude redesign proposals created several yrs ago. In addition; although there have been no operrors at the time of this report; the increased workload and added complexity on the controllers is incredible. Many of us have noted that we have to think about every clearance: nothing is 'automatic' now; although obviously it will become that way again. In my 20+ yrs as a center controller; I have never seen a plan of anywhere near this complexity implemented without any meaningful training. We were afforded 4 1/2 hour dysim problems that were not realistic at all; due to limited traffic and incomplete procedures. We got no real-time training.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: ZAU CTLR EXPRESSED CONCERN REGARDING NEW SECTORIZATION IMPLEMENTATION AND LACK OF TRAINING AND INFO ON THE SUBJECT CHANGE.
Narrative: EFFECTIVE MAR/XB/07 THE E SIDE OF ZAU WAS RE-SECTORIZED; CONCURRENT WITH NEW/REVISED ARR AND DEP RTES FOR ORD AND MKE. THE RTES AND SECTOR REVISIONS WERE IMPLEMENTED WITH LITTLE INPUT FROM USERS OR CTLRS; MINIMAL TRAINING FOR CTLRS; AND WITH NO TESTING OR MODELING. AS A RESULT; NUMEROUS FLAWS BECAME APPARENT UPON ACTIVATION OF THE CHANGES. AMONG THE PROBS NOTED EARLY ON MAR/XB/07: 1) THE ZOB/ZAU LOA WAS CHANGED LATE ON MAR/XA/07; BUT ZAU OPERATIONAL PERSONNEL WERE NOT PROVIDED WITH THE CHANGES; WHICH INCLUDED THE ADDITION OF A NON-RNAV RTE TO ORD. THIS RESULTED IN SEVERAL ACFT BEING RERTED OR REFUSED ENTRY INTO ZAU DUE TO ZAU PERSONNEL BELIEVING THAT THE ACFT WERE ON IMPROPER ROUTING. 2) ZAU CTLR CHARTS WERE INCOMPLETE AND/OR INCORRECT; EG; INCORRECT SECTOR NUMBERS; MISSING FREQS; INCORRECT BOUNDARIES; MISSING RTES. 3) ZOB MOVED THE BOUNDARY BTWN SECTORS 18 AND 28 (ALSO 19/29) WITHOUT NOTIFYING ZAU. 4) NUMEROUS ACFT DATABASES HAD NOT BEEN UPDATED FOR THE NEW RTES. IN SOME CASES SINGLE ACFT; IN OTHER CASES CLASSES OF ACFT. 5) NEW MKE DEP RTES WERE POORLY IMPLEMENTED; RESULTING IN GREATLY INCREASED CTLR WORKLOAD; AND MUCH LONGER RTES. 6) AUTOMATION PROBS: SOME AUTO-HDOF PARAMETERS WERE INCORRECT. ALL DTW ARRS ON POLAR STAR FAILED TO 'PASS' FROM ZAU TO ZOB. 7) POORLY PLANNED SAYRS STAR: A) NO PUBLISHED HOLDING PATTERN AT SAYRS WAYPOINT. B) SECTOR BOUNDARY PLACEMENT CAUSES INCREASED AND ADDITIONAL COORD. C) PUBLISHED 'EXPECT TO CROSS GHOST AT 10000 FT' IS INCORRECT. D) STALY HOLDING PATTERN TOO CLOSE TO ADJACENT AIRSPACE TO BE USEFUL. 8) SEVERAL SECTORS HAD INCOMPLETE VSCS UPDATES; BUT THIS WAS QUICKLY CORRECTED. MANY; IF NOT MOST; OF THESE ISSUES COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED BY INVOLVING THE WORKFORCE IN THE PLANNING STAGES. MOST OF THE PERSONNEL CREATING THE RTES; ETC; HAD NO EXPERIENCE IN THE AFFECTED AREAS OF SPECIALIZATION. MANY OF THE IDEAS WERE ADAPTED FROM INCOMPLETE HIGH ALT REDESIGN PROPOSALS CREATED SEVERAL YRS AGO. IN ADDITION; ALTHOUGH THERE HAVE BEEN NO OPERRORS AT THE TIME OF THIS RPT; THE INCREASED WORKLOAD AND ADDED COMPLEXITY ON THE CTLRS IS INCREDIBLE. MANY OF US HAVE NOTED THAT WE HAVE TO THINK ABOUT EVERY CLRNC: NOTHING IS 'AUTOMATIC' NOW; ALTHOUGH OBVIOUSLY IT WILL BECOME THAT WAY AGAIN. IN MY 20+ YRS AS A CTR CTLR; I HAVE NEVER SEEN A PLAN OF ANYWHERE NEAR THIS COMPLEXITY IMPLEMENTED WITHOUT ANY MEANINGFUL TRAINING. WE WERE AFFORDED 4 1/2 HR DYSIM PROBS THAT WERE NOT REALISTIC AT ALL; DUE TO LIMITED TFC AND INCOMPLETE PROCS. WE GOT NO REAL-TIME TRAINING.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.